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FOREWORD 
The "Benefit-Cost Methodology with Example Application of the Use of 
Wind Generators" under Contract NAS 3-17827 was conducted by the Engineering 
Experiment Station (EES) at Georgia Tech in conjunction with the Schools of 
Industrial Management (IM) and Aerospace Engineering (AE). The program was 
administered under Georgia Tech Project A-1632 by the Systems Analysis Tech-
nical Area within the Systems and Techniques Department. 
This report describes the work performed during the period June 1974 
through May 1975. The program was managed by the NASA/Lewis Research Center 
Space Flight Systems Study Office and directed to be responsive in its example 
application to areas of interest to the Solar Energy Branch. The NASA Program 
Manager was Gerald F. Hem. 
The Georgia Tech Project Director was Robert P. Zimmer and the project 
team was comprised of the following key personnel: 
C. G. Justus (AE) 
R. M. Mason (EES) 
S. L. Robinette (EES) 
P. C. Sassone (IM) 
W. A. Schaffer (IM)
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Many techniques associated with cost-benefit analysis (CBA) exist in the 
literature. Which technique(s) to use in evaluating competing technological 
alternatives is not always obvious and given the appropriate technique it is 
usually not clear how to use it or even to the extent to which it can be used. 
This program emphasized the assessment of the status of cost-benefit analysis 
methodology, the compilation of cost-benefit methodology, and the application 
of cost-benefit methodology to wind power systems. 
A thorough review of literature dealing with cost-benefit methodologies 
or analyses was made; journal articles, books, and other sources were reviewed 
and cost-benefit analysis concepts were assessed. The most pertinent concepts 
are identified and explained herein and a logically consistent, explicit, yet 
flexible methodology developed for the performance of cost-benefit analyses is 
presented. A major consideration throughout the program was the desirability 
that any methodology developed as a decision tool should achieve a high level 
of acceptance among policy makers and analysts. 
The cost-benefit methodology investigation described herein deals with the 
following topics description, origin, and use of CBA; basis of CBA in value 
theory and welfare economics; survey and critique of decision criteria, structure 
of decision problems, and matching the criteria to the structure; identifying, 
classifying, and measuring costs and benefits; shadow pricing, discount rate, 
social opportunity cost of capital, incommensurables and intangibles, and social 
impact analysis; sensitivity analysis; and organizing and evaluating a cost-
benefit study.
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The example application of the cost-benefit methodology was to the use 
of wind generators. The approach adopted for the example application con-
sisted of the following activities: (1) surveying of the available wind data 
and wind power system information, (2) developing models which quantitatively 
described wind distributions, wind power systems, and cost-benefit differences 
between conventional systems and wind power systems, (3) applying the cost-
benefit methodology to compare a conventional electrical energy generation 
system with systems which included wind power generators. 
Wind speed distribution data were obtained from sites throughout the 
contigious United States and were used to compute plant factor contours 
shown on an annual and seasonal basis. Plant factor values (ratio of average 
output power to rated power) were found to be as high as 0.6 (on an annual 
average basis) in portions of the central U.S. and in sections of the New 
England coastal area. 
Analysis of tower data from several locations were used to develop 
methods for projecting observed wind parameters to a uniform height level for 
plotting of the plant factor contour map. Although the plant factor maps pre-
sented here are only for selected aerogenerator systems (for example, cut in 
speed of 3.6 m/s and rated speed of 8.0 m/s) the general method developed could 
be used to evaluate plant factors for aerogenerators with other operating 
characteristics. Results of a parametric study of effect of aerogenerator 
operating characteristics on plant factor are presented. 
Categories of wind power systems which might have significant power 
potential were identified with emphasis on possible large scale utilization. 
Alternative technologies and alternative end-uses of the system product were 
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used as two classification dimensions. Two types of wind power systems were 
selected for the application of the cost-benefit methodolgy; the first system 
was the basis for a macro analysis of a wind system which is linked into a 
utility power grid having no storage capability. The second system was used 
as a basis for a micro analysis from the viewpoint of a firm that utilizes 
an energy intensive process. The first system was considered to be used as 
a fuel saver and the second was considered to be an electricity saver resulting 
in reduced operating costs. A cost-benefit model was designed and implemented 
on the computer to establish a practical tool for studying the relative costs 
and benefits of wind power systems under a variety of conditions and to 
efficiently and effectively perform associated sensitivity analyses. 
Results associated with the first system were found to be sensitive to 
the operational strategy (the most expensive fuels replaced first or all 
fuels replaced proportionately), installation costs, plant factor, fuel-price 
increases, and discount rates. Based on both wind potential and fuel prices, 
it was found that wind systems appear to have the greatest benefits in the 
New England and mid-Atlantic regions. The study showed that even for systems 
which act only as ruel savers and do not contribute to a finu system capacity, 
aerogenerators in utility grid can be economically advantageous. 
For the second system it was shown that the results are most sensitive to 
storage efficiency, wind plant factor, and installed costs. A range of parameter 
values exist that result in a positive net present value of the project 
scenario over the status quo scenario and that there is potential for the use 
of windmill generators to produce electricity for energy intensive processes. 
The uivergence between the social discount rate and the higher internal rate of 
return demanded by firms suggests that a socially optimal use of wind power can be 
Vi
achieved only by appropriate government inducements to firms to adopt this new 
technology. 
.As a general conclusion it might be stated that the cost-benefit methodology 
described in this report can be utilized in forming a cost-benefit analysis of 
a variety of projects. Although the general methodology would apply, the 
specific models must be tailored to some extent for the particular problems 
analyzed. The utility of the methdology should be widely accepted by decision 
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In order to evaluate some technological alternatives competing for 
resources, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) often 
must use the techniques of cost-benefit analysis.* Scientists, as well as 
managers, who have little experience in cost-benefit analysis are often 
requiree to submit program requests supported or justified by a cost-benefit 
analysis. It is usually not apparent what should be included in such an 
analysis; nor is it obvious to what depth the analysis should be conducted. 
On the other hand, higher level management receives for evaluation program 
requests that are supported by cost-benefit analyses in a variety of formats 
and utilizing a variety of methodologies. It is difficult for such decision 
makers to compare the relative merits of the alternative programs. 
Many techniques associated with engineering economic analysis and social 
impact analysis , as well as technology assessment exist in the literature. 
Which technique(s) to use in evaluating competing alternatives is not always 
obvious, and given the appropriate technique, it is usually not clear how to 
use it or even the extent to which it can be used. Thus, there is a definite 
need to assess the status of benefit/cost analysis methodologies that might 
be applicable to a wide range of technological alternatives of interest to 
NASA and to provide detailed guidelines on the use of these techniques. 
Results of such an assessment would facilitate the evaluation of competing 
technological alternatives so that appropriate decisions could be realized 
with a high degree of accuracy and credibility. 
* The term "cost-benefit" is used rather than "benefit-cost" to avoid 
possible confusion with the "benefit-cost" ratio, to be discussed in 
Part II.
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Like any methodology, its worth lies in the applicability to specific 
situations or problems and generally the broader the applicability the 
greater the value of the methodology. Thus, to demonstrate the application 
of the methodology it is necessary to select a technology or problem to 
address and wind power systems was the area that NASA believed would pro-
vide a suitable framework for the demonstration of the cost-benefit 
methodology. 
Although windmills have been used more than a dozen centuries for 
grinding grain and pumping water, interest in large scale electric power 
generation has developed only over the past 50 years and is currently at 
a high level due to the recent energy crisis. Although concepts and tech-
nologies associated with wind power generation exist today, there is an 
apparent lack of economic justification for the use of wind as a source of 
energy. It is therefore highly desirable to determine the potential of 
wind power systems with emphasis on systems that supply reliable energy 
at a cost that is competitive with other energy systems. 
There are many alternative wind power systems each having its own 
relative benefits and costs compared to existing power systems. For 
example, wind power systems can be operated autonomously, in tandem, in 
conjunction with existing conventional power systems, or with other applica-
tions. However, the potential of a particular wind power system cannot 
be estimated without determining favorable regions and sites for the 
operation of such a system. Although considerable data exist on clima-
tological parameters, there is need to systematically compile and 
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analyze climatological data with the objective of determining the 
potential for wind power systems. Once the alternative wind power systems 
have been identified, appropriate data collected and analyzed, and suitable 
regions identified, then benefit-cost analyses can be made using appropriate 
benefit-cost methodologies. 
Although estimates of the potential of wind power systems might be made 
based on benefit/cost ratios, a recommendation or decision based strictly 
on benefit/cost ratios might lead to an incorrect decision if intangible factors 
associated with the economic and social impact of implementing a particular 
alternative are not considered. Qualitative as well as quantitative aspects 
of each alternative must be included in the evaluation in order to arrive 
at the true relative merits of various competing alternatives. Also, in 
evaluating the alternatives, criteria must be used that are equally applicable 
to each alternative without having inherent biases. 
In view of the above needs, the work on the program described herein 
was oriented toward answering the following questions: 
1. Can a widely accepted methodology be established to evaluate the 
relative merits of alternative projects in todays complex economic 
political-social environment? 
2. Can high level decision makers be convinced of the utility of such 
a methodology? 
3. Can wind power systems be evaluated using such a methodology? 
4. What is the potential for wind power systems from operational, 
benefit and cost, and social and political viewpoints? 
5
In view of the above questions to be answered and the various disci-
plines involved, the program consisted of three major tasks; (1) assessment 
of the status of cost-benefit analysis methdology, (2) compilation of cost-
benefit methodology, and (3) application of cost-benefit methodology to 
wind power systems. Part II of this report is an exposition of the assessment 
and compilation of cost-benefit methodology. Part III of this report is de-
voted to an application of the methodology. The technology selected for this 
demonstration is the use of wind energy. Conclusions and Recommendations are 
presented in Part IV.
6
PART II 




Extensive government expenditures characterize today's economics. 
The governments of advanced economies spend for national defense and for 
diverse social projects such as water resource development, transportation 
networks, manpower training and technology transfer and assessment. The 
members of these economies, enjoying a relatively high consumption of goods 
provided by private enterprise (food, shelter, clothing, etc.), have turned 
largely to the public sector for further want satisfaction. Not enjoying 
high standards of living, the less developed nations have determindd that a 
way to achieve prosperity quickly is to develop their "social infrastructures" 
(communication and transportation systems, pools of skilled labor, education 
and cultural facilities, etc.). The governments of these countries take the 
lead in sponsoring projects to meet these ends. Thus, for varying reasons, 
public spending is becoming increasingly more important around the world. 
And with resource scarcity becoming more severe every year, governments are 
compelled to choose wisely the projects they wish to undertake. Of a large 
number of competing projects, only a few can be chosen for implementation. 
Public projects are commonly large-scale in nature and frequently have 
irreversible consequences. The need for careful analysis is apparent. 
The process of identifying acceptable public projects has become identi-
fied with the term "cost-benfit analysis" (CBA).* The purpose of Part II, 
Section I of this report is to develop the fundamentals of CBA in terms that 
* The term "cost-benefit analysis (CBA)" is used rather than "benefit-

cost analysis" to avoid any implication of a benefit/cost ratio. 
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would be useful to the engineer-scientist as well as to engineering and 
administrative managers. Sections 2 through 7 deal with various decision 
criteria used in CBA, means of identifying the costs and benefits related 
to public projects, various means of measuring costs and benefits, special 
measurement problems, measurement techniques used in previous studies, 
sensitivity analysis as applied to CBA, and suggestions for organizing and 
performing a cost-benefit analysis. The remainder of Section 1 is devoted 
to defining cost-benefit analysis and to establishing its economic basis. 
1.2 Definition 
Among non-economists, "cost-benefit analysis" and "cost-effective 
analysis" are often erroneously considered to be "techniques" for appraising 
public projects. If CBA is to be considered "a technique," it is at best a 
loosely defined one. A "cost-effectiveness analysis" is considered to be a 
special form or subset of CBA distinguished by the difficulty with which pro-
ject benefits can be identified in terms of dollars. 
Cost-benefit analysis is defined as an estimation and evaluation of net 
benefits associated with alternatives for achieving specific public goals. The 
meaning or implications of the words in this definition will unfold throughout 
the reading of this report. 
CBA is a generic term embracing a wide range of evaluative procedures 
leading to a statement assessing costs and benefits relevant to project alter-
natives. The variety of problems addressed and the ingenuity which must be 
exercised in estimating costs and benefits make it particularly difficult if 
not impossible to design an all-purpose CBA procedure. Several general 
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principles may be stated and a number of guidelines have been established 
over the years, but public projects differ so much in character that an 
all-encompassing procedure cannot be defined. 
1.3 A Brief History 
Although evaluations of public projects have doubtless occurred through-
out histqry, the modern literature on CBA normally dates from 1844 with the 
publication of an essay "On the Measurement of the Utility of Public Works" by 
Jules Dupuit [1]. A French engineer, Dupuit opened his discussion as follows: 
Legislators have prescribed the formalities necessary 
for certain works to be declared of public utility; politi-
cal economy has not yet defined in any precise manner the 
conditions which these works must fulfill in order to be 
really useful; at least, the ideas which have been put about 
on this subject appear to us to be vague, incomplete, and 
often inaccurate [2]. 
When confronted with the task of actually producing a cost-benefit analysis, 
the analyst today feels that he faces, at least initially, the same vagueness, 
incompleteness, and inaccuracies that Dupuit experienced. 
Dupuit's most important contribution to economic literature was the idea 
of consumer's surplus [3] which he presented along with a graphical interpreta-
tion. He pointed out that the output of a project multiplied by its price 
was equal to the minimum social benefit of the project; some consumers might 
be willing to pay more than the market price and so would enjoy excess utility, 
or consumer's surplus. This idea led directly to the concept of net social 
benefit which is now basic to CBA. 
While Dupuit's work was the beginning of a stream of thought, we normally 
consider the application of CBA to have started much later, with the United 
States Flood Control Act of 1936. By this Act, the Congress declared that 
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benefits of Federal projects "to whomsoever they may accrue" should exceed 
costs. But, as observed by Dupuit much before the fact, no consistent methods 
were developed by which to examine these benefits and costs. The Corps of 
Engineers, the Soil Conservation Service, the Bureau of Reclamation, and other 
agencies all used different approaches. With such accumulation of analytic 
experience, the Federal Government has attempted to standardize its project-
appraisal procedures. 
In 1950, the Subcommittee on Benefits and Costs of the Federal Inter-
Agency River Basin Committee issued its Proposed Practices for Economic Analy-
sis of River Basin Projects [4]. Known as the "Green Book," this document 
attempted to merge the language of project appraisal and welfare economics. 
Although it never achieved official standing, it formed a base for further 
work. The document was revised in 1958. 
In 1952, the Bureau of the Budget issued its Budget Circular A-47 15] 
formally setting forth considerations which would guide the Bureau in evaluating 
proposed projects. Although criticized along with the Green Book for its emphasis 
on gains as measured by changes in Gross National Product and for its ignoring 
of income-distribution issues and of gains and losses not measured in terms of 
national income, it remained the official guide for project evaluation into the 
1960's. 
In 1962, Budget Circular A-47 was replaced by Senate Document 97, 
"Policies, Standards, and Procedures In the Formulation, Evaluation, and 
Review of Plans for Use and Development of Water and Related Land Resources'[6]. 
And after extended review, this document was replaced by "Principles and Stan-
dards for Planning Water and Related Land Resources" in 1973 [ 7 ]. "Principles 
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and Standards . . •" represents a substantial revision of Federal practices 
as established in the 1950's. For example, much more than gains and losses 
in GNP are now considered. Four accounts are used in displaying beneficial 
and adverse effects and for analyzing tradeoffs among plans: national economic 
development, environmental quality, regional development, and social well-
being. While "plans . . . will be directed to improvement in the quality of 
life through contributions to the objectives of national economic development 
and environmental quality," separate accounts are also prepared on regional 
development and social well-being [8]. 
While Federal efforts were directed toward these revisions in practice, 
a firm theoretical base was being constructed in scholarly circles. Otto 
Eckstein's Water Resources Development [9] came out of the Harvard University 
Water Program in 1958 followed by a book of case studies edited by Eckstein 
and John Krutilla [10]. At the same time Roland N. NcKean's Efficiency in 
Government through Systems Analysis [11] appeared from RAND. These books were 
quickly followed by others in public expenditure analysis by such scholars as 
Jack Hirshleifer, J. C. DeHaven, and Jerome W. Milliman, Charles J. Hitch 
and Roland N. McKean, Arthur Maass, and Robert Dorfman [12]. 
In addition to these major critical works, numerous other studies have 
appeared in almost every field of public expenditure. Several excellent tests 
are now available on cost-benefit analysis including those by E. J. Mishan, 
Ajit K. Dasgupta and D. W. Pearce, and Leonard Merewitz and Stephen H. Sosnick 
[13]. 
1.4 The Economic Basis of Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Economics is a social science dealing, with human behavior. Conse-
quently, economics is far less precise than the physical sciences, but 
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perhaps slightly more precise than sister social sciences. Paul 
Samuelson has defined economics as "the study of how men and society end 
up choosing, with or without the use of money, to employ scarce productive 
resources that could have alternative uses, to produce various commodities 
and distribute them for consumption, now or in the future, among various 
people and groups in society. It analyzes the costs and benefits of im-
proving patterns of resource allocation [li]. 
The field of economics may be partitioned into positive and normative 
areas. Positive economics describes, explains, and predicts actual economic 
phenomena and is devoid of value judgement. It says nothing about whether 
given economic states of affairs are good or bad. Normative economics, on 
the other hand, explicitly introduces value judgements, or norms. Its 
purpose is to assess the relative desirability of different economic states, 
or conditions. Abstractly at least, it follows a well-accepted two-step 
paradigm: first, the stipulation of one or several criteria by which to 
judge states and, second, analyses of the states according to the criteria. 
Since the decision to implement a public project leads to a change from one 
economic state to another, and since our desire is certainly to determine 
which state is "better" (a value judgement), CBA falls directly into the 
province of normative economics. 
The term "normative" is not in common use among economists. Rather, 
its synonym, "welfare," is the usual term. The reader has doubtless run across 
allusions to welfare conomics. As happens all too often, the same word has 
achieved a connotation in the vernacular different from its meaning in economics. 
The common misunderstanding is to equate welfare economics with so-called 
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government welfare programs, such as the school lunch program or food stamps. 
Welfare programs are those which, in some manner, transfer real income from 
the well-to-do to the less-well-to-do members of society. Welfare economics 
is used to analyze such programs, but welfare economics does not espouse 
such programs. Welfare economics is politically neutral; it is not an 
apology for political liberalism, and in itself espouses nothing. As a 
method of analysis (the two-step paradigm mentioned above), it is merely a 
tool in the hands of the practitioner. If the reader feels that CBA, being re-
lated to welfare economics, is somehow politically biased to the left, he 
should know that one of the most common criticisms of CBA is that it ignores 
income redistribution. That is, the "whomsoever" receiving the benefits of 
a public project often turns out to be the well-to-do, while the costs often 
accrue to the less well-to-do, A good CBA will circumvent this pitfall, but 
if there's any bias at all, it's probably counter to espousing welfare pro-
grams. In brief, welfare economics, a neutral analytic method, provides the 
theoretical basis for CBA. Thus, it is sometimes said that CBA is simply 
applied welfare economics. 
If making value judgements about the desirability of economic states 
is the thrust of welfare economics, its cutting edge is the decision criterion 
adopted. A welfare economic analysis has merit only insofar as the criterion 
meets general acceptance. For example, the authors of this manual might 
suggest the following criterion: economic state one is better for society 
than economic state two if the authors get more income in one than in two. 
Economic analysis of alternative states based on this criterion is likely to 
achieve little general acceptance for the simple reason that the criterion 
ignores the preferences of the other members of society. At least in Western 
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society, a guiding rule in formulating criteria is that each individual's 
preferences must (somehow) count in the evaluation of alternative economic 
states. This rule has given rise to four popular criteria; which may be 
labelled unanimity, Pareto superiority, majority rule, and potential Pareto 
superiority. 
Unanimity. Economic state one is to be judged socially superior to 
economic state two if each member of society* individually judges one superior 
to two. 
This criterion provokes virtually no dissent. Who can argue that it is 
not ethical or moral or just? Unfortunately, the criterion is useless. In 
real life, one will never find a substantive policy issue--a policy which 
moves the economy from one state to another--on which unanimous agreement 
can be elicited. In the absence of unanimous agreement, this criterion gives 
no guidance as to which state is socially better. Thus it has no value as a 
guide to policy making. 
Pareto superiority. Economic state one is to be judged socially superior 
to economic state two if at least one person individually judges one superior 
to two, and no one judges two superior to one. (Vilf redo Pareto was a 
European social scientist writing around the beginning of this century. This 
criterion is based on his work.) 
This criterion amounts to a slight weakening of the previous one. It 
amounts to allowing indifference by some individuals in choosing between two 
states not to affect what is otherwise unanimity. In other words, state one 
is socially superior to state two if one or more persons prefer one to two and 
* In practice, the definition of society used in a cost-benefit analysis 
depends on the particular alternative projects under analysis and may be 
considered on a local level (e.g., a firm or town) or on a macroscopic 
level, the level used in these discussions. 
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everyone else is indifferent. If only one person prefers two to one, the 
criterion breaks down. It then says nothing about which state Is socially 
preferable. While economists have long favored this criterion In theoretical 
discussions, it should be obvious to the reader that it is a useless policy 
guide since it will never be applicable. In a real policy choice betwen two 
states, preferences on both sides of the issue are bound to exist. 
Majority Rule. Economic state one is to be judged socially superior 
to economic state two if the majority of the members of society prefer two 
to one. 
The democratic flavor of this criterion suggests that it might be 
widely acceptable. In fact, of course, it is not employed. Although, we 
may vote for our representatives in government, we do not usually vote 
directly on policy issues (local referenda would be the exception). Our 
representatives (those elected or those responsible to elected officials) 
generally make the policy decisions. Why is this the case? On one level, the 
answer is simply that this is what government constitutions provide for. On 
another level, the better answer would be that one could not expect voters 
to be completely knowledgeable about the hundreds of issues which arise every 
year. Thus, a policy decision based directly on voting may not be a well-
informed decision. 
Potential Pareto superiority. Economic state one is to be judged socially 
superior to economic state two if those who gain by the choice of one over 
two could compensate those who lose, so that if compensation were paid, the 
final result would be that no one would be worse off in state one than he 
would be in state two.
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This criterion is more complicated than the previous ones. An example 
will serve to clarify it. Suppose only two persons, A and B, are affected 
one way or the other by the movement of the economy from the status quo to 
either state one or two. If the change is to state one, A gains $20 and B 
loses $10. If the change is to state two, B gains $5 and A loses nothing. 

















According to this criterion, state one is socially superior to state two 
because A can give B an amount of money between $15 and $20, say $16, so 
that both end up better off than in state two. In this case, A would end 
up with $4 (after giving B $16 of the $20 he gets in state one) and B ends 
up with a net gain of $6 (after subtracting B's $10 loss in state one from 
his $16 transfer from A). This net potential result is shown in the last 
column of the above table. Since no one is worse off than he would be in 
state two, state one is socially superior to state two by the Potential Pareto 
Criterion. Note that if the movement were from the status quo to state 
two, there is no compensation which B could pay A to make them both no worse 
off than in state one. Thus, the criterion would state, as we would hope, 
that state two is not socially superior to state one. 
The great advantage that this criterion has over the first two criteria 
is that it is always applicable. It is always the case that the Potential 
Pareto Criterion, in comparing any two states, will find one superior to the 
other, or will find them equal (equality would have occurred in the example 
18
if B's gain from state two were +10 ijistead of +5, making the after-
compensation result of choosing either state identical to the other state). 
A disadvantage of this criterion is that It does not command the 
universal acceptance that the first two criteria are accorded. This is be-
cause the superiority of one state over another is based on a potential, 
rather than actual, compensation of the losers by the gainers. The criterion 
does not demand that the compensation actually be padi, only that it is 
possible that suitable compensation exists to leave no one worse off. There 
are two defenses for this argument with neither being completely convincing. 
First, the progressive tax structure tends to force compensation from gainers 
to losers. Second, when a large number of policy decisions are made, losers 
from one policy will be gainers from another, i.e.. differences tend to wash 
out. Empirical evidence in support of these contentions has never been 
presented, and probably never will be. 
The Potential Pareto Criterion forms the basis for the quantitative 
part of CBA. As will be discussed at length later, the qualitative aspects 
of CBA are attempts to circumvent the lack of universal acceptance of the 
criterion. 
Looking back at the table, the reader will appreciate how the Potential 
Pareto Criterion translates directly into CBA. CBA attempts to ascertain 
the net benefit (total benefit less total cost) of a policy or project. 
The net additional benefit of state one is +10, while the net additional 
benefit of state two is +5 (20 less 10, and 5 less 0, respectively). A little 
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reflection on the analysis accompanying the example will lead to the appre-
ciation that the difference of $5 in net benefits of state one over state two 
was the critical factor in the Potential Pareto Criterion's choice of state 
one over state two. 
In review, cost-benefit analysis is applied welfare economics. Resulting 
value judgements are based on the Potential Pareto Criterion. In effect, this 
criterion amounts to choosing the state with the greatest net benefits. Since 
the Potential Pareto Criterion is not universally accepted as the one and only 
welfare norm, CBAt5 quantitative aspects must be supplemented by qualitative 
analysis designed to ferret Out any socially unacceptable implications the 
application of the criterion might entail in any specific circumstance. 
1.5 Summary 
A cost-benefit analysis identifies and evaluates net benefits associated 
with alternatives for achieving defined public goals. Techniques used in 
identifying and comparing cost and benefits are almost as numerous as existing 
analyses. Nevertheless, some principles and guidelines can be stated. 
As applied welfare economics, cost-benefit analysis uses a decision 
criterion identified as the Potential Pareto Superiority criterion which labels 
a project as superior if those who gain from the project could compensate those 
who lose so that none would be worse off with the project. This criterion 
identifies net benefits to whomsoever they might accrue and forms the basis 
for a more detailed review of decision critetia in the following section. 
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THE STRUCTURE OF DECISION PROBLEMS 
AND THE CHOICE OF CRITERIA 
2.1 Introduction 
A sound public decision based on a cost-benefit analysis requires that 
the analysis be formulated with the appropriate decision criterion in mind. 
This section is a survey of the criteria which might be used in making deci-
sions and structuring decision problems. 
2.2 A Survey of Decision Criteria 
Many criteria have been suggested as appropriate for evaluating alter-
native investment projects. Some, such as benefit-cost ratios, have a long 
history of use in cost-benefit analysis and some, such as cut-off and pay-
back periods, have been employed only occasionally in public expenditure 
evaluations. One, however, is considered appropriate for many applications: 
net present value. A brief critical review of these criteria will be pre-
sented beginning with the one recommended for most applications. 
2.2.1 Net Present Value 
The net present value (NPV) method reduces a stream of costs 
and benefits to a single number in which costs or benefits which are pro-
jected to occur in the future are "discounted." For example, if a project 
is expected to yield a benefit worth $100 next year, we might value that $100 
next year, as $95 today. There are several reasons for discounting and a 
number of competing arguments as to how the discount rate ought to be deter-
mined. These are discussed elsewhere in this work. The formula is 
B -C	 B -C 
NPV = -C + B
1 - C1 +
	 + n
	 n = n t	 t 
°	 (l+d)1	 (l+d)n	 (l+d)t 
t=o 
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where C is the dollar value of costs incurred at time t, 
Bt is the dollar value of benefits incurred at time t, 
c is the discount rate, and 
n Is the life of the project, in years. 
The principal problems associated with using the NPV method are the deter-
mination of the appropriate discount rate and the fact that NPV does not 
discriminate magnitudes of benefits and costs. However, as we shall see, 
the consideration of a range of reasonable values is often sufficient in a 
CBA.
2.2.2 Cut-Off Period 
Here, a specific time in the future Is chosen. A project is 
acceptable only If it will cover all its costs by that time. Clearly, this 
method discriminates against projects whose benefits occur some time after 
the date of inception, even if these benefits are quite substantial. While 
this method might have Its place in a firm's profit calculus, especially in 
risky ventures, it appears to be unsuitable for the evaluation of public 
projects. 
2.2.3 Pay-Back Period 
According to this criterion, that project which recovers its 
costs in the shortest period of time is considered best. Its myopia is 
easily demonstrated. Consider the following comparison of projects A and B: 
C	 B -C	 B -C Project	 o	 1	 1	 2	 2 
A	 100	 110	 1 
B	 100	 0	 1000 
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Both A and B involve an initial outlay of 100 and both last two years. 
Since A returns 110 while B returns nothing after one year, A is judged 
superior to B. However, considering the second year payoffs, the "pay-back 
period" criterion appears somewhat faulty. 
2.3.4 Net Average Rate of Return 
The net average rate of return (NAR.R) is defined as the sum 
of the net benefits over the life of the project divided by the number of 
years over which such benefits are incurred. While overtly reasonable, it 
has its shortcomings. They are illustrated below: 
Project	 C0	 B1 - C1	 B2 - C2	 NARR 
A	 100	 115	
-	 115 
B	 100	 114	 114	 114 
Project A lasts one year while B lasts two years. Using the definition given 
above, the net average rate of return for each project is easily computed. 
These are presented in the last column of the table. Note that while the 
criterion chooses A over B, B is superior. The problem, of 
course, is that NARR does not adequately consider the length of a project's 
life. Put in another way, NARR implicitly assumes that any project can be 
done n times and will result in an n-fold increase in the original net bene-
fits. This assumption is usually unwarranted in the public sector. 
2.2.5 Internal Rate of Return 
The internal rate of return (IRR) is a measure popularized by 
John Maynard Keynes and has received a good deal of attention. The IRR 
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of a project is defined to be that rate of discounting the future that 
equates the initial cost and the sum of the future discounted net benefits. 
That is, the IRR is some r such that 
B -C	 B -C	 B -C 
= 1	 1	 t	 t +...+ n	 n 
(1 + r) 1	 (1 + r)t	 (1 + r)n 
Alternatively, it is that rate r which would make the NPV of the project 
equal to zero. A project exceeding some predetermined level (the social 
discount rate) is deemed acceptable. The problem encountered with this 
criterion is 
the r which solves the above equation is not necessarily 
unique. Since the equation Is of degree n, it has n roots. 
Thus, if the social discount rate is 5%, and roots 3% and 7% 
are calculated, the interpretation of the IRR is not at all 
clear. 
Multiple solutions for the IRR occur when there is more than 
one change of sign in the flow of funds. To prevent this 
occurrence a conversion to a single change of sign may be 
performed using the various interest factors and some pre-
specified rate of interest. However, this transformation 
results in ambiguity with respect to the solved value of 
the IRR and the prespecified discount rate mentioned above. 
2.2.6 Annual Value 
This criterion is formally equivalent to the NPV method. Essen-
tially, it transforms a generally fluctuating actual time stream of net 
benefits into an NPV-equivalent constant stream. That is, let the actual 
time stream of net benefits (NB = B. - C 1) be 
NB09 NB19 ..., NBt, ..., NB n 
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t=o	 (1 + d) 
Then the annual value, A, is such that 
n	 n NB A	 = t 
t=°	 (1 + d ) t	 t=o ( + d)t 
In other words, if A were received every year for n years, the NPV would be 
the same as when the variable NB t is received in each of the n years. 
2.2.7 Benefit-Cost Ratio 
The benefit-cost ratio (B/C) is normally defined in terms of dis-




t=o (1 + d)t 
While this has been a traditionally popular criterion, it has a flaw 
when being used to compare two or more projects. Specifically, the benefit-
cost ratio gives the (discounted) benefits per dollar of (discounted) cost. 
Thus the smaller of two projects may have a higher B/C, yet yield a smaller 
total net benefit. An example will clarify this. Two projects, x and y, 
are being considered for adoption, but only one can be chosen. Each has a 
life span of 1 year. Let the discount rate, d, be 5%. The values required 
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for comparing these two projects are as follows: 
Project	 B	 C	 B1	 C1 
x	 0	 1	 2	 0	 1.9	 0.9 
y	 0	 5	 8	 0	 1.5	 2.6 
As can be seen, x is judged superior to y on the B/C criterion, while 
the situation is reversed by NPV. 
Another difficulty in using B/C is its sensitivity to the defini-
tion of benefits and the definition of costs. While it would seem that 
a positive benefit should be identical to a negative cost (of the same 
magnitude), it clearly makes a difference in the calculation of a ratio 
whether a sum-is added to the numerator or subtracted from the denominator. 
An application where this difficulty is likely to surface is in the assess-
ment of external effects, e.g., pollution. Is a reduction of pollution a 
positive benefit to society or a reduction in cost? 
The benfit-cost ratio should be used as a ranking technique when 
several independent projects are to be chosen, and there is a given 
capital constraint. It is then appropriate to rank the projects by 
their respective benefit-cost ratios, implementing successively lower 
projects until the capital budget is exhausted or until the B/c of the 
marginal project reaches unity. To see the logic of this approach, con-
sider the following example. There are seven possible projects, A through C. 
Each has a lifespan of one year, and each incurs only initial costs (i.e.. 
no operating costs). Assume a discount rate of 5%, and a capital budget 
28
of 5. The relevant information is summarized below: 
Project c0 B1 NPV B/C 
A 5 10.5 5 2 
B 1 3.15 2 3 
C 1 4.20 3 4 
D 1 2.63 1.5 2.5 
E 1 3.15 2 3 
F 1 2.63 1.5 2.5 
G 1 3.15 2 3
NPV and B/C are calculated for each project using their respective formulae 
as presented above. Based on this information, the projects may be ranked 










B, E, G 
D, F 
A 
Projects are ranked top to bottom for each criterion--those on the same 
level are equal according to the criterion. Looking first at the NPV 
ranking, the budget of 5 dictates that only the top-ranked project, A, could 
be implemented since A exhausts the capital budget. The net benefits accruing 
29 
to society from A are given by A's NPV, which is 5. Turning to the B/C 
ranking, projects C, B, E, B, and D or F, all of which are smaller, would 
be implemented. These exhaust the capital budget and the sum of their 
NPV's is 10.5. Thus we see that in order to maximize the total (or sum of) 
NPV over several independent projects, subject to a capital constraint, 
the rule is to adopt projects based on the B/C ranking. 
2.2.8 Minimum Average Unit Cost 
This criterion addresses the scale question. It purports that 
the optimum scale of a project is that scale which minimizes average cost. 
The criterion is unequivocally incorrect for the simple reason that by 
focusing exclusively on costs it takes no account of benefits. In fact, the 
proper scale criterion is to set the scale so that marginal cost equals 
marginal benefit. This criterion and its relation to the minimum average 
cost criterion are illustrated graphically in Figure 2.1. It is assumed 
that scale is a continuous variable. The upper graph depicts total cost 
and total benefit as functions of scale; the lower graph presents corre-
sponding marginal cost and benefit and average unit cost. 
Looking first at the "total" graph, minimum average unit cost occurs 
at S. (Graphically, the average unit cost at any point on a curve is 
the slope from the origin to that point. The segment OA represents the 
minimum average unit: cost in this case.) However, the net benefits (TB-TC) 
are not a maximum at S, but rather at S* which is reflected by the inter-
section of MB and MV at S*. This is a graphic portrayal of the fact that 
the first derivative of net benefits must be equated to zero to maximize 



























Figure 2.1	 Illustration of minimum average cost criterion. 
(Note: MARGINAL FUNCTIONS ARE FIRST DERIVATIVES OF THE CORRES-
PONDING COST AND BENEFIT FUNCTIONS.) 
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2.2.9 Equity 
This criterion addresses the impact of the benefits and costs 
of a project on the individual members (or groups or classes) of society. 
On the most abstract level, the equity issue can never be adequately resolved 
by economic reasoning because at its foundation is the moral or ethical issue 
of how to compare the relative importance (or value) of different persons. 
Is "social welfare" unchanged if we take $100 from one person and give it to 
another? The answer might be that it depends on the individuals--their in-
comes, their wealth, their expenses, etc. No rule can be developed which 
adequately covers every circumstance. However, economists are in virtual 
accord that a project which benefits only the rich and costs only the poor 
should be judged inferior to the converse situation. Of course, almost any 
project will benefit some rich and poor alike and cost some rich and poor 
alike. Thus, the above criterion hardly provides a complete equity-decision 
criterion. 
With regard to the equity issue, then, the way to proceed is not to 
incorporate a formal "equity function" into the NPV maximand (since any such 
function is highly arbitrary). Rather, any cost-benefit analysis should 
include a separate, detailed statement as to how the costs and benefits of 
the project will be distributed among the members of society. In the final 
analysis, the decision maker must subjectively weigh the NPV of a project 
against any adverse equity consequences. Such subjective weighing will 
necessarily reflect the decision maker's own ethical standards, and possibly 
political realities as well.
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The argument is made by many economists that mildly adverse equity 
consequences should not necessarily preclude the acceptance of a project 
because diverse projects are probably being undertaken by a variety of 
government agencies at any given time. Distributional (equity) consequences 
are thus likely to be self-canceling. (It should be noted that there is 
no empirical substantiation for this argument.) 
Another argument in support of the contention that mildly adverse 
equity consequences not preclude a project is that there are far better 
means of achieving a given distribution of benefits and costs among society 
than by choosing public projects to that end. Adjustment of income tax 
rates is a far more flexible and accurate tool. Thus, in principle, an 
identifiable group of individuals who are repeatedly hurt by public projects 
could be compensated by more favorable tax treatment. However, there is 
no assurance that this would actually occur. 
2.3 The Structure of Decision Problems 
2.3.1 Alternative Decision Forms 
Once a social objective and the alternative means (projects) by 
which it might be achieved are precisely and explicitly defined (no mean 
task), it will be found that the structure of the decision problem takes 
one of three mutually exclusive forms. These are: 
1) one project Is to be accepted or rejected; 
2) one of several candidate projects is to be accepted; 
3) several of many candidate projects are to be accepted. 
The first two forms are relatively simple and require little discussion. 
But for the last form, it is important to determine whether the projects 
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are independent or dependent and whether there is an effective capital 
constraint limiting the sum of initial expenditures on the group of 
selected projects. 
2.3.2 Project Interdependence 
The independent-dependent issue demands some clarifications. 
A project is independent of other projects if the net present value (NPV) 
of that orolect is invariant with res pect to whether or not any of the 
other projects are implemented and with respect to the scale of those 
projects. Projects are independent of each other so long as the above 
criterion is satisfied for each project. This definition implies that the 
NPV of a project is unambiguously given by a scalar number (not by condi-
tional relations) and the NPV of any subgroup of projects is simply the 
sum of the NPV scalars of each of those projects if the projects are inde-
pendent. A project is dependent on other projects if the above underscored 
criterion is not satisfied. 
By way of example, suppose public beaches are being considered for 
development along a stretch of coastline. The stretch is 60 miles long, 
and 6 million persons live evenly distributed along its entire length. 
There are three possible sites (A, B, C) for the beaches (the 10, 30 and 
50 mile points along its expanse), and 0, 1, 2 or 3 sites are to be developed 
as beaches. The NPV of a beach is $50 to an individual if he doesn't have 
to travel to reach it. Travelling reduces its value by $1 per mile. Thus, 
an individual values a beach & miles away at $42. The same individual values 
a beach 50 miles away at 0 since he'd never use it. Each site, if developed, 
will be equal in every way. The cost of development is $50 million per site. 
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The question addressed by the cost-benefit analysis is which site(s) to 
develop, If any. 
Let us now determine the benefits associated with a beach at Site A. 
All persons west of A will use that beach; the net present value for those 
individuals is $45 million (average benefit of $45 per person times number 
of persons). All persons east of Site A will not necessarily use that 
facility. If Site B is developed, only persons west of the 20-mile point 
will use A; B is closer for all others. If only C and A are developed, 
persons living west of Site B will use A. Therefore, the benefits associated 
with A are not invariant with respect to whether or not the other projects 
are implemented. The calculations for A must be presented in tabular form. 
Benefits cannot be expressed unambiguously by a single scalar. Such a table 
may take the form shown in Table 2.1. 
By continuing the example, another crucial point can be illustrated. 
When projects are dependent, the only proper way to proceed is to form all 
possible (or economically feasible if there is an effective capital con-
straint) combinations of projects, and to evaluate the NPV of each combina-
tion. For this example, there are 7 possible combinations. The relevant 
decision table is shown in Table 2.2 Note that the dependence of the pro-
jects is clearly apparent in the table. The NPV of any combination of 
projects is not equal to the sum of NPV for the individual projects. 
2.3.3 Capital Constraints 
One point frequently omitted from superficial discussions of 
public expenditures is the relative scarcity of funds. This is especially 
true of situations in which positive decisions are based on a benefit-cost 
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TABLE 2.1 
BENEFITS ASSOCIATED WITH SITE A

IN HYPOTHETICAL BEACH DEVELOPMENT 
Site(s) Developed	 Benefits from A 
A Alone $170 Million 
A and B $ 90 Million 
A and C $125 Million 
A, B, and C $ 90 Million
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TABLE 2.2 
CALCULATION OF NET BENEFITS ASSOCIATED WITH ALTERNATIVE 








None $	 0 $	 0 $	 0 
A $170M $ 50M $120M 
B $240M $ 50M $190M 
C $170M $ 50M $120M 
A,B $255 M $100 M $155 M 
A,C $250 N $100 N $155 M 
A,B,C $270 N $150 M $120 N
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ratio (B/c) greater than one. But, whether implicit or explicit, capital 
constraints always exist and this decision criterion is of very limited 
value. * 
2.3.4 A Formal Decision Tree 
We are now prepared to present the formal decision tree'-matching 
each problem structure with the appropriate decision criterion. This tree 
is presented in Figure 2.2 
To illustrate use of the tree, consider the beach development example 
which involved the choice of a few projects; they were clearly dependent, 
and there was no capital constraint. Each possible combination was listed; 
the one with maximum NPV was chosen. Had there been a capital constraint of, 
say, $100M, the set (A, B, C) would have been excluded from the feasible 
set. In this case, the final choice would not have been altered. It is not 
difficult to envision circumstances where the imposition of a financial 
constraint would alter the project choice. 
* In fact, the usefulness of an acceptance criterion of B/C greater than 
one is so small that the term (benefit/cost analysis) is not commonly 





Decision	 dependence	 Constraint	 Criterion 







CONSTRAINT	 BY B/C > 1 
PENDENT
NO CAPITAL	 RANK 
CONSTRAINT	 BY NPV > 0 
CAPITAL	 FIND FEASIBLE 
CONSTRAINT	 SETS MAXIMIZE NPV 
NDFNT
NO CAPITAL	 FIND POSSIBLE 
CONSTRAINT	 SETS MAXIMIZE NW 
Figure 2.2 A Formal Decision Tree. 
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NOTES 
1. The criteria surveyed are so coon that no references are cited in 
this section. For further reading see texts listed in note 13, 
Section 1. 
2. The usefulness of an acceptance criterion of B/c greater than one 
is so small that the term "benefit-cost analysis" is not commonly 




IDENTIFYING COSTS AND BENEFITS 
3.1 The Identification Problem 
Once the problem structure has been defined, the next major step in 
performing a cost-benefit analysis is properly identifying costs and 
benefits. The choice of a decision criterion is simple since it is 
normally dictated by the problem structure. Sensitivity analysis becomes 
relatively easy once the researcher has a clear grasp of the procedures 
involved, and such questions as the choice of a proper discount rate are 
often resolved by a political decree. But identifying the detailed cate-
gories of costs and benefits in the course of a study is a major task which 
demands clear thought and careful planning. 
The major stumbling block in identifying costs and benefits is the 
double-counting problem. Much of the criticism levied against early CBA's 
and much of the nontechnical controversy in the literature has concerned 
the counting of benefits more than once, usually in an attempt to cover all 
possible objectives for a project. 
In assessing the benefits and costs of a project, benefits and costs 
may be classified in several ways and classification schemes can be both 
useful and harmful. They are harmful in that various categories overlap 
with others and may frequently lead to confusion and double counting. On 
the other hand, they are useful in that classification Is an aid to iden-
tifying effects, and knowledge of the various classification schemes can 
eliminate such problems as double-counting. One obvious example of a 
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scheme is that of "benefit and costs" which divides the effects of a 
project into positive effects (benefits) and negative ones (costs). 
This section deals with the various classifications of benefits and 
costs which appear in the literature and is concluded with some general 
remarks on developing scenarios for CBA. Throughout the section it is 
important to realize that although it may be desirable to place a benefit 
in one category or another, the important thing is that benefits (costs) 
be additions (deletions) to the real product of an economy. 
3.2 Classification Schemes 
3.2.1 Internal vs. External Effects 
Internal benefits accrue directly or indirectly to the entity 
under study. In the simplest case, the benefits returned by a private 
investment would be the revenues produced. For social Investment, internal 
benefits might properly be construed as those increases in values produced 
directly by the project itself as well as secondary increases in welfare 
occurring In other parts of the social entity. The domain of a project is 
commonly restricted to the project itself, and internal benefits are those 
which are "captured" by the project. 
External effects are much more complex in definition. External bene-
fits "escape" the project and fall into the hands of others. Although these 
benefits may be valued, they cannot be priced. The quantity of external 
effects may vary with the size of the decision unit. For example, a private 
hydroelectric dam may render flood control benefits to outsiders living 
downstream; these are external benefits. But a dam constructed by the Corps 
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of Engineers on behalf of the United States may render flood control benefits 
to citizens of the United States. To avoid undue controversy, externalities 
should be defined with reference to the project itself and the proper 
definitional question should be whether or not the benefits can be captured, 
priced, and sold by the project entity. 
External benefits may thus be defined as benefits involuntarily received 
by others for which they pay nothing. External costs are similarly defined 
as costs imposed on others without compensation. Collectively, these ex-
ternal effects are often called externalities. They are neither deliberately 
produced nor deliberately consumed. 
Externalities may be classified as either technological or pecuniary [1]. 
Technological externalities involve changes in real consumption or produc-
tion opportunities for outsiders. Thus increased recreational opportunities 
and flood controls associated with a private hydroelectric dam are techno-
logical externalities. These externalities represent increased social wel-
fare, cannot easily be priced, and are produced incidental to the purpose 
of the dam. Most frequently, technological externalities result from 
joint products. 
Pecuniary externalities are associated with the financial effects of 
the project on others, as felt through price changes for outputs or inputs. 
Thus decreases in the price of a product itself, increases in the price of 
a complement, decreases in the price of a substitute, decreases in the price 
of a joint product, or increases in the price of a resource used in produc-
tion are all pecuniary externalities. 
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Technological externalities clearly should be accounted for in a cost-
benefit analysis--they are real and they increase or decrease social welfare. 
Pecuniary externalities should normally be excluded: they most likely 
represent redistribution of income and their inclusion would represent 
double counting. For example, a rapid-transit station may increase the 
mobility of a nearby resident, yielding to him great time-savings. The 
value of his time saving is real and should be counted; the increased value 
of his house is pecuniary and should not be counted since it is derived 
from the real time-saving gain. 
3.2.2 Incominensurables and Intangibles 
Inconunensurables are effects which "cannot readily be translated 
into the common denominator or denominators that are being used" [ 2 ]. Intan-
gibles are incotuniensurables which are not measurable in even their own 
terms. 
Use of the term "incommensurable" has been questioned by Dasgupta and 
Pierce, who point out that "logically, there can be no such things as an 
'incommensurable' good. By definition of the concept of a shadow price* 
every outcome has a social opportunity cost, and hence a shadow price" [3]. 
These authors prefer the term "intangible" as descriptive of effects 
in which there is no market, or in which there is reason to suppose that 
existing markets do not value an effect completely" [4]. 
The distinction between incommensurables and intangibles is important. 
Although incommensurables might technically not exist if "cannot readily 
be translated" is emphasized in the definition, the set of effects to which 
the shadow pricing question applies has been isolated. The real problem 
* A full discussion of shadow price is given in Section 4. 
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in CBA is developing adequate measures for this category of effects. 
"Intangible" can be reserved for the really unmeasurable effects. 
A useful distinction of these "extrainarket" effects might be between 
"those of a material or economic nature and those involving values beyond 
the economic. Thus the provision of recreation facilities is obviously 
economic in nature in that additional commodities or services are made 
available to the public; it is ... [incommensurable] solely because of 
difficulties of measurement which are not, as a matter of fact, completely 
intractable. The preservation of human life or of democratic processes, 
on the other hand, brings into account values beyond the economic" [5]. 
With these remarks in mind, we prefer to use the term "incommensurable" to 
refer to all extramarket effects, reserving "intangible" to describe quali-
tative terms which are non-economic in nature. 
The analyst may be tempted to ignore incommensurables in an effort 
to compile a single dollar-value number for net benefits or a single 
benefit-cost ratio. This could very well be a mistake, for the effects of 
incommensurables could be just as important as others. When a decision 
maker chooses between alternatives, he implicitly values the incommensura-
bles; the analyst simply faces the problem of having no generally accepted 
procedure for quantitatively integrating these terms into his analysis and 
of presenting an analysis with marred neatness. 
An example might be seen in comparing two projects for orbiting manned 
spaceships. One is more expensive in dollars but includes multiple backup 
and recovery systems which minimize possible loss of life while the 
other is less expensive in dollars but has a higher probability associated 
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with loss of life. These alternatives cannot readily be expressed in 
common terms yet both must be considered by the decision maker. 
Other examples of incommensurables include human life, air pollution, 
noise, national defense, scenic or historic sites, public recreation facili-
ties, public transportation benefits, prestige, social institutions, redis-
tribution of production or consumption (net of efficiency), etc. 
Incommensurables can be treated in cost-benefit studies in several 
ways. Although considered more thoroughly in the discussion of shadow 
pricing, several alternatives deserve mention. One approach is simply to 
ignore the values of incommensurables, but this approach is obviously 
hazardous, and incorrect. The decision maker has a very inadequate notion of 
alternatives and, in fact, must know the values of effects not counted to 
know the importance of values included. At the very least, the analyst 
should list or describe all effects which are not quantitatively 
evaluated in his analysis. Another approach may be to identify effects 
in terms of physical (or other) units. If the number of measures is small 
enough, the decision maker may then have adequate information to properly 
weigh alternatives. This approach may also be sufficient to suggest an 
alternative valuation scheme to the analyst. 
In the case of public goods for which shadow prices cannot be constructed, 
the cost-benefit analysis may become a cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA), 
which, in essence, is a CBA with benefits not defined in the same terms as 
costs. Thus the objective may be maximizing physical benefits subject 
to a cost constraint, or it may be minimizing costs for a given level 
of physical benefits, or, in the case of an intangible, for a given benefit. 
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For example, consider the provision of equal access to public facilities 
for all citizens, including the handicapped and aged. "Equality of 
access" is an intangible benefit which cannot be quantified. The CBA, or 
CEA, would then compare alternatives for achieving this goal. 
The value of an incommensurable may also be estimated in terms of 
alternatives. For example, consider that alternative A is associated with 
considerable inconimensurables while B is not. Alternative A might be a 
domed stadium to house numerous major-league activities lending substantial 
prestige to a city while B might be park and recreation facilities estimated 
to yield equivalent recreational benefits to city residents. For the 
city to prefer the stadium to the parks It must value the prestige at 
least as much as the difference in the costs of the two projects. By 
casting a decision to build or not to build a stadium in terms of alterna-
tives, the analyst permits the decision maker to see the values which must 
be placed on incounnensurables for a positive decision. 
Shadow prices may be assigned in several ways. Values of similar goods 
in private markets, the results of consumer surveys, prices Implicit in 
historic governmental decisions, etc., may be used as proxies for a market 
price for Inconmmensurables. These problems are discussed in detail In 
Appendix D. 
The important point is that incommensurables should be displayed and 
discussed. Even if valued, they might best be considered separately to 
emphasize their non-market nature.
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3.2.3 Direct vs. Indirect Effects 
A direct benefit of a project is defined as an increased 
real value of output associated with the project. The most common direct 
benefit would be greater physical production such as more grain from an irri-
gation project, more power from a hydroelectric dam, etc. Direct benefits 
may also arise from changes in quality (e.g,, development of a higher grade 
turkey), in temporal value (e.g., from storage facilities), in spatial 
value (e.g., from transportation facilities), or in form (e.g., from sorting 
fruit). 
Secondary or indirect benefits "reflect the impact of the project on 
the rest of the economy" [6]. The term is normally applied to "the increased 
incomes of various producers . . . that stem from . . . projects" [7]. Its 
use has been severely criticized because of the doubtful applicability of the 
concept [8]. 
Secondary benefits are a form of external benefits. The term has been 
used primarily to identify incomes "stemming from" or "induced by" a project. 
Benefits stemming from a project include the net incomes of processors between 
the primary product and consumers (e.g., the merchants, haulers, millers, 
bakers, etc. lying between grain producers and consumers). This notion 
is much akin to the concept of "forward linkages" used in development eco-
nomics. Benefits induced by a project are related in the same vein to the 
concept of "backward linkages" and represent a counting of incomes of firms 
which supply inputs to primary producers. Because of the nature of these 
trackings, economic multipliers have been occasionally used to estimate 
secondary benefits.
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But the validity of tracking such benefits has been severely questioned 
and it is important to understand the criticisms levied against users of 
the category, primarily the Corps of Engineers. In an economic analysis of 
agricultural projects, Gittinger has summarized " ...the conditions under which 
the full multiple-effects . .
	 constitute a real net change in welfare are 
specific and operationally very limiting." These conditions include the 
following:
(1) the public expenditure is not financed out of tax revenues so that 
the multiplier-creating expenditures are not drawn away from the 
private sector; 
(2) the conditions of supply for all factors stimulated to employment 
by the investment are perfectly elastic at prevailing prices; 
(3) the opportunity costs of those factors in the absence of the 
investment are zero; and 
(4) the outputs which result do not simply substitute for other 
products In the market place and, thus, do not result in unemploy-
ment for other factors of production [9]. 
It is obvious that these conditions could seldom apply, especially in the long 
period over which most cost-benefit analyses normally apply. 
Eckstein summarizes the arguments from a national point of view against 
considering indirect benefits as follows: 
Stemming benefits are very unlikely In depression, are a 
possibility during Inflation if the specific commodities are in 
particularly short supply, and can only be granted for periods of 
economic balance in those instances where the premise of mobility can 
be denied because of extraordinary circumstances. The routine cal-
culation of stemming benefits, therefore, is not warranted. 
Induced benefits, on the other hand, are largely confined to 
nt the construction of the project. They are large in times of depression, 
nonexistent in times of economic balance, and negative during inflation. 
It can . . . only be concluded that the use of indirect 
benefits in benefit-cost analysis must be confined to cases where it 
can be shown that there are unemployed and immobile resources or that 
there is underutilized capacity in associated economic activities [10]. 
49
Perhaps the most violent attack on the counting of secondary benefits 
has come from McKean [ill. In an exhausting presentation, McKean points out 
the clear arguments against counting secondary effects in a fully employed 
economy, as above, and goes on to question the usefulness of the concept 
under conditions of unemployment. Not only must involuntary unemployment 
or underemployment exist for secondary employment benefits to be counted, 
but the condition must have otherwise existed for the entire project period. 
The hazards and uncertainties associated with projecting long-term resource 
unemployment are such that measurement of secondary benefits in a national 
cost-benefit analysis is not warranted. 
From a regional point of view, the estimation of secondary benefits 
is less risky since the "openness" of a regional economy lessens the con-
straints on resource use. But the important question here is not in counting 
benefits but in defining objectives. If the objective of the project is 
regional development, or spatial redistribution of economic activity, then 
secondary benefits may be real and important and should at least be iden-
tified and listed (although inclusion in a formal summation of benefits 
is still open to question). Maass succinctly summarizes this point as 
follows:
it is interesting to examine the arguments over so-called 
secondary benefits and how they should be included, if at all, in 
project analyses. There is no such thing as a secondary benefit. A 
secondary benefit, as the phrase has been used in the benefit-cost 
literature, is in fact a benefit in support of an objective other than 
efficiency. The word benefit (and the word cost, too) has no meaning 
by itself, but only in association with an objective; there are 
efficiency benefits, income redistribution benefits, and others. 
Thus, if the objective function for a public program involves more 
than economic efficiency--and it will in most cases--there is no 
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legitimate reason for holding that the efficiency benefits are 
primary and should be included in the benefit-cost analysis whereas 
benefits in support of other objectives are secondary and should be 
mentioned, if at all, in separate subsidiary paragraphs of the 
survey report. Using the current language and current standards, 
most of the benefits to the Indians in the Indian irrigation project 
are secondary benefits.. How silly [12]! 
3.3 Developing a Scenario 
With some of the problems associated with identifying costs and bene-
fits in mind, it is now worthwhile to introduce the concept of a scenario. 
How does one go about developing a scenario for analysis? This question 
will be briefly commented on in .this subsection and will be discussed in 
more detail in Section 7. 
The first step in developing a scenario is to identify the objective 
of a public expenditure. If a dam is to be built, is the real objective to 
increase recreation alternatives, control flooding, and produce electric 
power in a river basin, or is it justified by contributions to social welfare 
through serving several objectives? Can the objective(s) be separated from 
the means (the dam, itself)? The analyst may work under a restrictive man-
date from a public authority and so be limited in his pursuit of alternative 
means; in this case, alternatives may be investigated by other interest groups. 
Or the analyst may be charged with examining all possibilities. So the first 
question to be settled is: What are the objectives of and alternatives to 
a project? 
Once this question is settled, a set of accounts must be devised through 
which to organize the analysis. This process is based on experience and 
observation and, to some extent, public law.* Federal projects, for example, 
The best source of information on setting up accounts is the "Principles, 
Standards, and Procedures for Water and Related Land Resource Planning" 
and the critical literature associated with this document. 
51
require both national economic development and environmental accounts, with 
distributional accounts (such as regional development or income-class) 
displayed for information. After the summary accounts are established, 
then the analyst must identify the benefits and costs appearing under each 
account and carefully check for double-counting problems. 
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QUANTIFYING COSTS AND BENEFITS 
4.1 Introduction 
This section provides an introduction to some of the principles of 
quantifying costs and benefits. First, an outline is given of the cost-
benefit framework to establish the analytic environment in which shadow 
prices arise. Then, a discussion is given on the ethical basis for CBA as 
seen in the principles of consumer sovereignty and in the assumptions regarding 
the distribution of income. Next, the concept of shadow pricing is illustrated 
with a linear program and shadow prices are derived with the theory of pure 
competition. Lastly, an example is presented to show the proper place of 
marginal social benefits and marginal social costs. This section thus 
establishes the logic of quantification. Later sections become more spe-
cific regarding actual measurement problems. 
4.2 The Cost-Benefit Framework 
The most important aspect of a cost-benefit analysis is the identifi-
cation of all the relevant costs and benefits. Second only to this in 
importance is the quantification of such costs and benefits. The raison 
d'etre of quantification is to facilitate the analysis of trade-offs. Any 
CBA will involve considerations of both losses and gains to society. It's 
obvious that the magnitudes of such losses and gains are a crucial input 
to the decision maker. 
Although a good deal of controversy has been generated by this topic of 
quantification or measurement in CBA, it should be noted that the controversy 
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centers on the specifics of application rather than on general principle. 
In fact, it will not be difficult to state the widely accepted principle of 
measurement in CBA. First however, the formal framework and terminology of 
CBA must be introduced. A state (of the world), S. is a specific distribution 
* 
of utility among the members of society. That is, 
S = cu-. u 2 , ..., u, ... 
for a society of N members. A project is a well-defined, intentional action 
or set of actions which will lead society from the status quo (current state), 
S0 , to alternative state S ' . The value of a project to individual j, V, is 
the maximum amount he would be willing to pay to have the project adopted 
when he favors the project and is the negative of the minimum amount he 
would accept as payment to leave him just as well off in S as in S° when 
he does not favor the project. When the project does not alter j's utility, 
V. = 0. (Economists have a special term for V: compensating variation.) 
The social value of a project, V, is 
n
V. J j=1 
That is, social value is based on willingness to pay of individuals. This 
is the basic and straightforward principle of measurement in CBA. 
How is V to be inferred? Asking every individual for his V is 
clearly a hopeless task for two reasons. First, each person would 
have to be apprised of every detail of the project and its consequences so 
that he could come to some conclusion about its value to himself. This 
* The utility function reflects all of the decision maker's feelings about 
various events and may well include factors other than monetary factors. 
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alone would appear to be a practical impossibility. Second, there is no 
reason to suppose every person would convey his true V.,, particularly if 
it were negative. The tendency would be to overstate ones opinion of 
the project In the hope of influencing the final decision. 
Thus, the V's are best determined without recourse to interviews or 
questionnaires. Subject to a number of qualifications discussed later, 
market prices reflect the V's. 
Suppose the only effects of a project are an increase in the production 
of good X by AX and a decrease in the production of good Y by AY. The prices 
of the goods, P and
	 remain unchanged. The value of the project to 
individual j is 
V. 3 = P	 AX. - P
	 AY 
x	 j	 y	 j 
where AX. and AY. are j's changes in consumption of X and Y. Clearly 
Ax =
	




•	 •  
To find the social value of the project directly--by summing the V's_- is 
an onerous task. It involves knowing each AX. and each AY.,. The job is 
greatly simplified by noting that 
V = F, V. =	 AX. - P AY.) 
	
j=l	 j=l  
n	 n 
= P	 AX. - P E AY. 
	
j =l	 j=l 
= P AX - P AY
x	 y
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Thus, CBA conclusions can be reached from knowledge of the gross physical 
effects (the AX and AY) and the corresponding market prices of those goods. 
Clearly, these market prices must have some normative significance--that is, 
they must say something about the value of the goods--if the evaluations of 
projects intended to improve the welfare of society are based on them. 
In economics, the notion of a shadow price arises from the recogni-
tion that market prices do not always reflect social value. That adjusted 
price, which does reflect social value, is a good's shadow price. 
4.3 Ethical Foundations of Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Before entering into a more detailed discussion of shadow prices, a 
final point must be made about the CBA general principle of measurement: 
willingness-to-pay. It should be noted that this principle is based, at 
least implicitly, on the acceptance of two ethical postulates. The first 
is that of consumer sovereignty. By this is meant that the individual is 
the best judge of his own welfare, or state of well-being. Thus, when we 
speak of the "value of a project to individual j" in a CBA, value is computed 
with specific reference to the consumer's own judgements as to the worth of 
a good. The acceptance of consumer sovereignty is to be contrasted with a 
"dictatorial regime" wherein the decision maker is allowed to base his 
decision on how he feels one should value a good. By way of example, 
suppose the market price of a "baked Alaska" is $3, and a project will 
reduce their production by 100 units. Consumer sovereignty demands we value 
that decrease as a cost of $300 to society however much the decision maker 
feels that we are all too fat and less baked Alaska is not a loss at all, 
but rather a gain.
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There is a possible point of confusion here, and it deserves some men-
tion. Often a project will involve the gain or loss of some commodity which 
is not exchanged through a market. Such a commodity might be a public park, 
and suppose a project is to provide one. Since there does not exist an 
observable price which reflects consumer evaluation of the park, the cost-
benefit analyst must somehow inpute an evaluation to the relevant consumers. 
The imputation, per Se, is not a violation of consumer sovereignty. For 
the analyst's task is to determine how much consumers would be willing to 
pay, not how much they should be willing. He must base his calculation on 
his best assessment of the consumers' own evaluations. 
The second ethical postulate is that the existing distribution of 
income is acceptable. Distribution of income is an ethical issue because 
a judgement is being made, for example, that those in poverty deserve it 
in some sense. The fact is that the distribution of income influences 
consumer evaluations as they are reflected in market prices. A corollary 
of this statement is that it is possible that a project accepted under one 
income distribution would be rejected under another, and conversely. This 
attitude casts an unwholesome air of capriciousness about CBA unless one 
is willing to sanction the given distributions of income. 
To see that income distribution affects prices, thereby potentially 
affecting the results of a CBA, consider the following example. A project, 
being evaluated by CBA. has a social opportunity cost of $5,000. Its only 
benefit will be an increase in the output of walking canes, the kind used 
exclusively by retired persons (whose average income is notoriously low). 
The current market price of these canes is $7. The projected increase in 
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output is 600 canes. The market value of the benefits is $4200. The net 
social benefits are -$800. If retired persons had higher incomes, the 
market demand curve for canes would be shifted to the right. Assuming the 
long-run supply curve of canes Is upward-sloping, the result would be a 
higher market price for canes--say $9 each. Net
 social benefits are now 
+$400. If the decision maker bases his judgement entirely on the CBA, 
the distribution of income is the critical factor. Paradoxically, higher 
income qualifies the retired persons to get more benefits. The point here, 
then, is that for a decision maker to reject the project because it lost 
$800, he must implicitly sanction the existing income distribution. 
4.4 Shadow Pricing 
The term "shadow price" has received a good deal of attention in recent 
years. Two circumstances account for this. First, the so-called "dual" 
variables of linear programming attain significant import when they are 
interpreted as shadow prices. Second, the widespread interest in CBA has 
placed the term "shadow pricing" in the vocabulary of most policy analysts, 
independent of its linear programming heritage, as some formof -cost-
measurement technique. 
A shadow price may be defined as a value associated with a unit of some 
good which indicates by how much some specified index of performance can be 
increased (or decreased) by the use (or loss) of the marginal unit of that 
commodity. This definition applies equally to the linear programming and 
CBA uses of the term, suggesting that an understanding of the term in one 
of its uses will facilitate its appreciation in the other. Specifically, 
a simple linear model of an economy is constructed to show how shadow prices 
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arise quite naturally. Then considering the standard economic model of 
perfect competition, it is found that competitive market prices correspond 
exactly to shadow prices. Finally, considering the complexities of the 
real world, economic theory enables some progress toward deriving shadow 
prices from observed, but not perfectly competitive, prices. 
What is the relation between the terms "shadow price" and "opportunity 
cost"? Both claim to measure "true" social cost. The shadow price is 
the per-unit opportunity cost of some good. The term opportunity cost 
is usually reserved for the aggregate values of a set of resources. 
Thus, if a project is to use 5 units of X and 10 units of Y, whose 
shadow prices are 2 and 3, respectively, the opportunity cost of the 
project is
5 • 2 + 10 . 3 = 40 
To clearly appreciate the concept of shadow prices, it Is useful to 
begin with a linear progranm.ing framework. Imagine a simple economy whose 
main features are: 
A) There are two types of goods, final consumption goods and raw 
materials. Call these X and Y, respectively. 
B) The members of society have valued the final goods by attaching 
prices to them. The higher the price, the more valuable that good 
is to them. The higher the price, the more valuable that good 
is to each individual. These prices are P 1
 (i = 1, 2, ..., N). 
C) There is a linear technology through which society transforms the 
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raw materials into final consumption goods. 
X1 = a11Y1 + a12112 + ... + a1MY1N 
= a1Y + a22Y22 + ... + a2MY2M 
aNlYNl + aN2YN2 + ... + aNMYNM 
X. is the number of units of consumption good i produced, and I 
goes from 1 through N. Y.. is the number of units of raw material 
used in the production of final good I. The a.. are non-negative 
parameters. 
D) The total amount of any raw material available for use in any time 
period is limited. The maximum available amounts are Y. (j1,2,. . 
Thus, society's production process must also satisfy 
Y+Y+...+Y<Y ll	 21	 N1	 l 
"12 +
	 +	
+ 'N2 - 2 
+ Y	 +... + 
im	 2M
E) Society's goal is to maximize the value of its total production. 
That is, of all feasible sets of final goods (X 1 , X2 , ..., 
society wants to produce that set which maximizes 
V = P 1 
X 1 + P 
2 
X 2 + ... + PNXN. 
When society's production planning agency solves the problem stated in 
E, it finds that it has also found values for the linear programming dual 
variables X1. A,	 Dual-variable A. corresponds to the constraint 
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on Y. in D. These A's would not be very interesting except for the remarka-
ble fact that, if society were somehow able to find one more unit of Y to 
use in production, the value of the final output would increase by A... That 
is, A. tells the production planning agency how much the marginal unit of 






is the shadow price of Y.. 
J 
Now let's consider the performance of CBA in this simple economy. Two 
projects have been identified as possibly worth undertaking. Each involves 
a new method of "extracting" raw materials from the earth. Because of 
political considerations, only one project can be chosen for implementation. 
(A maximum of one will be chosen since neither may actually be worthwhile.) 
Project Alpha would involve taking one unit of Y1
 and two units of Y2 out of 
the production of final goods, but would use them to increase the extraction 
of Y by two units. The new Y could then be used in the production of 
consumer goods. Project Beta would use one Y and one Y to get three more 
Suppose the shadow prices of Y 1 . Y 2 , and Y are 1, 2, and 3 respectively. 
How can we evaluate these projects? By assumption E, society is interested 
only in the output of final consumer goods--the X's. Society's interest in 
raw materials extends only to how they affect production; raw materials have 
no social value in themselves. Thus, the appropriate way to attack this 
problem is to ask how Alpha and Beta would affect V, the value of final out-
put. Clearly it would be useful to have some way to relate changes in the 
Y's to V. But this is precisely the role of the shadow price! The cost-benefit 
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analysis of Alpha and Beta must be performed in terms of the relevant shadow 
prices. The following table summarizes the analyses: 
Project Alpha	 Project Beta 
Social Benefit Social Cost 	 Social Benefit Social Cost 
2Y3 @3 = 6	 1Y1@1+ 
2 Y @ 2 = 5
3Y2 @3=6	 1Y1@1+ 
1 Y3 @ 3 = 4 
Project Beta turns out to be the preferred alternative, since it would in-
crease V by 2 while Alpha would only increase V by 1. Cost-benefit analysis 
is an almost trivial task in this simple economy. 
A final crucial point remains to be made in the context of this model. 
Suppose that the Y's had prices associated with them which, for some reason, 
did not correspond in direct proportion to the shadow prices or the X's. 
However tempting, it would be incorrect to use those prices in CBA. They 
would be completely irrelevant to the problem. Only if there were some 
systematic deviation of those prices from the shadow prices would the 
former be useful in inferring the values of the latter. This constitutes 
the foundation of actual attempts to derive shadow prices, as will be 
explained in more detail. 
4.5 The Ideal Economic Model: Perfect Competition 
A linear programming approach to determinitg shadow prices for an actual 
economy might seem.a good way to proceed. The model of the previous section, 
after all, does capture many of the salient aspects of reality: consumption 
goods and raw materials (physical resources, capital, labor) a limited 
technology which transforms one type of good Into the other, an objective of 
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maximizing the value of production, limited resources, etc. Why can't we 
just construct the actual problem, solve it, and thereby determine the dual 
variables, or shadow prices? One reason is that an actual economy is far 
too complex for a sufficiently detailed model to be constructed. In addition 
to inherent non-linearities and even non-convexities (which are major obsta-
cles to analysis), there would be many thousands of technical relationships 
to be estimated, and hundreds of institutional and other non-economic types 
of constraints. However, the primary reason is that there is a far better 
method--better in the sense that the expected accuracy of the modeling 
approach can be achieved at much less cost. This method is economic theory. 
The theme which has attracted the most attention from modern economists 
is construction and analysis of the model of a perfectly competitive economy. 
This model is based on the following assumptions: 
A) In the market for each good, there are a large number of relatively 
small buyers and sellers. 
B) All firms in the same industry produce homogeneous goods. Thus 
no buyer has any a priori reason to prefer the output of one firm 
over that of another. Another way of saying the same thing is 
that products are completely standardized among firms and there 
is no brand loyalty among consumers. 
C) Resources are completely mobile. Owners of productive resources 
(land, labor, capital) are free to put them to whatever use they 
please. Anyone can work in, or sell his physical resources to, 
any industry he pleases. There are no barriers to establishing a 
firm in any industry.
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D) Each economic agent is an optimizer. Each individual acts to 
maximize his satisfaction, each firm acts to maximize its profits. 
E) Each economic agent has perfect knowledge. He knows, with certainty, 
all present and future prices. 
F) There are no price rigidities. Prices may move up or down subject 
to market pressures. 
If the above conditions hold, it is easy to prove that: 1) prices are 
determined by the market equilibration of supply and demand; and 2) in the 
long run, all goods, are produced and sold at the lowest possible price. 
If, in addition to A-F, some other conditions hold, then another result 
very useful to CBA can be established. Among these conditions are: 
G) Individual utility functions are "selfish." Each person's feeling 
of well-being is determined exclusively by his own consumption. 
He is free of both sympathy and envy in the sense that others' 
misfortune or fortune do not affect his feeling of satisfaction 
H) Individuals are "greedy," or "more is better." A person never 
reaches the satiation point. He always feels better off by 
consuming more. 
I) Individual preferences are such that diminishing marginal rates of 
substitution between goods exist. That is, indifference curves are 
convex to the origin. 
J) There are no production processes which exhibit increasing returns 
to scale. 
K) There are no externalities. 
L) There are no public goods.
66
N) There is no government taxation (except, perhaps, a head or p011 
tax) and no government subsidy of any good. 
N) All goods are exchanged in markets. 
0) All markets are in equilibrium. 
If conditions A-O are satisfied, then economic theory has established this 
very important result: all goods have market prices, and the market prices 
are exactly equal to the corresponding shadow prices (true social values). 
Once again, CBA would reduce to a relatively trivial matter. But this 
time we did not have to resort to a programming model of the economy. 
Instead, by employing the results of economic theory, we have arrived at 
the same point--an environment in which foolproof CBA can be accomplished. 
But what form of chicanery is this? For the conditions of this model 
seem as unrealistic as the construction of the programming model was 
impossible. The key is in the last paragraph of the previous section--
systematic deviation. Even though conditions A-O may not all hold, economic 
theory can often predict, by determining which assumptions are violated, 
the direction in which the observed price deviates from the shadow price. 
Sometimes, but less often, it is possible to make a reasonably good estimate 
of the magnitude of the deviation. When prices do not exist, i.e. when 
there are not markets for the goods (like public parks), economic theory 
can at least suggest the principles and problems of measurement to guide 
the analyst in making his approximations. 
This, then, is the forte of attacking shadow pricing with economic
theory rather than mathematical programming. While neither can be directly 
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applied to reality, the former takes account of the systematic deviations 
of reality from the idealized model, the latter cannot. In fact, it is 
probably fair to state that the topic which has attracted the most atten-
tion from economists, second only to the development and analysis of the 
ideal model, is the analysis of the implications of deviations from that 
ideal. But make no mistake, economic theory is far from a panacea. A 
great deal of information is needed to determine shadow prices, information 
which is often not readily available. However, even this quantity of in-
formation does not approach the amount required for the construction of a 
full-scale model of the economy--a model from which meaningful dual varia-
bles could be elicited. 
4.6 An Example 
To illustrate the use of economic theory in deriving shadow prices 
through the analysis of systematic deviations from the ideal model (assump-
tions A-0 above), consider the case of a hypothetical producer of newprint 
who occupies a monopolistic position in his market. Newsprint involves 
externalities in both the production and sales ends of operations. The 
production process pollutes the water source, causing an external diseconomy. 
The final product, the newprint, provides an external benefit (economy) to 
society by virtue of its role as a medium of vast amounts of information. Such 
information flows are the foundation of political democracy (informing 
readers about issues, world events, government actions) and economic compe-
tition (advertisements about new products, prices, new stores, etc.). Pre-
sumably, the value to society of newsprint exceeds its relatively low final 
cost to consumers. For example, an individual may be willing to pay $50 
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per year for a given quantity (and quality) of printed news, but society 
may feel that the overall value of keeping a citizen well informed is 
$55 or $60 or even more. 
Suppose that a government policy is being considered which will have the 
effect of increasing newsprint production by some marginal amount, perhaps 
through more favorable tax treatment How does shadow pricing apply to 
this cost-benefit decision? 
Before answering this question, let's consider the economics of the 
"ideal" firm. This will provide a base for the systematic deviations of 
the newsprint firm from ideal characteristics. Among other things, the 
ideal firm is a price-taker (meaning its relatively small size forces it 
to accept the prevailing market price as the price at which it will sell 
its output) and does not induce any external economies or diseconomies. 
Note, then, that our hypothetical newsprint firm is in violation of assump-
tions A and K above. Figure 4.1 presents the salient features of the ideal 
firm. The market price is OB. Since the firm feels it can sell all it 
wishes at OB, the demand curve it faces is BC. The constant selling price 
means BC is the marginal revenue curve. Since demand reflects willingness-
to-pay (the measure of benefits) BC is the marginal private benefit curve. 
Since there are no externalities, BC is also the marginal social benefit 
curve. DE is the marginal cost of production for the firm. Again, because 
of no externalities, DE is also the marginal social cost of production. 
The firm's output, assuming it maximizes profit, is OA. Thus, with respect 
to marginal changes in output, OB is simultaneously the market price of the 


















Figure 4.1	 Salient economic features of the ideal firm. 
price of inputs (true measure of the cost to society of using those inputs). 
Since OB is directly observable, CBA involving gains or losses of that good 
is a simple matter. To reiterate the point made earlier, CBA is an almost 
trivial matter in the "ideal" economy. 
Turning now to the economics of the newsprint firm, the situation be-
comes more complex as we consider how it deviates from the ideal firm. As 
a monopolist, it faces the entire market demand for its output. Such demand, 
of course, is downward sloping to the right--only at lower prices can more 
be sold. The demand curve, identical to the marginal private benefits curve, 
is AB in Figure 4.2. Since there are external economies associated with 
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Figure 4.2	 Salient economic features of the hypothetical 
"newsprint" firm. 
The firm will produce OK units of output, since marginal revenue equals 
the firm's marginal cost at that output level. Then, with respect to margi-
nal changes in output, OL is the firm's unit production cost, OM is the 
unit production cost to society (OM > OL because of the pollution by-product 
of the production process), ON is the price the firm will charge per unit, 
and OP is the value to society of each unit. Now note that only ON is 
direct observable. OL may usually be estimated reasonably well using 
accounting data and knowledge of the firm's production operations. But for 
CBA, ON and OP are the crucial magnitudes. In contrast to the case of the 
ideal model, these magnitudes are not directly observable. However, and 
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here is the solid contribution of economic theory, the requisite infor-
mation is now neatly circumscribed. What is needed is the local (in the 
neighborhood K) properties of HJ and CB. The use of a programming model 
would have required more information. 
4.7 Summary 
In summary, it has been shown that shadow prices can be thought of 
either as dual variables arising from mathematical programming or as true 
economic valuations. In principle, the two meanings are identical because 
the programming approach explicitly optimizes over a set of constraints 
and the results of economic theory have implicitly accounted for the same 
optimizing behavior. The market demand curve, for example, is based on 
consumer utility maximization. Economic theory views each economic agent 
(consumer or firm) as an optimizer. The equilibrium conditions in economics 
are nothing more than first- and second-order optimization conditions. In 
a sense, this is nothing more than Adam Smith's notorious "invisible hand." 
Relying on economic theory rather than programming for shadow-pricing 
guidance exploits what order there is in economic behavior. In a sense, the 
programming approach forces one to reestablish already well known results, 
and to collect excess data. In deriving shadow prices, then, economic 
theory's main contribution is the specification of the minimum requisite 
information, accomplished by exploiting the systematic deviations of the 
real world from the "ideal" competitive model. In the final analysis, 
however, the situation at hand will dictate whether to use the programming 




SPECIAL PROBLEMS IN MEASUREMENT 
5.1 Introduction 
This section deals with two specific problem areas in CBA, the discount 
rate and the social opportunity cost of capital, and is concluded with a 
few comments on "social impact analysis," a term recently introduced into 
the literature to describe cost-benefit analyses subject to some broad 
definitional and measurement problems. There are no completely satisfactory 
solutions to any of these problems, but an attempt is made to explain each 
problem area, to analyze its significance, and to make broad recommendations 
to guide the analyst. 
5.2 The Discount Rate 
Invariably, a project CBA will have costs and benefits spread over a 
number of years. To compare one project to another, or to determine the 
economic viability of a particular project, the time stream of costs and 
benefits must be reduced to a single number. This number may be the Net 
Present Value (NPV) of a project. The reader will recall that NPV and 
related terms were discussed in Section 2.2. The NPV approach discounts 
future values to their present value. Cleary, the rate of discount is 
a crucial parameter in the NPV calculation. In the evaluation of a 
single project, the discount rate will affect whether the NPV is greater 
or less than zero. In comparison of projects, the discount rate will affect 
their NPV ranking. This last statement may not be obvious, for it may be 
thought that while the chosen discount rate affects the magnitude of NPV, 
it does not affect the ranking of projects. This fallacious notion is 
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easily dispelled by an example. Projects A and B each last three years. 
Their annual net benefits (i.e. each entry is total annual benefits less 
total annual cost) are as follows:
NET BENEFITS 
Initial Cost	 Year 1	 Year 2	 Year 3 
Project A	 -100	 220	 12.1	 13.3 
Project B	 -100	 0	 0	 266 
Project A has a large initial return which tapers off over time. Project B 
has net benefits occurring only in the terminal year. Now let us calculate 
NPV for each project at discount rates of 1% and 10%. The results are as 
follows:
NPV at 1% 
Project A	 143	 120 
Project B	 158	 100 
Note that B is superior to A at a discount rate of 1%, but A is superior to B 
at a discount rate of 10%. Thus, the discount rate obviously can affect the 
ranking of projects. High discount rates penalize projects whose benefits 
occur further in the future. 
In CBA, one of the problems which has attracted a considerable amount 
of attention is the discount rate to be used. Through much research, 
debate, and soul-searching, economists have generally concluded that this 
question is not amenable to strictly economic analysis. This is because 
the social rate of time preference--the rate at which society as a whole 
is willing to give up present consumption for future consumption (the correct 
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discount rate for CBA)--is not reflected by an individual's rate of time 
preference and only the latter can be observed in economic data. Even if 
it were possible to determine each individual's rate of time preference, and 
even if an appropriate "averaging" technique could be agreed upon, the re-
sultant rate would not necessarily be the social rate of time preference. 
In general, it would be too high. To see this, consider the following decision 
(or game) matrix. It is assumed an individual obtains satisfaction from knowing 
that future society will "inherit" goods the present society has provided through 
investment--i.e. through devoting current resources to projects which will pay 
benefits in the future, even though depriving the present of some consumption 
opportunities. The individual may feel this way for any number of reasons, 
among which are 
-he may be part of the future society, 
-his children and other relatives may be part of that society, or 
-a general feeling of altruism toward mankind. 
For simplicity, assume the representative individual has two choices: 
invest for the future (I), or don't invest for the future (DI). Likewise, 
he perceives that society as a whole has those same choices. Suppose his 
"payoff" (its value to him) when both he and the rest of society invests for 
the future is 100. If the rest of society invests and he doesn't, he is even 
better off. For then he has the satisfaction of knowing the future is being 
prepared for, but he personally has not had to forego any present consumption. 
Say this value is 150. The converse situation--he invests and society does 
not--is the worst possible. Not only does the future get nothing (since his 
lone contribution has a negligible impact in the future), but he has foregone 
present consumption. Let the value of this outcome be -50. If society chooses 
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DI and the individual does also, at least he hasn't given up present con-
sumption. He is clearly better off than -50. However, since hs loses the 
satisfaction of knowing the future is being provided for, he gets less than 
100 from this outcome. Say the (DI, DI) payoff is 25. These choices and 
their values to the individual are summarized in the following payoff matrix: 
SOCIETY'S CHOICES 
Representative 
Individual's Choice	 Invest	 Don't Invest 
Invest




Now let us analyze the investment decision in two contrasting contexts: 
a private investment decision and a public investment decision. Suppose, for 
concreteness, that both investments involve the purchase of land which is 
currently unusable but will be a beautiful natural area twenty-five years in 
the future, e.g. swamp land, where drainage is expected with certainty. The 
individual would like to dedicate the small tract he purchases as a wildlife 
refuge. He realizes, however, that as an individual he has no control over 
what society does with all the adjoining land twenty-five years hence. Thus, 
his "wildlife refuge" of several acres may turn out to be surrounded by heavy 
industry (i.e. he invests for the future and society does not). On the other 
hand, if everyone else buys the land to keep It natural, and he does not, his 
marginal acres will not make much difference. The above decision matrix has 
obvious application. The individual's rational choice must be DI, since the 
payoff is higher for DI, no matter what the rest of society does. That is, 
the individual will decide not to purchase the land for dedication as a natural 
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area. Such private decisions about provision for the future seem to imply 
that individuals have a "high" discount rate for future goods. This is what 
private investment decisions would seem to imply, and this would be reflected 
in the data. For instance, the data would show that at current market interest 
rates, individuals do not feel that this public investment is worthwile. 
Suppose the individual can affect society's choice. That is, suppose the 
matter of what to do with all the land is to be decided by a public vote. If 
the majority decided to purchase it for a natural state, the purchase will be 
financed by taxes. Now each individual will consider the decision from 
society's point of view. The rational social choice is I--to invest. By a 
public decision to invest, each individual forces the rest of society to choose 
I in return for being forced to choose himself. Thus each person can assure 
himself a payoff of 100. Society's rational choice to invest in the land 
means its discount rate, the social rate of time preference, must be lower 
than the discount rate reflected by private decisions. The example shows that 
in the case of this type of investment for the future, everyone is made better 
off by having the decision made with reference to the social rate of time 
preference rather than the individual rate of time preference. The social rate 
of time preference is lower than the individual rate, and it is reflected only 
in public decisions. At the risk of being repetitive, we must stress that this 
social rate cannot be derived from data on individual investment decisions. 
Operationally, what all this means is that market interest rates, which reflect 
individual investment decisions, are no guide to the correct discount rate 
for CBA, except as an upper bound.* 
* The normative significance of market interest rates it further obscured 
by the realization that market rates are manipulated by federal policies 
(e.g. stabilization, employment, foreign exchange) for reasons far removed 
from long-term public investment decisions. 
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We must look then, at public investment decisions themselves to 
determine the proper discount rate for public projects. The reasoning 
here is not circular in a democratic political system. While every public 
investment decision is not thrown open to a public vote, the public offi-
cials reponsible for those decisions are subject to periodic public review 
via the election process. Administrations which implement projects incon-
sistent with the true social rate of time preference tend to lose votes. 
The democratic political process ensures the tendency of public decisions 
to conform to public desires. Thus, the correct discount rate for CBA 
might be inferred from recent popular public investment decisions. 
Finally, there is the basic question: what is the cost-benefit 
analyst to do about the discount rate? While the above discussion hope-
fully illuminated some of the problems in choosing a rate, it admittedly 
circumvented a direct answer. Fortunately, a direct answer may readily be 
given. Since the choice of a discount rate is really a policy decision, 
the analyst should not choose the figure. Often, in CBA for a particular 
government agency, the agency itself will specify a discount rate. Failing 
that, the analyst should parameterize the rate. CBA results should be 
presented for a number of discount rates, e.g., 3%, 5%, 8%. Again, the 
analyst's goal is to present the decision maker with all the relevant 
information in a convenient format. The analyst should clearly explain 
how, if at all, the discount rate affects the results of the CBA. Another 
useful calculation by the analyst is the determination of a critical value 
for the discount rate. For example, in the comparisons of two projects, 
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there will generally exist a discount rate below which one project has 
greater expected value than the other and above which vice versa. If such 
a critical value turns out to be high, e.g. 14%, the decision maker need not 
agonize over choosing a specific rate; rather, on the knowledge that the 
proper rate is definitely below 14%, his choice of projects is greatly 
facilitated. This is but one example of how the analyst properly aids the 
decision maker. 
In actual practice, how have decision makers determined the discount 
rate? It seems that, the foregoing objections not withstanding, the rate 
has been tied to the federal government's cost of borrowing. The following 
is taken from the Water Resources Council's relatively recently established 
Principles and Standards for Planning for Water and Related Land Resources.* 
The discount rate will be established in accordance with the con-
cept that the Government's investment decisions are related to the 
cost of Federal borrowing. 
(a) The interest rate to be used in plan formulation and evaluation 
for discounting future benefits and costs, or otherwise converting 
benefits and costs to a common time basis, shall be based upon the 
estimated average cost of Federal borrowing as determined by the 
Secretary of the Treasury taking into consideration the average yield 
during the twelve months preceding his determination on interest-
bearing marketable securities of the United States with remaining 
periods to maturity comparable to a 50-year period of investment: 
Provided, however, that the rate shall be raised or lowered by no 
more than or less than one-half percentage point for any year. 
When the average cost of Federal borrowing as determined by the 
Secretary of the Treasury exceeds the established discount rate by 
more than 0.25 percentage points, the rate shall be raised 0.5 per-
centage points. When the average cost is less than the established 
rate by more than 0.25 percentage points, the rate shall be lowered 
0.5 percentage points. 
(b) The Water Resources Council shall determine, as of July 1, 
the discount rate to be used during the fiscal year. The Director of 
the Water Resources Council shall annually request the Secretary of 
* Federal Register, Sept. 10, 1973, Vol. 38, No. 174, Part III. 
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the Treasury during the month of June to advise the Water Resources 
Council of his determination of the average cost of Federal borrowing 
during the preceding twelve months. 
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this 
section, the discount rate to be used in plan formulation and evaluation 
during the remainder of the fiscal year 1974 shall be 6-7/8 percent. 
The following table will enable the reader to get a "feel" for alterna-
tive discount rates. The entries in the table are the "weights" which the 
discounting process assigns to costs or benefits incurred in the corresponding 
year and at the corresponding discount rate. 
EFFECTIVE DISCOUNTING WEIGHTS 
Discount	 Weight in Nth year, N = 
Rate	 5	 10	 20	 30	 40 
0 1 1 1 1 1 
1 .95 .90 .82 .74 .67 
3 .86 .74 .55 .41 .30 
5 .78 .61 .38 .23 .14 
7 .71 .51 .26 .13 .07 
10 .62 .39 .15 .06 .02 
15 .50 .25 .06 .02 .00
For example, at a discount rate of 7%, a benefit incurred 20 years into the 
future is worth only 26% of what that same benefit would be worth if incurred 
in the present. Clearly, the adoption of a higher discount rate implies 
less concern with the future than does the adoption of a lower discount 
rate.
This discussion can now be briefly summarized. The discount rate to be 
used in CBA is the social rate of time preference--the rate at which society 
is willing to forego present consumption in return for future consumption. 
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This rate, a crucial figure in CBA, cannot be determined by strictly 
economic analysis. Rather, it reveals itself in the political process. 
The cost-benefit analyst should not choose the discount rate, since this 
is essentially a policy decision. If the rate to be used is not specified 
by the agency sponsoring the CBA, the analyst should parameterize the dis-
count rate and/or compute critical values. This information and its 
implications should then be communicated to the decision maker. The final 
choice of the appropriate discount rate rests with the decision maker. 
5.3 The Social Opportunity Cost of Capital 
The literature dealing with this topic raises the issue that funds 
transferred from the private to the public sector to finance a project 
represent a greater real cost to society than conventional CBA would imply. 
The reasoning is that the transfer of funds reduces both consumption and 
investment in the initial period. The reduced investment causes a lower-
than-otherwise level of national income in succeeding years, and consequently 
a lower level of consumption in those years. The quite legitimate argument 
is made that this lower-than-otherwise consumption is the real social cost 
of the project. 
In more formal terms, the argument starts with the time stream of 
consumption which society would enjoy in the absence of the project. Denote 
this consumption stream by 
CO3 C19 C2, ..., C, ..., CT. 
This consumption stream is associated with a corresponding stream of savings 
which are invested to maintain the consumption stream in future periods. 
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By drawing resources from the private sector, a public project reduces 
private investment. This private investment would have had a positive effect 
over the years. That is, investment today would produce a continuous stream 
of returns (income) in the future. In each of these years, investment is 
further increased because of the higher income level. Thus, each year 
gives rise to its own stream of extra consumption in the future. For 
example, in the fifth year, consumption includes that generated by invest-
ments in the first, second, third, and fourth years. Thus, the argument 
states that all these consumption streams are foregone by the transfer of 
funds to the government. Denote the resultant time stream of consumption 
by
C' C'	 C 0'	 1'
	
2 1 , ...' C t 
1
	
C' '	 • '	 T 
This time stream is net of the consumption which the government project 
would give rise to, since that is to be added to the benefit side of the 




,t = O,l, ...,T 
The real cost to society, then is the difference in the two time streams. 
The present value of this difference is the social opportunity cost (SOC) 
of the capital transferred to the public sector. 





It is maintained, then, that in computing the social value of a project, 
the SOC (as defined above) should be subtracted from the present value of 
the benefit stream. 
Implied by this analysis is the existence of a multiplier, N. Suppose 
that the project in question initially removes R dollars of resources from 
the private sector. In general, SOC will exceed R. The exact relation 
can be expressed as 
SOC = N • R 
where N will exceed unity. For example, if M = 2.5, this means that every 
dollar transferred out of the private sector (in some marginal range) would 
have increased the present value of future consumption by $2.50. By making 
some fairly restrictive assumptions about economic behavior, it is possible 
to construct an economic model which permits N to be specified as a function 
of observable economic statistics, such as the interest rate and the marginal 
propensity to consume 11]. Operationally, Mwo&ild be calculated rather than 
the alternative consumption time streams. 
Now, what can be said about the validity of this approach, and should 
it be adopted in CBA? First, it must be stated that the approach to the 
measurement of costs--the value of foregone consumption--is unassailable. 
This is the approach stressed throughout this volume. A social cost 
is a benefit foregone. The real (and fatal) flaw of this approach is that 
it is built on highly questionable assumptions. When the assumptions are 
satisfied, the approach is valid. However, it cannot be accepted that the 
assumptions are generally satisfied to a degree sufficient to warrant the 
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use of this approach. There are three basic assumptions involved. The 
first is the most unrealistic. It alone would be sufficient reason to 
preclude the general use of a Soc multiplier in CBA. 
Assumption 1: A government decision to implement a project causes a 
transfer of funds from the private sector to the public sector equal to the 
cost of the project. 
The government budgetary process is an immensely complicated affair, 
and this is not the place to delve into how projects are financed. However, 
it is very definitely the case that it does not work such that the approval 
of a $1-million project at the agency level causes a memo to be sent to the 
Treasury specifying that an additional $1 million must be raised from the 
private sector. The $1 million comes out of the agency's budget. There is 
no reason to believe the budget is any higher because of that specific 
project. If that project did not exist, another one would. Each agency 
vies for a. portion of the federal budget. Each agency's current appropriation 
is determined in large measure by its previous appropriation, current govern-
ment fiscal and monetary policy, and the Administration's goals. Thus, a 
specific project may have little or no effect on the size of an agency's 
budget. Furthermore, since the size of the total government budget is 
dictated, at the margin, by broad economic policy objectives, more for one 
agency necessarily means less for another. What all this amounts to is that 
a project competes for funds directly with alternative projects of the same 
agency and indirectly with projects of other agencies. Thus, the base of 
reference for the analysis of a project should be the alternative use of 
funds within the government sector, not the private sector. 
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Assumption 2: The transfer of funds from the private sector to the 
public sector reduces private investment. 
Although there is no quarrel with this assumption taken literally, one 
must ask whether the transfer of funds causes a "significant" reduction in 
investment. If the true reduction is small, errors of measurement are 
likely to overwhelm the object of the measurement. It seems this assumption 
ignores the "liquidity preference" aspects of economic behavior. For example, 
an increase in government taxation or borrowing could cause individuals to 
draw on their financial assets rather than forego investment opportunities. 
Even in a full-employment economy, consumption may decline to compensate 
for the transfer of purchasing power, and investment may not be affected. 
Assumption 3: The foregone private investment has a time stream of 
impacts whose present value is positive. 
This is a reasonable assumption; the objection is simply a way of 
introducing mitigating factors. First, private investment often has some 
negative side effects (external diseconomies) such as pollution. This 
tends to reduce its "face value." Second, the number of business failures 
indicates that much private investment is done in error. When a firm in-
vests in an already saturated market, for example, it draws capital from 
other uses (a social cost), but may not survive to expand the amount of con-
sumption goods available to the economy (no social benefit). However, since 
the effects discussed here are marginal changes in total private invest-
ment, and businesses which fail are very likely well represented at this 
margin, a marginal decrease in total private investment may well more than 
proportionately reduce the number of "wrong" private investments. Again, 
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the marginal social value of marginal private investment may be well below 
the average social value of private investments. This is an important point 
because, in practice, average values are often taken as proxies for marginal 
values. 
The lack of faith in these three premises, particularly the first, has 
spurred an apparent concensus among economists that the social cost of a 
project ought not be calculated using the multiplier approach (except, of 
course, in the unusual circumstance when the assumptions do appear satisfied). 
5.4 Social Impact Analysis 
"Social impact analysis" is an alternative term used to describe cost-
benefit analysis in the broad sense presented here. It is sometimes used 
to ensure that a CBA presenting only the costs and benefits which can be 
given a dollar valuation not be taken as encompassing all effects of a 
project. To a perceptive analyst or to a person accustomed to reviewing 
good analyses, introduction of a new term was unnecessary. What was and 
is needed is simply a correct interpretation of the analyst's task to begin 
with. Nevertheless, the term has taken its place in the vocabulary in 
response to shortcomings appearing in existing analyses. Although it is not 
the purpose here to pursue these shortcomings in detail, a few of them should 
be mentioned. 
Most of the problems leading to the term "social impact analysis" are 
measurement problems. As discussed in Section 3.2, some effects, called 
"incommensurables and intangibles," are difficult both to identify and to 
measure. The former are effects which are economic in nature, yet not readily 
measured in monetary terms. With those, the problem is not so much determining 
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whether the effect is good or bad, but what magnitude ought to be attached 
to it. The latter are noneconomic effects and so are not only not measurable 
in dollars but defy any measurement whatsoever. In general, these effects 
must be judged by values beyond economic ones. 
Examples of inconimensurables are recreation, nonrenewable resources, 
and changes in technology. Intangibles may relate to politics, some 
demographic effects, social justice, individual liberty, aesthetics, and 
social harmony. The reader is referred back to Section 3.2.3 for further 
discussion. 
A second problem leading to the use of the term "social impact analysis" 
is associated with the regional effects of a project. The problem Is really 
one of definition. 
If the economy under study is the region itself, the regional effects 
of the projects are the economic effects--the benefits and costs--themselves 
and no problem exists. If the economy under study is the nation, then the 
regional development effects may or may not be subject to inclusion in 
project evaluation. Under conditions of full employment, resources employed 
in a project in one region have been diverted from use in others. In this 
case, regional benefits and costs should clearly be counted and the problem 
is no different from the usual CBA problem. Under conditions of severe 
resource unemployment, the unemployed resources may be used at no cost to 
society. But accounting for these resources as costless over any length 
of time requires such strong assumptions about the future that the general 
concensus of opinion is to account for resources at normal market costs and 
to avoid "full employment" as a potential benefit. 
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Other problems leading to the use of the term "social impact analysis" 
are concerned primarily with the defining of objectives. If the objective 
of a project is solely national efficiency, then the distributional changes 
pursued in a social impact analysis are superfluous. As noted in Section 
3.2.4, the indirect effects of a project on regional development, or on a 
regional redistribution of resource use under conditions of full employment, 
and the effects of a project on the distribution of income among classes 
are effects which are to be included in a calculation of costs and benefits 
subject to some specific assumptions. If, as is traditional, the net gain 
"to whomsoever it may accrue" is a primary concern, redistributions may 
represent double counting. But if the objective of a project is to effect 
a redistribution of the society's total project (broadly defined) across 
income classes, regions, or other groupings of the population, then the 
objective function of the CBA for this project must be similarly defined. 
As mentioned above, in any cost-benefit analysis certain of the iden-
tified effects of a project will be incommensurable or intangible. That is, 
they will not readily lend themselves to quantification or monetary valuation. 
The problem, of course, is that such effects must nonetheless be somehow 
incorporated in the cost-benefit analysis. Social effects are no less 
costs or benefits because of their inherent intractability. As a decision 
aid, CBA must present all relevant information to the decision maker. 
A fruitful approach to social impact analysis is the iterative 
interactive decision mode. This approach combines objective data analysis 
by the analyst and subjective problem analysis by the decision maker. 
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The merit of the method is based on quantifying and evaluating the minimum 
number of social effects necessary for the decision maker to act. A 
number of variations on the basic theme may be conceived, but essentially 
proceeds as follows. 
Step 1. List the sets of all valid project costs, C, and all valid 
project benefits, B (Section 7 - "Performing a Cost-Benefit Analysis" 
details the procedures by which such a list may be generated.) 
Step 2. Taking into account such factors as data availability, the 
goals of the CBA, the relative importance of the various costs and benefits, 
time and budgetary restrictions, and the needs of the decision maker, 
choose a subset of the cost set, C 1 , and a subset of the benefit set, B1. 
Step 3. Find the Present Value (PV) of the costs and the Present 
Value of the benefits listed in Step 2. 
Step 4. Develop reasonably detailed qualitative descriptions of the 
costs and benefits omitted in Step 3, i.e., complements of B 1 and C1: 
B1  and C1'. 
Step 5. Present the decision maker with the current state of the 
analysis:
NPV(Project) = [PV(B1) + PV(B1 1 )] - [PV(C 1 ) + PV(C11)] 
Example:
NPV(Project) = [$lOOM + Qualitative Description of B1'] 
- [$90N + Qualitative Description of C1t] 
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Step 6. The decision maker determines whether the present state of 
the analysis is sufficient for a decision to be made, or whether further 
quantification of effects is necessary. 
Here, quite obviously, the subjective element is formalized. With 
reference to the above example, the decision maker must subjectively deter-
mine whether the net value of the unquantified effects is more or less 
than -$lOM, that is, whether the value of the unquantified costs exceeds 
the value of the unquantified benefits by $10M. If so, the NPV(Project) 
is negative; if not, NPV(Project) is positive. 
Step 7. If the decision maker determines that the current information 
content of the analysis is insufficient, return to Step 2 and enlarge the 
benefit and cost sets to be quantified. 
5.5 Summary 
This section has focused on problems of which the cost-benefit analyst 
must have a sharp awareness although he has little control over their even-
tual resolution. The discount rate used in a CBA is the social rate of time 
preference as revealed in the political process. Although the analyst may 
explore the sensitivity of his results (see Section 6) to variation in 
the discount rate and present these explorations in his report, the final 
choice between present and future consumption as expressed in the discount 
rate rests with the decision maker. 
Although the social opportunity cost of capital appears to be greater 
than the costs implied in a conventional CBA, the consensus among 
economists is to avoid on practical grounds the complex estimations 
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associated with this concept even though its basis--the value of foregone 
consumption--is flawless. Government decisions are most frequently In 
allocation of existing budgets--in the weighing of alternative projects 
against themselves rather than against private consumption foregone--and 
so do not involve social opportunity cost calculations vis-a-vis the 
consumer. 
Social impact analysis is a term summarizing a variety of problems 
associated with the proper identification of project objectives and the 
measurement of project effects. It arose from a feeling that cost-benefit 
analyses were incomplete, focusing only on effects measurable in dollars. 
As defined in this work, however, social impact analysis and cost-benefit 
analysis are synonymous terms; they both attempt to ferret out the true 





Up to this point, emphasis has been placed on the identification and 
measurement of specific costs and benefits as they relate to CBA. Of course, 
any CBA will involve the consideration of a number of different costs and 
a number of different benefits, each spanning a number of years. We know, 
from Section 2 that the best way to aggregate these figures into a single 




it is the value of the ith benefit in year t, and c the 
value of the ith cost in year t, the expression for net present 
value is
(bit	
it - c ) 
NPV=  
(l+d) 
For example, b might be the value to all consumers of a drop in the priceit 
of some good for some year, and c might be the value to all consumersit 
of an increase in pollution for that year. In previous sections it was 
pointed out how the b.c's and the c j 's should be estimated, with the correct 
measurement approach depending on the specific circumstances. 
Of course, each b. t and c it that is estimated will be just that--an 
estimate. Clearly, the reliability of the final NPV figure will depend on 
the accuracy of these estimates. Admonishing the analyst to be accurate does 
not resolve the issue of NPV reliability, for there is always some degree 
of error inherent to the measurement process itself. Even if one attempted to 
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measure a physical phenomenon which occurred in the past, say the change in 
wheat production from 1973 to 1974, the estimate cannot be 100% reliable. 
In CRA, many of the measurements deal with the nonphysical, such as willing-
ness to pay, and all deal with the future and thus are predictions. No 
rational being is likely to accept that, under these circumstances, the 
calculated NPV of a project is to be interpreted as a precise figure. Given 
the intrinsic uncertainty surrounding the computed NPV, is there any way the 
analyst can aid the decision maker, beyond the perfunctory caveat that the 
computations are subject to error? The answer is yes. The analyst should 
provide the decision maker with some idea of the degree of error that the 
estimates are subject to. Then, for example, in a CBA of two alternative 
projects, if the NPV estimate of one is "much" larger than the NPV estimate 
of the other, and the analyst finds that the degree of error is "small," the 
decision maker can feel confident about the choice of the former over the 
latter. On the other hand, if the difference in the estimates of NPV were 
small relative to the degree of error, the decision maker might well choose 
the other, or neither, or comission a CBA of a third project, a further 
study of the original two, etc. 
The important point is that the analyst should present to the decision 
maker as much information as possible in a format useful to the decision maker. 
The analyst must be careful to imply neither a greater nor lesser degree of 
confidence in this estimate than the data permit. 
The variance of an estimate should supplement the mean as input to the 
decision making process. In contrast, the argument is often made that for 
public projects the mean alone is a sufficient decision input. This argument 
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rests on the premise that, at any given time, the government is engaged in 
a large number of similarly risky projects. Those that fail to meet expec-
tations are balanced out by those which more than do so. Thus, the deviations 
net out, and society ends up with the mean values. The argument is theoreti-
cally sound, given the premise. However, there is no evidence that this 
premise is usually satisfied. Quite the contrary, experience would suggest 
that each project has a number of unique characteristics. The acceptance of 
the mean alone as a decision guideline is not appropriate as a general rule. 
In the discussion below, it is assumed that some measure of dispersion is 
relevant to the decision. 
The analyst's attempts to gauge the degree of error in his estimates 
fall under the general term "sensitivity analysis." Conceptually, one can 
distinguish among three levels of sensitivity analysis: subjective estimate, 
selective sensitivity analysis, and general sensitivity analysis. The 
following sections discuss these levels in detail. 
6.2 Subjective Estimates 
This is the least rigorous and quickest approach. Calling on his previous 
experience, intuition, "gut feelings," etc., the analyst determines some 
estimate of the actual degree of error. For example, after calculating the 
NPV of a project, he might state that this figure is subject to an error of 
plus or minus 10%. Or he might state that the chance of the true NPV being 
more than 10% different from his estimate is less than one in twenty. There 
are many ways the analyst can state his error estimate. The point here is 
that the error estimate is obtained subjectively without recourse to formal 
calculation.
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The advantages of subjective estimates are their ability to account 
for variability not reflected in objective measures, and (ordinarily) the ease 
with which they can be formulated. The drawbacks of the subjective approach 
are that the decision maker may place less confidence in such an estimate and 
that he may have difficulty defending his decision to critics. Further, the 
absence of a well-defined approach to error estimation, which necessarily 
occurs in subjective estimates, makes it impossible for anyone to trace the 
analyst's approach and to assess its reasonableness. 
6.3 Selective Sensitivity Analysis 
This method is an objective approach to error estimation In the sense 
that it is arrived at via an explicit series of calculations. The most conmion 
variant of selective sensitivity analysis goes as follows. The analyst selects 
a parameter in the NPV calculation which he feels is both subject to error 
and capable of significantly affecting the NPV calculation. He selects likely 
high and low (or best and worst) values for this parameter and computes the NPV 
with each. The decision maker Is then presented with three NPV estimates for 
each project--high, medium and low--and for each parameter selected for 
sensitivity analysis. 
For example, in a project to determine the economic viability of a wind 
energy system, the price of oil for the period 1980-1985 may be an important 
parameter. The NPV for the project would be initially computed using all the 
"best" estimates for each parameter. Thee, NPV would be computed using the 
high and low prices of oil, but with the same "best" estimate of other 
parameters. Thus, the decision maker will have information on how sensitive 
NPV is to the 1980-1985 price of oil. The same procedure, for example, could 
be carried out for the 1980-1985 demand for electricity. 
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The advantages of selective sensitivity analysis are derived from the 
objective nature and relative ease of computation. Its objectivity ensures 
that defenders and critics alike argue the merits of the analysis on well-
specified data and assumptions. The major difficulty with this approach is 
that it is usually unsuited for the analysis of anything more than a few 
parameters. This difficulty can be appreciated from the following. 
For concreteness, let us suppose that the calculations for each of two 
alternative projects involve ten parameters, each a candidate for sensitivity 
analysis. A selective sensitivity analysis of the ten parameters would produce 
twenty NPVs for each project, in addition to the initial "best" estimate. The 
analyst must present to the decision maker a total of forty-two NPVs. Such 
a large number of figures may not aid the decision maker at all. In fact, the 
presentation of all NPV estimates might even violate the analyst's charge to 
present the decision maker with results in a format convenient for his use. 
Even more important than format convenience, the twenty-one NPV's presented 
to the decision maker for each project omit a great deal of important informa-
tion. For instance, the decision maker may wish to know the worst outcome he 
can reasonably expect. He might associate this outcome with the simultaneous 
realization of, say, seven worst outcomes and three medium outcomes on the 
parameters. (Recall that this information is not computed under selective 
sensitivity analysis. Each parameter is evaluated at its worst while every 
other is set at medium. No simultaneous "worsts" are calculated.) Further-
more, the decision maker would undoubtedly like to know the chance of such a 
worst outcome. 
The reader may object that it is not difficult, in principle, to calcu-
late all the combinations of worst, medium, and best for each parameter. 
97
Then, for this relatively simple case of ten parameters, the decision maker 
would be presented with 
310 
or 59,049 NPVs for each project! And one still 
has not incorporated information such as the chance of one of the bottom 1000 
outcomes actually happening. These objections are all answered by the next 
approach. 
6.4 General Sensitivity Analysis 
This approach hinges on the derivations of a probability distribution 
of NPV outcomes. In this way, all of the information contained in the 59,049 
individual possible NPV outcomes of the previous paragraph is captured in a 
format very convenient for the decision maker. At a glance he can tell for 
each project the chances of breaking even, of complete disaster or of over-
whelming triumph. Since this approach is least likely to be familiar to the 
reader, it shall be sketched in greater detail than the previous approaches. 
The b it	 it 
and the c which constitute the heart of the NPV calculation 




For each specification of a, a particular NPV will result. 
In general, the members of a will not all be independent of each other. 
For example, suppose a contains the three parameters: 
1985 price of oil, P, 
1985 quantity of oil consumed, Q, and 
1985 price of natural gas, 
Suppose that high, medium, and low estimates are available for each. These 
high, medium, and low estimates are projected to occur with certain probabilities 
for each parameter. Table 6.1 summarizes the nature of the raw data. Since 
these are three parameters, each with three possible values, it might be 
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Table 6.1 Illustrative Occurence Probabilities 
Probability of Occurence 
Parameter High Medium	 Low 
P 1/3 1/2	 1/6 





	 I)emanc1De d Curve for Oil 
I.	 M	 H 
Figure 6.1 Illustrative demand curve for oil 
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thought that these parameters alone would give rise to 33 or 27 NPV 
figures (for each specification of the remaining parameters in a). This 
would not be correct. Since these three parameters are related, only certain 
of the 27 possibilities can really occur. The relation is clear from elemen-
tary economic reasoning. The price of oil and the quantity consumed are 
related by the demand curve for oil. The higher the price, the lower the 
quantity, and conversely. Figure 6.1 depicts the necessary relation. It is 
clear that rather than nine possible combinations of values for P and Q, 
there are only three. These are 
(P0' Q0 ) = (H,L), (M, M), and (L, H). 
In many ways, natural gas is a substitute tor oil. Thus, if the price of oil 
were high, some users would switch to gas, increasing the demand for that prod-
uct. The increased demand, of course, drives up the price of gas. The re-







Figure 6.2 Illustrative demand and supply curves for gas, given 
various oil prices. 
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DM1 and DH are the demand curves for gas when the price of oil is low, medium, 
and high, respectively. Note that the market price of natural gas will tend 
to be high, medium, or low as the market price of oil is high, medium, or low, 
respectively, Thus, there are only three, not nine, possible relations between 
P and P C . These are 0 
= (H, H), (N, M), (L, L) 
Finally, it is clear that instead of twenty-seven there are only three 
possible sets of values for all three parameters: 
(P, Q' PG) = (H, L, H), (M, M, N), (L, H, Q. 
The associated probabilities are 1/3, 1/2, and 1/6, respectively, for these sets 
to occur. Note how the proper consideration of dependencies among parameters 
does affect the final NW probability distributions. Proceeding as though 
the three parameters were not related, the outcome (H, M, H) has a prob-
ability of 1/3 x 1/2 x 1/3 = 1/18, and a corresponding NW would be calcu-
lated. In fact, (H, M, H) will not occur, so its correct probability is 
zero; no corresponding NW is to be figured. 
In general, the parameters in the set a must be separated into subsets 
on the following bases: 
1) If any two parameters cy. and a . are related, they must be in the 
same subset. 
2) If any two parameters




It follows that each oe . must be a member of one, and only one, subset. 
It is likely that some subsets have only one a. in them. Denote the sub-
sets as Al., A2 , ...,	 A, where 
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A. J = {ci.1 , ...} 
and J	 (the number of original parameters). 
Since the a 1 's in each A. are related, there are only certain combinations of 
values each A. can assume. The analyst must determine these combinations and 
the corresponding probabilities. Suppose the set A. can assume 0. different 
configurations. Denote these configurations as 
A. 1 , A. 2 ....., A. 0 ; and the corresponding probabilities as P(A1) 
P(A. 2	
3
), ...,P(A.Q J ). 
J  
Naturally, the probabilities over the values of any A. must sum to unity. 
It might be useful at this point to summarize the discussion and clarify 
the notation via an example. Suppose 
o.{cz,c,cL,c	 and 1	 2	 3	 14	 5	 6 
A1 ={a 1 c3, a 4 




A11 = (H, L, H) A21 = (L,	 L) A31 = (L) 
Al2 . = (M, M, M) A22 = (L, M) A32 = (M) 
A13 = (L, H, L) A23 = (M, N) A33 = (H) 
A24 = (M, H) 
P(A11 ) = 1/3 P(A21) = 1/10 P(A31) = 1/3 
P(Al2 ) = 1/2 P(A22) = 3/10 P(A32) = 1/3 
P(A13 ) = 1/6 P(A23) = 4/10 P(A33) = 1/3 
P(A24 ) = 2/10
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In this example, K = 6, J = 3, 0, = 3, e = 4, e = 3. 
Returning to the development of general sensitivity analysis, the dis-
tribution of NPV can be done in either of two ways: complete enumeration 
or random sampling. 
6.4.1	 Complete Enumeration 
When the total number of parameter combinations (ei x 02 x ...x	 e)
is small, say less than 100, then all the possible NPV's can be computed 
with their corresponding probabilities. (The use of an electronic computer 
would certainly ease matters.) It should be clear to the reader that the 
number of NPV calculations equals the number of parameter combinations. Each 
calculation will yield a NW and a probability of observing it. Of course, 
the probability is calculated separately from the NW. In terms of the fore-




a2 a3 , '4
 a5, 0'6	 (H, L, L, H, L, L). 
In practice
-
numbers replace the H's, N's, and L's. With all the parameters 
specified, the NW is calculated--say NW = 100. Then 
P(A 11 ) x P(A 21 ) x P(A 31 ) = 1/90. 
For the example, 36 (3 x 4 x 3) such calculations must be performed to yield 
each NW and its corresponding probability. From these pairs, it is an 
easy matter to construct the cumulative probability density function of 
NW for the project at hand. To do this, choose a number of arbitrary NW 
figures, and add up the probabilities of the calculated NW's which fall below 
each of those arbitrarily chosen figures. The results may be plotted to yield 
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Figure 6.3 Illustrative cumulative probability density function 
a graphical display. It would look something like Figure 6.3. The inter-
pretation is straightforward. The decision maker can tell at a glance that 
if he chooses this project 
- the chance that its NPV turns out less than zero is about .05 or one 
in twenty, 
- there is no chance that NP'? can be less than -1000, 
- the chance of a positive NPV is 95 percent, 
- the chance of an NP'? over 5000 is zero, 
- the chance of an NP'? between 0 and 3000 is about 80 percent, 
- the expected (or best single estimate of) NPV is 1500, etc. 
The NP'? cumulative probability distribution is a powerful tool for the 
decision maker. It presents him with all the relevant information in a 
very convenient format. It explicitly shows what risks a decision entails. 
6.4.2 Random Sampling 
When the total number of parameter combinations (01 x 82 X	 X 0) 
is large, it is both impractical and unnecessary to compute the NPV and associated 
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probability for each combination. Instead, a random sample of, say, 100 com-
binations can be drawn from the total population of combinations. The random 
process is assurance that these 100. will be representative. The NPV cumulative 
probability function is then derived just as above. The interpretation is also 
the same as above. 
The discussion of general sensitivity analysis has assumed that the analyst 
is able to assign meaningful probabilities to the sets of a. 's, i.e. to A1, 
A 2 , etc. Suppose that the analyst determines that for some subset of the 
y. 'S, say A. 1 , ..., A. 0 ., he simply cannot assign probabilities which are any-
thing more than totally arbitrary. Formally, this situation--where meaningful 
probabilities cannot be assigned--is called a situation of uncertainty, while the 
situation where probabilities are assignable is called a situation of risk. 
Previous discussion has dealt with risk, not uncertainty. It is difficult 
to say why probabilities can be assigned in one circumstance and not in 
another. To some extent, it is a matter of the analyst's judgement. However, 
it is probably fair to say that uncertain situations are usually relatively 
unique and/or involve guessing about conscious human choice. For example, 
an analyst might consider that the state of East-West relations over Berlin 
in 1980 is an uncertain situation. On the other hand, the state of midwest 
rainfall in 1980 is a risk environment. Meaningful probabilities can be assigned 
to the possible outcomes using past data. 
The uncertainty of a parameter--the inability or unwillingness of the 
analyst to assign probabilities to the possible values of that parameter--does 
not destroy general sensitivity analysis, but it does complicate matters somewhat. 
The analyst must compute a NPV cumulative probability function for each value 
(say H, M, L) of the uncertain parameter or set of parameters. In terms of the 
previous example, suppose the analyst has uncertainty about the possible values 
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of A 1
 = (c)	 cr4). That is, he knows the possible values are (H, L, H), 
(M, M, N), and (L, H, L), but he cannot assign probabilities to these outcomes. 
Three NW cumulative probability functions can be computed, each considering 
one of the uncertain values as given. This information is then presented to 
the decision maker who must subjectively determine the likelihood of the 
occurrence of the uncertain states and act accordingly. The analyst has pro-
vided the decision maker with as much information as possible in a digestable 
format. By admitting uncertainty, the analyst has not implied his calculations 
are more precise than they really are. 
6.5 Choice of Sensitivity Analysis 
The three levels at which sensitivity analysis can be performed has been 
discussed in this section. Which one should the analyst use? If the cost-
benefit analyst were not constrained by time and resources in conducting his 
cBA, general sensitivity analysis would be the recommendation for all but the 
simplest cases. It provides the most complete and reliable information in a 
digestable format for the decision maker. However, the time and resources 
available for a CBA are usually limited. In the absence of a specific charge 
by the decision maker, the analyst must determine the proper level of sensitivity 
analysis by an exercise of judgement.
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SECTION 7 
PERFORMING A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
7.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this section is to present an overall design for CBA and 
integrate the material of earlier sections into that design. A central theme 
of this section is the importance of planning the design, or charting the course 
of a CBA. Too often, the tendency is to plunge directly into gathering data 
and estimating benefits and costs with the hope that it will all fit together. 
In an undertaking as complex as CBA, this is not a wise course. Much effort 
is wasted and much remains undone when precise plans do not guide the 
analysis. 
Another theme of this section is the analyst's interaction with the 
decision maker. The decision maker Is the beginning and the end of the CBA 
cycle. Initially, the decision maker must communicate to the analyst a detailed 
description of the problem to be addressed and the nature of the information 
he desires, e.g., the scope of the sensitivity analysis or the emphasis of the 
social impact analysis. The analyst's design of the CBA will reflect, in 
large measure, the requirements of the decision maker. The completed CBA is 
finally used by the decision maker as an aid in making the requisite decision. 
CBA is an information-processing "machine." The decision maker's input to the 
analyst will affect the analyst's output to the decision maker. The better the 
problem is specified the more useful will be the final report to the decision 
maker. 
Figure 7.1 presents a schematic representation of the major steps in CBA. 
Some of the steps have already been discussed in detail, the others are the 
primary subject matter of this chapter. The numbers adjacent to each block 
refer to that part of this section dealing with that topic. 
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(4)
Figure 7.1 Flow diagram depicting major steps in performing 
a cost-benefit analysis. Numbers in parenthesis 
refer to section in text dealing with the 
corresponding step. 
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7.2 Defining the Problem 
Although defining the problem to be analyzed may appear to be an almost 
trivial task, any CBA veteran will testify otherwise. This first step gives 
direction to the remainder of the analysis. It is here that the decision maker 
plays a crucial role, communicating to the analyst precisely what he wishes to 
be done. It is the analyst's task to record these desires, and elicit what-
ever information is needed to exactly define the problem. While each project 
has its own unique features, many aspects of problem definition are common to 
most and though such a listing can never be complete, it forms a basic checklist 
for both the analyst and decision maker. A discussion of these aspects is 
given below. 
7.2.1 Project and Scenario 
A technical description and a detailed scenario definition of the 
projects to be analyzed are obviously important initial steps. The main point 
here is that explicit recognition should be given to all resource inputs and final 
outputs of the projects, and the calendar time in which they will occur. On 
the input side, these descriptions must include the types and amounts of 
resources (e.g., numbers of scientists, managers, clerical staff; various types 
of capital components for initiation, operation, and maintenance of the projects; 
amount and nature of land needed to site the facilities, etc.). On the output 
side, the time streams of each final good of the projects (e.g. electrical 
energy, miles of highway, retrained manpower, etc.) are equally important. 
The nature and physical dimensions of "externalities," (e.g., smoke, noise, 
water pollutants, etc.) must also be communicated to the analyst. 
Often, some of this information will not be available. This lack of 
information is not detrimental to the analysis as long as this lack is 
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recognized and dealt with, not ignored. The usual ways of solving this 
information problem are either to perform a simultaneous "engineering" study 
to determine unknown technical values or to parameterize the unknown values in 
recognition that the final results will be conditional on the assumed parameter 
values. 
7.2.2 Status-Quo Scenario 
Similarly, a technical description and detailed scenario of the 
universal alternative--the status quo--should be constructed. Every project 
has an alternative, even If it is to "do nothing." For to "do nothing" implies 
a time stream of costs and benefits to society just as a project does. 
Of course, it's exactly this "do-nothing" or status quo scenario with which 
each project is compared. CBA focuses on how a project will change the 
status quo time stream of social well-being. Thus, only the differences between 
the status quo time stream and the with-project time stream are considered in 
CBA. The "good" differences are the benefits of the project, the "bad" 
differences are the costs. Since the difference that the project will make 
is of primal importance, it is essential to have the status-quo scenario with 
which to compare the project scenario. An example will clarify this need for 
a status-quo scenario. 
Consider a project to provide electric energy using wind, i.e., "windmill" 
construction. Suppose the social cost of a windmill--the value of the resourceE 
used to build a windmill--is known. Are the benefits the value of the electri-
city produced? Not necessarily. It depends on the status-quo scenario. If, 
in the absence of windmills, conventional means of producing electricity would 
be expanded so that society will get the same amount of electric energy without 
as with windmills, the benefits would be in the value of fuel saved by conven-
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tional power generators, not in the extra electricity. There would be no 
difference in electricity generated, but there would be a difference in the 
amount of oil, for example, that society could put to alternative uses. On 
the other hand, if the status-quo scenario provided less electricity than did 
the windmill project, at least part of the benefits of the project would be 
in the value of electricity produced by windmills. 
7.2.3 Definition of Society 
CBA attempts to assess social costs and social benefits; that is, 
CBA takes the public point of view. As the reader will recall from Section 4, 
the value of a project is the sum of its value to each member of society. 
Clearly, then costs and benefits depend on who is included in society. For 
projects at the national level, the usual definition is that society consists 
of all U.S. citizens. At the regional, state, and local levels, the operational 
definition of society is not so easily made. There are often benefit 
and cost spillovers (externalities) beyond the stipulated geographical bounds of 
the project. For example, a state-level manpower-training program has obvious 
spillover benefits--some persons who receive training will eventually migrate 
out of that state. Benefits will accrue to both residents and non-residents of 
the state. Which benefits are to be counted in the CBA? The most appealing 
(to economists) normative answer is that all benefits ought to be counted. 
However, there are any number of circumstances in which this will not be very 
palatable. If the training program were financed entirely by taxes on state 
residents, political realities might dictate that the benefits to the residents 
outweigh the costs, irrespective of whoever else gains. The point here is that 
the decision maker must define the "society" which the analyst is to employ. 
Almost inevitably, some uncounted effects will occur and spill over onto persons 
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not included in the CBA's society. When this spillover is apparent, the 
analyst should point it out to the decision maker. To reiterate, the decision 
maker is the final authority on the bounds of "society" for the purposes of the 
CBA.
7.2.4 Constraints on the Problem 
It may be necessary that to be chosen, a project must satisfy a 
number of diverse constraints. Such constraints may be budgetary, legal, 
social, political, or institutional. These, of course, must be communicated 
to the analyst at the start of the CBA. This early communication will enable 
the analyst to quickly exclude alternative projects which obviously are not 
feasible. It is impossible to completely explore the scope of each type of 
constraint; however, an example of each will convey their spirit: 
budgetary:	 The initial cost of the project cannot exceed $X and annual 
operating costs cannot exceed $Y. 
legal:	 Pollution caused by the project cannot exceed some set 
standards. 
social:	 Benefits and costs of the project cannot be divided along 
racial lines. 
political:	 Benefits and costs of the project cannot be inequitably 
divided among different political jurisdictions, e.g. 
states. 
institutional: The project cannot usurp the powers of institution X in 
favor of institution Y, e.g. place matters pertaining to 
the Department of Agriculture in the domain of the AEC. 
Although the placement of a particular constraint in a particular category may 
be somewhat arbitrary, the important point is that each constraint be explicitly 
recognized to the extent possible and incorporated into the analysis. It is 
the decision maker's task to inform the analyst of all such constraints. 
7.2.5 Direction of Social Impact Analysis 
One can argue that, in principle, the analyst should have free rein 
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over the social impact analysis. After all, he must carefully describe all 
relevant non-quantifiable effects of the projects in an objective manner. 
However, the harsh realities of time and budgetary restrictions will often 
impede a completely thorough approach. Thus, when the analyst is forced to 
trade off one area of investigation against another, it is useful to be aware 
of the decision maker's preferences and needs. 
Accepting the decision maker's direction in the social impact analysis 
should not undermine the integrity of the analyst's report. The previous 
paragraph may cause alarm in those who feel the decision maker often has biases 
and his influence will alter the neutrality of the CBA. Although the existence 
of bias is, of course, a possibility, the analyst must flatly state in his 
report to the extent desirable which areas have not been investigated, and also 
state his opinion as to whether such an investigation would affect the overall 
assessment of a project. In addition, he should state to what extent his 
choice of areas for social impact investigation was influenced by the decision 
maker. In this way, the decision maker may be accommodated without a sacrifice 
of CBA integrity. 
7.2.6 Control Variables 
Often, all the technical details of a project will not be initially 
specified by the decision maker. Rather, the analyst will be charged with 
choosing optimal values for some variables, such as scale, location, start-up 
time, number of installations, etc. In a strict sense, optimization falls 
outside the domain of CBA and generally into the domain of optimization methods. 
The variables to be optimized, if any, should be clearly distinguished from 
those to be parameterized. Ordinarily, the latter are outside the control of 
the decision maker (sometimes called "state variables") and the former are not. 
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However, the distinction is not always so clearcut and the decision maker 
and analyst should agree on which non-specified variables are to be optimized 
and which merely parameterized. 
7.2.7	 Discount Rate 
As mentioned previously, the discount rate is best considered a 
policy variable, to be set by the decision maker. He may desire that a single 
rate be used, or he may request that several values be considered. Alterna-
tively, he may wish critical values to be computed. The analyst must get this 
direction from the decision maker. 
7.2.8 Time Horizon 
The time horizon is also a policy variable, though it is not as 
volatile an issue as the discount rate. The decision maker must decide how 
far into the future that costs and benefits are to be projected and thus 
counted into the net present value of the project. Ordinarily, most costs of 
a public project are incurred in its early years, so a truncated time horizon 
has the effect of excluding more benefits than costs from consideration. Thus, 
a time horizon places a conservative bias on the NPV calculation but it should be 
realized that with time horizons of fifty years or more, the bias is very 
slight. The discounting process is such that values occurring fifty years or 
more in the future add little to present value. Clearly, the higher the 
discount rate chosen, the shorter the time horizon that need be considered. 
7.2.9 Data Sources 
Although source identification and data gathering are responsibilities 
of the analyst, it will often be the case that the decision maker, through his 
own investigations prior to commissioning the CBA, will have come across 
relevant data sources. The analyst, in the interest of saving time, should 
explore such possibilities before initiating his own searches. 
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7.2.10 Format of Results 
Throughout these discussions, it has been stressed that the analyst's 
task is to present the decision maker with all the relevant information in a 
convenient format. Although it may not seem like an important point, the 
convenience of the format may well affect the extent to which the decision 
maker utilizes the CBA as a decision aid. Thus, the analyst should elicit 
from the decision maker his preferences regarding the scope of the sensitivity 
analysis, use of critical values, and what general level of "technical 
language" should be used in the report proper. 
In summary, defining the problem is the first step in a CBA. It requires 
close cooperation and communication between decision maker and analyst. 
Insofar as it gives direction to the rest of the study, it should be treated 
as a major part of a CBA. Failure to invest time in problem definition almost 
invariably results in confusion and wasted efforts in the remainder of the 
study. 
7.3 Designing the Analysis 
Formally designing the cost-benefit analysis should be done during the 
early stages of a CBA before plunging into data collection and cost and 
benefit estimation. Six basic points are involved in carrying out the design 
and are discussed below. 
7.3.1 The Problem Structure 
Determining the analytic structure of the problem follows directly 
from defining the problem. The purpose here is to determine which measure 
(e.g. net present value on benefit-cost ratio) to employ in comparing 
alternatives. In Section 2.3 the relation between the structure of a problem 
and the decision measure to employ was discussed. The main aspects of structure 
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are the dependence or independence of projects, the type of constraints, and 
the variables to be optimized. At this stage of the design, the analytic 
structure of the problem should be written out as carefully as possible and 
all vagaries should be uncovered. 
7.3.2 Preliminary Identification of Costs and Benefits 
The identification problem was discussed at length in Section 3. 
Basically, there are two ways of discovering costs and benefits: searching 
for affected goods and services or searching for affected persons. In practice, 
it is useful to employ both of these approaches, remembering, however, that 
each is a different way of arriving at the same costs and benefits. That is, 
either the commodities or the persons approach is a good way to discover 
effects, but only one can be used to count a cost or benefit. Using both 
results in double counting. How are the affected commodities and persons to be 
discovered? A number of complementary ways can be used to suggest what inter-
relationships exist between the project and the rest of the economy: 
a) Economic theory 
b) Professional literature dealing with previous similar projects 
c) The scenarios developed in defining the problem 
d) Introspection 
e) Brainstorming with colleagues 
f) Interviews with interested persons, including the decision-maker. 
Thus, the result of this step is a list of costs and benefits which are 
likely to be incurred by each project under consideration. 
7.3.3 Assessment of the Listed Costs and Benefits 
This assessment is with respect to validity and quantifiability. 
With regard to the former, the analyst must be wary of including transfer 
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payments or sunk costs as social benefits or costs. He must also be sure that 
true values are not being double counted. It must then be determined whether, 
to what extent, and in what dimensions each valid cost and benefit can be 
quantified. This determination requires a cursory survey both of data 
availability and of the potential of gathering new data. 
7.3.4 Scope and Dimensions of the quantitative Analysis 
In principle, a CBA should deal with all. the costs and benefits of a 
project. Some of these will be quantified, the others treated in a qualitative 
fashion. It is not too great a departure from conventional usage to bring 
all the qualitative analysis under the umbrella term of social impact anlaysis. 
Of necessity, some costs and benefits such as intangibles can be treated only 
qualitatively. Among the quantifiable costs and benefits, some may not be 
quantified in the CBA because of time and budgetary restrictions. Of those 
which are quantified, some will be put in money terms and others in their own 
dimensions (inconmiensurables). However, by no means is there a well-defined 
boundary between incoimnensurables and the costs and benefits which have ready 
dollar values. It is probably best to consider the costs and benefits of a 
project as lying along a spectrum of "quantifiability," ranging from 
intangibles through incoinmensurables to market goods. Intangibles would 
include the project's effects on such things as social justice, social harmony, 
personal freedom, democracy, aesthetics, etc. These all involve values beyond 
the economic and do not exhibit even likely dimensions for measurement, much 
less actual numerical values. Incommensurables would include lives lost, 
injuries and illnesses sustained, national defense, other public goods such as 
recreation facilities, and some externalities. Evidently, inconimensurables may 
involve economic or non-economic values. Their distinguishing characteristic 
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is that they may be readily quantified, but not in money terms. For example, 
measurements can easily be made of number of lives lost, number of work days 
lost due to illness or number of user-days of a recreation facility. Measure-
ments can even be made of national defense as a probability of forestalling 
pre-emptive nuclear attacks, or as a percentage of population survival after 
an enemy's first strike. Of course, to a greater or lesser extent, these 
measurements are not easily converted into dollar values. 
Market goods are agricultural products, textiles, electricity, auto 
servicing, etc.--any good or service exchanged through a market. The most 
important feature of a market good is the existence of a corresponding market 
price which, subject to the qualifications outlined in Section 4, directly 
measures social value in money terms. 
Thus, with regard to a spectrum of "quantifiability," all non-quantifiable 
costs and benefits fall into the intangibles range and all quantifiable 
effects are in the incommensurable-market goods range. Only effects in the 
market goods range, however, are readily measured in money terms. There is no 
clearcut boundary between any of the ranges in the spectrum and it often 
happens that some cost or benefit will appear to lie somewhere between 
incommensurables and market goods. Such a cost will be readily measurable in 
non-monetary terms but will also appear convertible into a meaningful dollar 
value. As an example, such costs may be associated with recreation benefits, or 
losses due to illnesses or injuries. One of the major problems faced by the 
analyst is determining how far to go in converting apparent incommensurables 
into dollar values. Some observers would argue that the analyst should convert 
all effects into dollar values, even intangibles. The idea is simply that the 
NPV thus computed captures everything. This complete conversion virtually 
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obviates the role of the decision maker, since he could easily be replaced 
by a 3x5 file card containing such Immutable rules as: If NPV > 0, accept 
the project. This notion--total conversion into dollar values--has probably 
been the greatest source of criticism for CBA. Fortunately, the advocates of 
that notion seem to be waning in strength. 
On the other hand, a CBA which fails to convert enough effects into 
dollars will not be a successful decision aid. For the decision maker will 
then be forced to compare projects on the basis of two- or three-dozen 
dimensions, a situation not too far removed from eyeballing raw data. Once 
again,, then, how far is the analyst to go in converting seeming incommensurables 
into dollar values? Although there is no categorical answer, the decision 
maker can specify to the analyst those apparent incommensurables for which he 
can accept dollar conversions and those for which he cannot. The decision 
maker and the analyst can jointly determine the dimensionality of the results. 
In effect, with the technical aid of the analyst in elucidating relevant 
tradeoffs, the decision maker determines the cut-off point in the cost-benefit 
spectrum between effects usefully measured in dollars and those better measured 
in their own dimensions. This process would appear to be the only way the 
analyst can ensure that his approach to quantification will be acceptable to 
the decision maker in the sense that the results are credible and thus useful 
as a decision aid. 
In brief, this discussion has centered on determining the scope and 
dimensionality of the quantitative part of the CBA. Implicitly, then, the 
breadth of the social impact analysis (the qualitative part of the CBA) is 
determined simultaneously. For whatever effects are not quantitatively analyzed 
must be qualitatively analyzed, at least cursorily. The factors affecting this 
119
determination are portrayed in Figure 7.2. There is no denying that the 
analyst must exercise his own judgement in allowing each of these factors to 
influence his determination. 
7.3.5 Choice of Sensitivity Analysis 
The three broad levels of sensitivity analysis discussed in Section 
6 were subjective, partial, and general. There it was pointed out that the 
choice of which level of sensitivity analysis to employ depends on the inevitable 
trade off between time and resources spent on one part of the CBA versus time 
and resources spent on another, and how this relates to the quality of the 
overall CBA. It was also mentioned that in certain circumstances mean values 
alone are sufficient to guide the decision maker, obviating the need for 
extensive sensitivity analysis. Finally, the desires of the decision maker 
must be considered. There is no point in developing extensive probability 
distributions of net present value if the decision maker will not use the 
information. Of course, the analyst should perform that analysis when the 
decision maker expresses the desire for such information. Once again, this 
issue must be decided by the good judgement of the analyst. 
7.3.6 Determination of Data to be Collected 
This flows directly from the discussions of sub-sections 7.3.4 and 
7.3.5 above. Once the nature of the quantitative analysis is set and the type 
of sensitivity analysis which will be employed is known, the necessary data to 
accomplish these tasks is manifest. Essentially, the process of sub-section 
7.3.4 determines the category of data needed (e.g., price of electricity in 
1985) and that of 7.3.5 determines whether point estimates are needed, or 
bounding estimates should be used like high and low values in addition to a 
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Figure 7.2	 Factors affecting quantification of costs and benefits 
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need be sought out. 
7.4 Collecting the Data 
Although it isn't necessary to go into a detailed discussion on collecting 
data, a few common sense considerations deserve mention. Planning the format 
of the collected data is extremely important. The format should specify the 
number of significant figures for each entry and should allow easy access to any 
part of the data, and should be capable of quick updating. The data should be 
gathered from original sources when possible. Using original sources minimizes 
the risk of recording errors which creep into transcribed data. All the 
qualifications to the data should be accurately recorded. Finally, the sources 
of all data should be recorded for eventual reference in preparing footnotes and 
bibliography. 
7.5 Performing the Analysis 
Quantitative analysis was treated at length in Sections 4, 5 and 6. The 
essence of this task is the use of raw data and the economic theory of Section 
4 to make good estimates of social costs and benefits. The identification of 
such costs and benefits was discussed in Section 3. If a thorough job of 
designing the analysis (discussed above) has been done, the analyst hopefully 
will encounter no major problems at this state. Performing a thorough job is 
not to say that every estimate will be precise, only that any lack of precision 
will be acknowledged either verbally, or in formal sensitivity analysis. The 
quantitative analysis includes finding "best" point estimates of the social 
value of a project along with a sensitivity analysis. 
Performing the social impact analysis, defined to include an examination 
of non-economic effects, was discussed in Section 5. In this part of the 
analysis all non-quantified effects are brought out as clearly as possible. 
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As mentioned previously, some aspects may receive more extensive treatment at 
the expense of other aspects. There is no objection to this type of treatment 
so long as the relative importance of each effect is not obscured, and the 
analyst holds fast to a completely scientific (i.e. neutral) viewpoint. 
7.6 Preparing the Results 
Throughout Part I, three key points emerge time and again. These are 
(1) that CBA depends on the proper identification and measurement of all 
project effects, 
(2) that inconimensurables and intangibles, which are those effects which 
are not susceptible to quantification or monetization, must be 
acknowledged and displayed as accurately as possible, and 
(3) that CBA, ultimately, is an aid to the decision maker. 
These three points provide, in a sense, the critical test of a CBA 
accounting scheme. Such a scheme must permit the comprehensive itemization of 
project effects and their corresponding quantification, the qualitative 
assessment of intangibles, and all in a format useful to the decision maker. 
A CBA accounting scheme should also lend itself to the special demands 
which are often made on project analyses. These special demands include 
analyses of project impacts on regional development, income redistribution 
among income classes, the environment, and social values in general. 
Figure 7.3 presents an accounting format which is designed to fulfill the 
foregoing requirements. All project effects with which the analyst has 
associated dollar values are listed under monetized effects. Here, the entries 
are generally descriptive. However, quantitative information can also be 
presented, as when the particular effect is an "incommensurable." For both 
benefits and costs, the national entries are analyzed into regional and income 
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class components. Line 1 summarizes the real direct effects of the project. 
Line 2 allows whatever income transfers are present to be displayed. Line 3 
summarizes the monetary effects on a regional basis, and line 4 summarizes the 
effects by income class. 
A general summary table, less detailed than the foregoing accounting 
format, is often very useful. The following figure serves the dual purpose of 
suggesting a format for a general summary table and succinctly reviewing for 
the reader what information the analyst must eventually provide the decision 
maker. The illustration assumes two projects are being compared (each of 
course, to the status-quo). Suppose there are two uncertain parameters which 
affect the results, a and	 Suppose they are dependent and can jointly 
assume only the values (high, low) and (medium, medium). Recall that 
uncertainty is to be distinguished from risk. Under risk, even though a 
correct value is not known for sure, meaningful probabilities can be attached 
to the various possibilities. Under uncertainty, the analyst is unable to 
assign such probabilities. Thus, a "risky" parameter can be incorporated 
directly into a sensitivity analysis by weighting its various values by the 
probabilities. On the other hand, an uncertain parameter can only be used 
'!conditionally" in a sensitivity analysis. These ideals were discussed more 
fully in the previous chapter.
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SECTION 8 
GLOSSARY OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS TERMS 
This glossary defines major terms frequently employed in cost-benefit 
analysis. It is not intended to be comprehensive and many of the less 
important terms used in this report have not been included. The number in 
brackets after each definition refers to the text page on which the term 
is discussed. 
COMPETITIVE MODEL: An abstract model of a market economy which satisfies 
certain well-defined assumptions. It is the basic model of economic analysis. 
Economists have shown that an actual economy patterned after the competitive 
model will make the most efficient use of resources and make society as 
well off as possible (according to the Pareto criterion). If certain 
assumptions are made in addition to those characterizing the competitive 
model, it can be shown that observable market prices equal the shadow prices 
of the economy's goods and services 
COMPENSATING VARIATION: In considering movement from one economic state to 
another, the maximum amount of money the individual would be willing to pay 
to make the move (if he favors the move), or the minimum amount he would 
accept as compensation for making the move (if he does not favor the move) 
CONSUMER'S SURPLUS: The difference between what a consumer would be willing 
to pay for some good and the price of that good. Measures of consumer's 
surplus are derived from the consumer's demand curve, and are widely used 
in cost-benefit analysis when the project being investigated will cause a 
significant price change in some good. Consumer's surplus is an approxima-
tion to the more technically proper compensating variation. In general 
consumer's surplus is not a proper measure of benefits. 
COST: What must be given up to acquire or achieve something. Costs to 
individuals are often different than costs to society. This occurs when 
transfer payments or externalities are involved. Examples: Buying a used 
car is a cost to an individual but is not cost to society, since the transaction 
represents a transfer payment. 
Operating a car is a greater cost to society than to the individual, since 
pollution is created. This is an external diseconomy. 
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (CBA): A systematic evaluation of a project to deter-
mine whether, and to what extent, its social benefits outweigh its social 
costs. Also, the various techniques used to perform the evaluation, such 
as shadow pricing and discounting. CBA draws heavily on the concepts and 
methods of economics
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COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS (CEA): A systematic evaluation of alternative 
approaches to achieving a specified goal. The object is to select the 
least cost approach. CEA is most useful when the benefits are not readily 
and meaningfully translated into dollar amounts 
DEMAND: The schedule of the various quantities of some good which will be 
purchased at various prices during a specified period of time. The concept 
may refer to an individual or to the sum of all individuals--the market. 
Demand schedules may be represented in tabular, graphic, or equation 
form 
DIRECT EFFECTS: Increased real value of output or real cost associated with 
a project 
DISCOUNT RATE: Given some benefit (or loss) which will be incurred at 
some specified date in the future, the number which, when the future bene-
fit (or loss) is discounted by that amount, makes that benefit (or loss) 
comparable to one incurred in the present. The number is usually specified 
as an annual rate. Example: Suppose $100 is expected to be received im-
mediately. If the discount rate is 107, 107 x $100 = $10 means the $100 now 
is comparable to $110 one year from now 
ECONOMIC STATE (OF AFFAIRS): The distribution of utility, or satisfaction, 
among the members of society 
EFFICIENCY: A characteristic of a part, or the whole, of an economic system. 
Efficiency prevails when, for a given amount of input, the greatest possible 
output is produced. Alternatively, efficiency prevails when, for a given 
amount of output, the least possible input is used to produce it 
ELASTICITY: A measure of the responsiveness of quantity to price along 
demand or supply curves. It is defined as the percentage change in quantity 
divided by percentage change in price 
EQUILIBRIUM: A state of balance between opposing forces. An economic 
equilibrium is a situation which is gravitated towards and, once achieved, 
remains. The most common application is market equilibrium, wherein the 
forces of supply and demand drive the market price to an equilibrium. At 
equilibrium, the price tends to remain constant unless disturbed by new 
forces 
EQUITY: The "fairness" of the distribution of income, or utility, in an 
economic system. Since the concept inherently involves value judgements, 
there are no acceptable universal quantitative measures. Ordinarily, in 
CBA, the decision maker, when presented all the evidence, must subjectively 
determine whether reasonable equity standards are satisfied 
EXTERNAL EFFECTS: See "externality." 
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EXTERNALITY: A factor which causes an individual or firm to become better 
or worse off, but over which that individual or firm has no control, and 
for which that individual or firm can be charged no fee (in the case of 
an external economy) or can exact no compensation (in the case of an 
external diseconomy). Pollution is an often cited external diseconomy 
IMPERFECT COMPETITION: A term characterizing a market which is not perfectly 
competitive, such as monopoly, oligopoly, or monopolistic competition 
INCOMMENSURABLE: A gain or loss which, while easily quantified in its own 
dimensions, is not readily translated into monetary terms. The classic 
example is the loss of human life. Number of lives lost is (usually) 
easily determined, but the associated monetary value is elusive 
INDIRECT EFFECTS: The impact of a project on the rest of the economy. 
Indirect or secondary benefits are a form of external benefits. Their 
inclusion in cost-benefit analyses has been subject to violent attack in 
recent years. The logic of counting these benefits should be carefully 
constructed and justified in terms of the objectives of a project 
INTANGIBLE: A gain or loss for which there are not apparent dimensions in 
which to quantify the value of the gain or loss. Examples would include 
gains or losses in fields of aesthetics, personal freedom, social justice, 
international peace, or changes in the distribution of income 
INTERNAL EFFECTS: The effects of a project which accrue directly or 
indirectly to the entity under study. They are the benefits (costs) 
which are "captured" ("suffered") by a project and clearly are included 
in a cost-benefit analysis. 
MARGINALISM: A characterization applying to most forms of economic analysis 
in recognition of the fact that economic decisions are rarely "all or none" 
but rather "more or less." Thus, economic decisions are most often made 
"at the margin" 
MONOPOLY: A market situation in which there is only one firm selling a 
product with no close substitutes. Also, the firm itself 
NET PRESENT VALUE: A single number representation the value of a future 
stream of benefits and costs discounted to the present 
NORMATIVE ECONOMICS: See "welfare economics" 
OPPORTUNITY COST: Sometimes called "alternative cost." The value of the 
benefits foregone by choosing one course of action over another. As an 
aggregate measure, it is composed of individual shadow price valuations. 
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PARETO CRITERION: This is a criterion for judging an economic state which 
has achieved a high degree of acceptance among economists. It states that 
State One is (Pareto) superior to State Two if, in State One, no one is 
worse off than he would be in State Two and at least one person is better 
off. The problem with the Pareto Criterion is that it fails to be 
applicable to real situations wherein some persons are worse off, and 
some better off, in going from one state to another 
PECUNIARY EXTERNALITIES: The financial effects of a project on other parts 
of an economy as felt through price changes for outputs or inputs. They 
are not generally included among the effects of a project because they 
do not reflect changes in the real production of goods and services and 
often would lead to the double counting of project benefits on costs 
POSITIVE ECONOMICS: That branch of economics which describes, explains, 
and predicts actual economic phenomena. It is devoid of value judgements, 
saying nothing about whether or not given economic states of affairs are 
good or bad 
POTENTIAL PARETO CRITERION: This is a decision criterion used in judging 
the superiority of an economic state. By this criterion, State One is 
judged socially superior to State Two if those who gain by the choice of 
one over two could compensate those who lose such that, if compensation 
were paid, the final result would be that no one would be worse off. This 
is the criterion most frequently used in cost-benefit analysis 
PUBLIC GOOD: A good with two characteristics: 
i) Non-Rivalry in Consumption 
ii) Non-Excludability 
The first means that, at least up to some point, the consumption of the good 
by one person does not diminish the amount available to another person. The 
second means that, once provided, it is impractical, or impossible, to 
exclude anyone from consuming the good. Examples of public goods include 
bridges, parks, national defense, and disease control 
SCENARIO: An outline or synopsis indicating scenes, characters, plot, etc. 
This term has been adopted from theater use to dramatize the need for 
establishing and visualizing clearly the detailed nature of a project 
alternative 
SECONDARY EFFECTS: See "indirect effects." 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS: Given some relation A = F(P11J P2, 	 , P ), where 
the P's are parameters, the determination of the responsiveness 'in Q to 
changes in the parameters. This is an important aspect of cost-benefit 
analysis, since values for some parameters must often be crudely estimated. 
This allows the analyst to determine how sensitive his conclusions are to 
his choices of parameter values.
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SHADOW PRICE: The true economic value of a good, as measured by its ability 
to contribute to social well-being. The shadow price in economics is 
analogous to the dual variables of linear programming. In a perfectly 
competitive economy, market prices would accurately reflect shadow prices. 
Shadow prices are the proper valuations to employ in cost-benefit 
analysis 
SOCIAL IMPACT ANALYSIS: The attempt to identify all the significant direct 
and indirect effects of a proposed action on man's economic, social, cul-
tural, political, and physical environment. The analysis attempts to assess 
the magnitude of each impact and its value. Through the process of valua-
tion, an attempt is made to determine, as far as possible, whether the 
overall effect of the proposed action is socially favorable or not. S.I.A. 
also attempts to determine how detrimental effects can be circumvented. 
The analysis is an aid to the decision maker and should present as much 
information as possible in a digestable and useful format. Care must 
always be exercised to accurately convey the reliability limits of the 
analysis 
SOCIAL OPPORTUNITY COST: What society must give up in order to accomplish 
some goal or achieve some end. It represents the true cost of a project 
SOCIAL RATE OF TIME PREFERENCE: The discount rate at which society as a 
whole is willing to give up present consumption for future consumption. 
Although it cannot be observed in economic data and must be approximated, 
it is generally considered the correct discount rate for use in cost-
benefit analysis 
SUPPLY: The schedule of the various quantities of some good which will be 
offered for sale at various prices during a specified period of time. The 
concept may refer to a single firm or the sum of all firms--the market. 
Supply schedules may be represented in graphic, tabular, or equation 
form 
TECHNOLOGICAL EXTERNALITIES: Real consumption or production opportunity changes 
for other units in an economy which are due to a project. They represent 
changed social welfare, cannot easily be priced and are frequently 
incidental joint products. They are normally included in a cost-benefit 
analysis 
TRANSFER PAYMENT: A shift in income from one person to another or from 
government to some person for which there is no corresponding increase in 
current production. Thus, transfer payments are financial transactions 
which are not reflected in national income or national product accounting 
statements 
VALUE THEORY: That branch of economics which deals with explaining and 
predicting the values cf goods, as such values are revealed in economic 
transactions. Value theory is associated with supply-demand analysis 
and marginalism
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WELFARE ECONOMICS: That branch of economics concerned with measuring and 
improving individual and social well-being. It is based on explicitly 
stated value judgements, or criteria, by which economic states may be 
compared. The Pareto criterion is a widely used value judgement in wel-
fare economics 
WILLINGNESS-TO-PAY: The widely accepted measure of the value of some 
good to some individual. It is used for estimating the value of certain 
types of benefits, especially when market prices are not available 
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PART III 
EXAMPLE APPLICATIONS OF 




A small fraction of the solar energy falling on the earth each day is 
converted into surface winds, which in some areas are quite strong and 
provide a useful source of energy for performing mechanical work and generat-
ing electric power. Although windmills have been used more than a dozen 
centuries for grinding grain and pumping water, interest in large scale 
electric power generation has developed only over the past 50 years and 
is currently at high level due to the recent energy crisis [11. 
9.1 Work to Date on Wind Power Systems 
In order to estimate the potential of wind power systems it is 
necessary to identify candidate systems and obtain as much information as 
possible on their overall system performance characteristics, mechanical 
and electrical characteristics, estimated costs, etc. Following is a brief 
description of some of the perhaps more important works in the area of wind 
power systems. References to authors and titles of these works are listed 
at the end of this section. 
In 1939 work was begun on a 1.25 NW wind power plant on Grandpa's Knob 
near Rutland, Vermont. Electricity was generated and delivered to the 
utility transmission grid in October, 1941, the first synchronous generation 
of power from the wind. The rotors and electric generator were mounted on 
a 110 foot tower and turned in any direction to face the wind. The two 
stainless steel blades weighed 7.5 tons each and swept a circle 175 feet 
in diameter with a rated speed of 28.7 rpm. Full power operation was 
achieved for wind velocities in excess of 30 miles per hour, which occurred 
about 70 percent of the time. Icing of the blades was not a problem since the 
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ice would break up during rotation. The total weight of the wind power 
generator was 250 tons, and the cost was slightly over one million 
dollars [2]. 
Partly because the project was rushed to completion in the days preceed-
ing World War II, it was plagued with component failures. Replacements were 
especially difficult to obtain during the war. Finally, on March 26, 1945, 
the blade broke during a storm. Because of the limited financial resources 
of the company operating the plant, the generator was not repaired, but 
dismantled and removed from the site [3]. 
Based on the experience at Grandpa's Knob, the Federal Power Commission 
conducted a study of wind electric power generation for use with inter-
connected utility networks, and concluded that a power plant capacity be-
tween 5 and 10 Megawatts could make wind power economical. A 7.5 MW unit 
was designed using two-bladed propellers, similar to the propellers used 
on small airplanes. A separate design for a 6.5 MW plant used three-bladed 
propellers. A wind-driven d.c. generator provided power to a converter which 
produced synchronous a.c. power. The projected costs of these plants, in 1945 
dollars, were $68 per kilowatt of capacity for the 7.5 MW unit and $75 per 
kilowatt for the 6.5 MW unit [4]. 
In addition to the Grandpa's Knob experiment, a variety of similar pro-
jects have been undertaken around the world. A 100 kW direct current wind 
turbine with a 30 meter propeller diameter was operated in the Soviet Union 
in 1931. In 1942 a three bladed propeller 50 kW a.c. plant was operated in 
Germany, and the next year a 20 kW generator using two 6 bladed 9 meter 
diamter propellers was tested in Berlin. In Denmark a 200 kW generator 
with a single 3 bladed propeller of 24 meter diameter has been operated, 
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and a 100 kW 15 meter three bladed turbine has been tested in England. Be-
tween 1961 and 1966 a 35 meter diameter, 100 kW double bladed wind turbine 
operated in West Germany, following tests with a 10 kW model. The power 
output of the 100 kW unit increased linearly from 10 kW at a wind velocity 
of 4 meters/sec to 90 kW at 9 meters/sec. The power output was usually 
held to 90 kW for wind velocities greater than 9 meters/sec. The most 
spectacular European wind generator has been the 31 meter diameter, 800 kW 
generator built in France in 1958. This generator used a single three-
bladed propeller [5]. 
Another type of windmill known as the sail wing uses cloth sails on 
a wooden or tubular metal framework. These windmills are lightweight and 
cheap to construct, but require periodic maintenance of the cloth sails. 
Sherman [61 described work on an 8 meter diameter sail wing windmill 
erected on a small peanut and sesame farm in South India to lift soil and rock 
from the well being hand dug below the windmill. Sweeney and Nixon [71 
have reported on the current developments of the sail wing concept at Princeton 
University. 
Clews [8] reported on his home power system which uses a windmill to 
provide all his power for lights, appliances, TV, tools, etc. He uses a 
2 kW generator for use as an emergency backup system in case of prolonged 
calm periods. The complete installation costs $2800. 
A 100 kW windmill generator was constructed 1 by the NASA Lewis Research 
Center with a 125 foot diameter rotor blade mounted on a 100 foot tower [9]. It 
is located at the Plunibrook test area at Sandusky, Ohio and began opera-
tion in mid 1975. The project is designed to determine the performance, operating 
characteristics and economics of windmills for the future generation of commercial 
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electric power. The rotor blades are located on the downwind side of the 
tower and the alternator and transmission are housed in the enclosure on top. 
The three-phase generator is expected to reach 100 kW output from an 18 mph 
wind. This is the first large wind energy system constructed in the United 
States in 30 years. 
9.2 Scope of the Present Study 
Although concepts and technologies associated with wind power generation 
exist today, there is a lack of economic justification for the use of wind as 
a source of energy and the utility of wind power systems is not well established. 
It is therefore highly desirable to determine the potential of wind power 
systems with emphasis on systems that supply reliable energyat a cost that is 
competitive with other energy systems. 
The present study is not intended to be a complete cost-benefit evaluation 
for wind power systems. Cost-benefit analysis is inherently a project related 
decision making tool (i.e., accept or reject a proposed project, or select one 
or more of several alternate proposed projects). It is certain that there 
will be some wind energy projects which will be cost effective (e.g. on-site 
power generators at remote facilities), whereas certain applications of wind 
power may never be cost effective (e.g. wind powered transportation systems). 
The following sections give example applications of the economic 
techniques developed in Part II to cost-benefit evaluations for two example 
wind energy projects. Both examples are of the type where wind energy is used 
only as a fuel saver, not to augment electric generating capacity. These two 
cases are examples of the type of projects for which wind energy may find 
application.
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The scope of this program did not include the design of a windmill or a 
wind generator system. Emphasis was placed on determining not how much does 
a windmill system cost but rather what ranges of cost and scenario character-
istics correspond to positive net present values. 
With the economic tools developed in Part II, the wind assessment data 
in Section 12, and the examples developed in the following sections, the 
decision maker should be able to conduct a cost-benefit evaluation of any 
actual wind energy project under consideration. 
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This section describes the overall approach utilized in applying 
the cost-benefit methodology to the analysis of wind power systems. The 
approach adopted for the example application of the methodology consisted 
of the following activities: 
A. Surveying of the available wind data and wind power system 
information; 
B. Developing models which quantitatively described 
(1) wind distributions, 
(2) wind power systems, 
(3) conventional electric power generation systems, and 
(4) the cost and benefit differences between the conventional 
systems and wind power systems; 
C. Applying the cost-benefit methodology to compare a conventional 
(a specified baseline) electrical energy generation system 
with systems which included wind power generators. 
Figure 10.1 illustrates the overall approach to the application of the cost-
benefit method to wind power systems. 
Surveying the available wind data and information of wind power systems 
established a data base from which subsequent decisions could be made regarding 
system definitions, the structure of quantitative models, and the values of 
model parameters. This survey identified wind data which were available and 
accessible, and it permitted the setting of realistic objectives for the 
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Models were developed which quantitatively described wind statistics, 
wind-wind power system relationships, and benefit-cost differences between 
a scenario of conventional electric power generation (a baseline scenario) 
and a scenario which included electric power generated by the wind. Table 10.1 
summarizes the models and model parameters. These models were necessary in 
order to precisely state the assumptions made, and to provide a consistent 
framework for analyzing alternative systems and scenarios. Additionally, 
the models permit iterative calculations to determine the sensitivity of the 
results to variations or changes in the values of parameter and variable. 
This sensitivity analysis is necessary because many of the quantities are 
not known with certainty. Some parameters, such as maintenance costs and 
investment costs, have no values established because of the lack of large 
scale production and operational data on wind power systems. 
The selected approach specified two different wind power systems. The 
detailed specification is necessary in order to illustrate the application 
of cost-benefit analysis methodology and two systems were selected in order to 
illustrate different wind power applications. 
System I, the "Macro" system application, consists of wind power units 
in a regional network which is linked with the electric transmission grid. 
No energy storage is postulated, thus the wind power network can furnish 
power to the utility grid only when the wind speed exceeds the cut-in speed 
of the units. The purpose of this system is to act as a "fuel saver," 
reducing the amount of fuel consumed by conventional electric power plants. 
The detailed description of System I and cost-benefit assessment of its 
application are given in Section 14.
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TABLE 10.1 
SUMMARY OF MODELS DEVELOPED 
NAME	 PRIMARY INPUTS
	 PRIMARY OUTPUTS 
Wind Speed	 Wind Data
	 2 parameter descriptive model 
Model	 of probability distribution of 
wind speed at particular 
heights and locations 
Wind Power	 Cut-in Speed, rated
	 Plant Factor, Power Output 
Unit Model	 speed, feathering speed, 
height, and rated power 
of wind generator; two 
parameters of the wind 
speed distribution 
Cost-Benefit	 Differences in costs
	 Net Present Value of the 
Model	 and benefits between
	 difference in net benefits of 
two scenarios, requires
	 the two scenarios 
plant factor and 
power output from wind 
power unit model
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System II, the "Micro" system application, consists of wind powered 
units which generate electricity for an industrial application, a chemical 
process which is energy intensive and requires large amounts of electrical 
energy in one of the process steps. The purpose of this system is to reduce 
the cost of energy to the industrial plant and possibly to reduce its 
dependence on the public utility for electric power. The system, detailed 
scenarios of potential applications, and the cost-benefit assessment of system 




CATEGORIZATION OF WIND POWER SYSTEMS 
The purpose of this task is to identify the categories of wind power 
systems which might have significant positive potential especially for large-
scale utilizatidn. The objective Is a list of system options, categorized 
in a matrix classification scheme using (1) alternative technologies and 
(2) alternative end uses of the system product as the two classification 
dimensions. This classification scheme permits a comprehensive overview 
of alternative systems which either have been developed or might be 
developed. The matrix format simply furnishes a convenient framework for 
presenting the background material on wind systems. 
11.1 Applications 
As shown on the vertical, left side of the matrix (Table 11.1), 
wind system applications were classified under three major headings. 
Electric power generation has received coisIderable emphasis recently and 
may be economically feasible now or in the near future. Mechanical power 
is probably the oldest application of wind energy systems and was used 
extensively by the early Chinese and Persian civilizations. Special appli-
cations such as the production of hydrogen gas or oxygen gas, probably 
through the intermediate steps of electrolysis and electrical energy genera-
tion, are not necessarily independent of the other categories, but this is 
included as a separate category because of the relatively distinct possible 
applications of the system outputs. 
Electrical power generation may be further categorized as 
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(2) a DC or synchronous AC generation system which furnishes power 
into the electrical network on an interruptible basis. This 
application is strictly a "fuel saver," and no energy storage 
is included; and 
(3) a DC or synchronous AC power generation system which furnishes 
power into the electrical network on a firm basis. This applica-
tion increases the firm capacity of the network system and 
includes energy storage. 
Mechanical power generation may be further categorized as 
(1) pumping of water for irrigation purposes: 
(2) pumping of water for energy storage, either for hydroelectric 
power generation as a later step or as potential energy for 
mechanical power systems; 
(3) compressing gas for stored mechanical energy; and 
(4) process power, such as power for grinding wheels, cane crushers, 
mechanical threshers and winnowers, etc. 
11.2 Technology 
The horizontal dimension of the categorization matrix represents the 
alternative technologies which might be utilized in a wind power system. 
A complete wind power system consists of the following subsystems and major 
components: 
an extractor/momentum exchange mechanism (Table ll.la), 
a support structure (Table ll.lb), 
a convertor; e.g., mechanical to electrical energy (Table ll.lc) 
an (optional) energy storage mechanism (Table ll.ld), and 
a delivery system (Table ll.le). 
These major components and subsystems fulfill essential functions (energy 
storage is an optional function), and alternative technologies may be 
utilized to fulfill these functions.
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The "momentum exchange" function is to extract power from the wind. 
Typically, this function is accomplished using some form of mechanical 
mechanism rotating about a vertical or horizontal axis: vertical axis 
rotors (Savonlus "S" rotor, Darrieu rotor), propeller-type horizontal axis 
rotors, sail wing type horizontal axis rotors, turbine-type horizontal axis 
rotor, and other types of mechanisms (e.g., the University of Montana 
design of cars "sailing" on an oval track). 
The "support structure" function is to support the momentum exchange 
mechanism (and perhaps the convertor mechanism). Support structures may be 
a single pole (guyed or free-standing), a space-frame tower, a billboard-
type frame (usually with multiple rotors), or a tower-cable suspension 
arrangement. 
The "convertor" function is to transform the mechanical motion of the 
momentum exchange mechanism into electrical energy or into other forms of 
mechanical energy. The convertor typically is a mechanical (e.g., rotary-
to-linear convertor) or an AC or DC electrical generator. 
The "storage mechanism" function is to store the energy obtained from 
the wind for later use. Electrical storage batteries, compressed gas, 
pumped water (hydroelectric) and hydrogen gas production are alternative 
methods for storing wind-derived energy. 
The "delivery system" function is to convey the wind-derived power from 
the generation site to the utilization site. Electrical energy will typi-
cally be conveyed via electrical cables or transmission lines, pipes or 
channels (e.g., canals) may be used to transport pumped water. 
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11.3 Approach 
The project team contacted researchers known to be investigating wind 
energy systems, contacted known supporters of wind energy research, and 
utilized literature on wind energy identified through manual and computer 
searches. No attempt was made to perform a comprehensive literature sur-
vey, since wind energy systems have been in existence for many years and 
the literature on windmills and wind power is extensive. However, the 
approach taken resulted in a meaningful overview of wind power systems, 
particularly of recent developments and current concepts of wind power. 
Each distinguishable and separate wind power concept identified through 
the personal contacts and through the literature was examined to determine 
(1) the application of the system and (2) the technology used by the system. 
Each concept was identified by a number and brief reference to a complete 
bibliographic citation (Table 11.2, "Key to Categorization"). The numbers, 
each representing a different wind energy concept, were placed in the matrix 
(Table 11.1) whose elements represent different application--technology 
combinations. The resulting matrix displays the relative concentration of 
interest, as evidenced by recent research and literature, in different 
wind power system concepts. The matrix also can be used as a reference 
guide to research and literature for a particular application--technological 
concept; by looking up the numbers found in the matrix element of interest, 
appropriate descriptive reports (or personal contacts) are identified for 
use in further investigations. 
The project team investigated wind system costs and performance through 
discussions with knowledgeable researchers and through literature scanning. 
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TABLE 11.2 
KEY TO WIND SYSTEM CATEGORIZATION MATRIX OF TABLE 11.1

(Complete Citations given in "References") 
Matrix 
Number	 Brief Identification 	 Reference Number 
1 Smith-Putnam (Grandpa's Knob, Rutland, Vt.) 10 
NSF p. 5, 0. 8z lecture on alternatives 
p. 14 
2 Various designs by Thomas 	 2 - 10 MW units 10 
NSF pp. 11-18 
3 Past European installations 	 NSF pp. 19-22 10 
4 Cyclone D-30	 NSF p. 23, 33 10 
5 Aerogenerator Arrays	 NSF p. 53 (Hewson) 10 
6 Princeton Sail Wing 	 Sweeney	 NSF p. 70; 10,11 
personal communication 
7 Grumman Sail Wing System (based on Princeton 2,	 8 
Sail Wing design) William Carl,, personal 
communication, Lindsley 
8 Hughes, William (Oklahoma State) personal 4,	 8 
communication, Lindsley (Pop. Sc.) 
9 Windmills in India	 NSF pp. 75-77 10 
10 Jacobs Generating Plants	 NSF pp. 155-157 10 
11 Barbadox Irrigation	 NSF p. 160, 205 10 
12 Quick wind generator 	 NSF pp. 166-169 10 
13 Electro wind generator	 NSF pp. 167-169 10 
14 French systems	 NSF pp. 186-196 10 
15 1-kW Quick-Barbados	 NSF p. 159 10 
16 9-kW Andreau	 NSF p. 159 10 
**	 17 Haiti pump	 NSF p. 160 10
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TABLE 11.2 (cont.) 
Matrix
Number Brief Identification Reference Number 
**	 18 Montreal-powers house
	 NSF p. 160 10 
19 Cars on track	 NSF p. 177; Lindsley 8, 10 
(Pop.	 Sci.) 
20 OWPS Electrolyzer Plant
	 Heronemus, 1972; 14 
Wolf, 1973 
21 Design of 100 kW Turbine Generator 7 
Puthoff and Sirocky 
22 Honeff's power plant 	 Juchem (NASA- 6 
TT-F-15860) 
23 Stoetten power plant	 Gross (NASA- 3 
TT-F-15855) 
24 J. Jowl power plant (45 kW)	 Gross 3 
(NASA-TT-F-15855) 
25 Gedser power plant (200 kW)	 Gross 3 
(NASA-TT-F-15855) 
26 Orkney Islands power plant (100 kW) 3 
Gross (NASA-TT-F-15855) 
27 Cherbourg power plant (130 kW) 	 Gross 3 
(NASA-TT-F-15855) 
28 Various windmills in Denmark	 (NASA-TT-F 12 
15868) 
29 Bogoe power plant	 Rangi, et al 9 
30 Vester-Egesborg experimental 	 (NASA- 5 
TT-F-15439) 
31 Shell offshore platforms	 Oil & Gas J.V. 1 
72 N36, 9/9/74, p. 96 
32 NASA 15 ft. dia. windmill 	 Walters-Mech. 13 
Eng. V. 96 N. 4, 4/19/74, pp. 55-65
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No detailed, original research was undertaken on either wind system design, 
system costs, or system technical performance. 
11.4 Results 
Table 11. 1 illustrates the results of the categorization of wind power 
systems in the application--technology matrix. Thirty-two separate wind 
system concepts were identified and categorized. As shown in the table, 
most of the categorized concepts are intended to be applied for the genera-
tion of eletrical energy, either as an independent system or as a part of 
an electrical utility system. Particular technologies for the system 
components also exhibited significantly higher interest than other tech-
nologies; propeller-type, horizontal axis rotors; tower frame support; 
both AC and DC generators; and electrical cables/transmission lines for 
transporting the energy. 
As will be seen in Section 12, wind system performance depends on 
several factors, and the following scheme generally appears to be adequate 
for describing performance/wind/system design relationships for electrical 
power wind generators. A design typically will specify a cut-in speed (V0), 
a rated speed (V1 ) and a rated power	 and a feathering speed (v 2 ). The 
methodology described in Section 12 on wind analysis can be used with wind 
data and these four system parameters (V o l V1 , V2 , and P R' as inputs to 
determine the annual energy output and the plant factor (ratio of average 
power output over the year to the rated power of the system). Because of 
the power available in the wind is proportional to the cube of the velocity 
and the power output of an aerogenerator typically is designed to be constant 
between the rated speed and the feathering speed, the output of a wind system 
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is more sensitive to the value of the rated speed than to the cut-in speed. 
(These issues are discussed in more detail in the next section on wind 
analysis.) 
From the overview of the literature, It was determined that there 
were no current values for wind system and component costs, with the 
exception of relatively small (< 10 kW capacity) units. Costs of large 
aerogenerator systems and components are not well established for current 
technologies, and it was judged that costs of previous designs (e.g., 
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SECTION 12 
WIND DATA COLLECTION AND ASSESSMENT 
Several attempts have been made previously to estimate the average wind 
power potential for the United States. Two examples of these estimates are 
those of Thomas [1] and Reed, et al. [ 2 ] . Thomas presented a map of 
isopleths (constant value contours) of mean wind speed V =:<V> for the 
continental U.S., while Reed, et al. presented isopleths of mean wind energy 
density (P = 1/2 p <V 3> , where P is the air density). Although these types 
of presentation are good for determining which areas of the country are 
relatively good or bad for wind power applications, they are not sufficient 
for making detailed estimates of power output from specific wind generators. 
However, the desired information can be obtained easily if the probability 
distribution (or probability density function) of wind speed p(V) is known. 
With p(V) known, the mean wind speed can be calculated from 
co 
V =	 = I  Vp(V)dV	 (12.1) 
0 
and the mean wind energy density can be evaluated by 
co P
m
 = 1/2 p <V3> = 1/2 p 1  V 3p(V)dV	 (12.2) 
0 
More importantly, however, the average power output P of a wind generator, 
whose power output as a function of wind speed is some known function P(V), 
can be compiled by 




The output power function P(V) for most wind generator systems can be 
characterized as zero up to some speed V09 known as the cut-in speed, then 
increasing linearly (or with some curvature, which may easily be approximated 
as parabolic) up to the rated power output 
t'r 
at some speed V1 . known as the 
rated speed. Above the rated speed the power output remains level at the 
value P until some speed V 2 . known as the feathering speed, at which point 
the system is shut down (e.g., by feathering the blades) to avoid damage under 
high wind loads (See equation (B-i) and Figure B-i in Appendix B). 
Routine wind data measured at a number of National Weather Service sta-
tions throughout the U.S. is adequate to evaluate details of the wind speed 
probability distribution function at these sites. However, for ease in data 
manipulation for the large number of sites required on a nationwide wind 
potential assessment, and for simple means of comparing and relating data 
from different sites or times, it is convenient to parameterize the proba-
bility distribution function as some analytical function, with a limited 
number of arbitrary parameters to be evaluated in determining the proba-
bility distribution at each site. Both analytical and practical considera-
tions indicate that a one-parameter wind speed probability distribution function 
is inadequ4te. However, at least two different forms of two-parameter analytic 
functions could be used to characterize the probability distribution function. 
After careful examination of the wind data records from a number of sites, 
the Weibull distribution was selected as the better of the two different 
two-parameter functions studied (the other being the log-normal). The 
Weibull distribution function is given by 
p(V)dV = (k/c) (V/c)k	 exp [_(V/c)k]dV	 (12.4) 
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where the scale parameter c has units ot speed and is related very closely to 
the mean wind speed V, and the shape parameter k (dimensionless) is a measure 
of the variance of the distribution (the larger k, the smaller the variance). 
See Appendix C for a discussion of the choice of the Weibull distribution and 
the method used for determination of its parameters c and k. 
12.1 Evaluation of the Wind Distribution Parameters 
Frequency of wind speed occurance data were obtained from several different 
sources in order to be used in the evaluation of Weibull distribution parameters 
and eventually In the evaluation of wind energy potential across the U.S. 
Data from several sites were obtained in the form of monthly and annual wind 
speed summaries as listed in 1951-1960 summaries of hourly observations, 
published by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and 
available from the National Climatic Center (NCC) in Asheville, N.C. The 
other primary source of wind summary data was obtained on a special tape 
prepared by NCC and containing seasonal and annual summaries of wind speed 
distributions from "STAR" (STAbility Rose) wind summaries. A large number of 
stations were represented by the data from these two sources. However, only 
sites with constant anemometer heights over the period of the wind speed 
summary were usable in the distribution analysis. Anemometer heights for the 
National Weather Service (NWS) sites were determined from station histories 
published as part of NOAA's Local Climatological Data series. After elimination 
of sites whose anemometer height changed during the period of the summary, 
there were 134 stations with usable data from these two data sources. Addi-
tional wind summary data were obtained in the form of a copy of a tape 
originally prepared by NCC for the Sandia Corporation. This tape contained 
data from a large number of NWS sites and also numerous military stations. 
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Many of the NWS sites on the Sandia tape were duplications or were other-
wise unusable, and all of the military sites were not usable at the present 
time because anemometer heights could not be obtained for them (these height 
data are available at NCC, but each military station would probably have to 
be looked up in separate station history logs). On the Sandia tape there 
were only nine usable new data sets not available from the other two data 
sources. Since these 9 data sets had seven different speed category break-
downs, it was decided not to use any of the Sandia tape data at the present 
time, but to await further information on the anemometer heights from the 
military sites. 
Weibull distribution scale parameter values (c, in m/s) and shape 
parameter values (k, dimensionless) were evaluated from the 1951-1960 and 
"STAR" format wind summaries, by the method discussed in Appendix C. These 
results, along with the anemometer height values, are given for each of the 
sites in Appendix D. All values in Appendix D were evaluated from 5 or more 
years of wind summaries. 
12.2 Height Variation of the Wind Distribution Parameters 
The anemometer heights of the sites listed in Appendix D show a wide 
range of variation and most are lower than heights at which large wind 
generators would be operated. Therefore, in order to facilitate inter-
comparison between sites and to evaluate output power characteristics of 
wind generators at realistic heights, a method had to be determined for 
estimating the height variation of the c and k values from measured values 
at one given height. Two basic approaches were used to devise such a height 
variation method: analysis of wind summary data from several levels on 
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meteorological towers, and differences in C and k values between two different 
anemometer heights (at two different times) at the same station (see, e.g., 
Mobile, Ala., Tallahassee, Fla., and Atlanta, Ga. listings in Appendix D). 
Wind data from NASA meteorological towers at Kennedy SC (1967-1969) 
and Wallops Island (1961-1965) were obtained from the National Climatic 
Center (NCC) in Asheville. Additional data were also obtained from the 
Battelle tower [3] at Hanfàrd, Washington (1955-1970) and 
NOAA's instrumented tower [4] WKY-TV at Oklahoma 
City (June 1966-May 1967). Wind distribution parameters were calculated at 
each height level for these tower data, by the methods discussed in Appendix C. 
Figure 12.1 shows the observed height variation, for Kennedy SC1967-1969, 
of the Weibull scale parameter C (which corresponds closely to the mean wind 
speed). As seen in Figure 12.1, c increases as a power law with height in 
each season and for the annual mean. The Kennedy SC power law exponents 
vary from 0.17 for spring to 0.23 in the winter, with an annual average of 
0.20. The average exponents for the other tower data were found to be 0.27 
for Wallops and 0.23 for both Hanford and WKY. Thus the overall average 
exponent for all four sets of tower data is 0.23, with a standard deviation 
of 0.03. This power law exponent at 0.23 agrees well with the power law 
exponent for the height variation of the mean wind (0.24) for these four sets 
of tower data. Such a value of exponent is indicative of surface roughness 
lengths corresponding to terrain between smooth flat terrain and forest [51. 
The average surface roughness length for the four data 
sets was found to be 24cm, in agreement with the exponent in indicating 
slightly rough surfaces, and in general agreement with previous estimates of 
32 cm for the surface roughness at Kennedy SC [6] and 6 cm 
at the WKY facility [7].
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Figure 12.1
	 Observed power law height variation of the Weibull 
scale factor c, which corresponds closely to the 
mean wind speed. Numbers beside each curve are 
power law exponent values. 
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Good data were available from 24 stations with anemometers at two 
different heights during two separate time periods (see Appendix D). In 
all of these cases the scale factor c increased with height at a rate 
corresponding to a power law with average exponent of 0.15 with 0.08 
standard deviation. Data from three sites (St. Louis, Mo., Asheville, 
N.C., and Harrisburg, Pa.,) were rejected because the c values showed no 
Increase or showed a decrease with height. For two reasons it was decided 
to use the tower data exponent of 0.23 for the height variation and to 
ignore the two-anemometer height analysis results: 1) the larger 
variability of the exponent values for the two-anemometer height analysis 
(0.08 a vs. 0.03 a for the tower data), and 2) the smaller height differences 
in the two-anemometer height analysis (only 6 AZ values greater than 12.2m 
(40 ft.), compared to an average AZ (top to bottom) of 187m (613 ft.) for 
the tower data). 
Figure 12.2 shows the shape parameter values k determined from the Kennedy 
SC data. The increase up to a maximum near a height of 60m (200 ft.) was 
found in all four sets of tower data. For this reason, a normalized curve 
of k/k, shown In Figure 12.3 could be constructed. With a single value 
for k determined at any height for a given location, the complete height 
variation of k at that location can be found by application of the 
curve In Figure 12.3. 
The height variation of plant factor F, the ratio of the average output 
power to the rated power (see Appendix B), was also evaluated from the tower 
data. Figure 12.4 shows the computed height variation of F for the Kennedy 
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Figure 12.2 Observed height variation of the Weibull shape factor k, 
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is the maximum k ve (near 60 or 70m). 
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of average output power to rated power) using the cut-in 







mean wind and the output power (F times the rated power) is assumed to follow 
a V3 relation with the mean wind, so that a 3/7 (0.43) power law of output 
power (or F) is assumed [ 8 ] . Figure 12.4 shows that F does 
not increase with height as the cube of the velocity increase (i.e., not 
with an exponent of 3 x 0.23 - 0.69). Nor does it increase as a.3/7 (0.43) 
power law. Instead the actual exponent for the power law of F versus 
height is found to be somewhere in between these two values. Operating 
characteristics of the NASA Plumbrook unit [9] i.e., 
cut-in speed 3.6 m/s (8 mph) and rated speed 8.0 m/s (18 mph) were used for 
the calculation of the F 
p 
values in Figure 12.4. 
12.3 Evalaution of Nationwide Wind Potential 
The seasonal and annual values of the Weibull parameters for each of the 
sites listed in Appendix D were projected to a height of 61m (200 ft.) by 
using a power law exponent of 0.23 for the scale parameter c and the 
"IJniversial" k/k
	
curve of Figure 12.3. A height of 61m (200 ft.) was
max 
chosen because it represents a reasonable height for operating large wind 
generators, and, from the results of Figure 12.4, it appears that little 
added output power would be gained by going above about this height (the 
optimum height would depend somewhat on the cut-in and rated speeds used to 
evaluate F in Figure 12.4). The lower height of 30.5 (100 ft.) corresponds 
to the height of the present NASA 100 kW test unit at Plumbrook, and repre-
sents a more easily achieved height for smaller generator systems where 
tower costs are a more important part of the total costs. Figure 12.5 
shows the locations of all of the sites listed in the tables of Appendix D. 







































at heights of 30.5m and 61m are shown in Tables D-2 and D-3 of Appendix D, 
and annual average wind speed contours at the 30.5m height are given in 
Figure 12.6. The Weibull c and k values at 30.5m and 61tn were used in the 
method described in Appendix B to evaluate plant factors for two sizes of 
aerogenerator systems: 100 kW and 1 MW. Numerical plant factor results 
are given in Tables D-4 and D-5 of Appendix D. Contour maps of the plant 
factors are shown in Figures 12.7 through 12.14. Annual average plant 
factors for the 100 kW and 1 MW units at heights of 30.5m and 61m. are 
shown In Figure 12.7 through 12.10, while Figures 12.11 through 12.14 
show plant factor contours on a seasonal basis for the 100 kW unit at a 
height of 61m. For the 100 kW (NASA Plumbrook site) unit the following 
generator characteristics were used: cut-in speed V = 3.6 m/s (8 mph), 
rated speed V1 = 8.0 m/s (18 mph), feathering speed V2 =:` 26.8 m/s (60 mph). 
For the 1 MW system, generating characteristics were used as follows: V = 6.7 m/s 
(15 mph), V1 = 13.4 m/s (30 mph), V 2 = 26.8 m/s (60 mph). Figures 12.7 
through 12.14 show that (not surprisingly) the central states of Nebraska, 
Kansas, Oklahoma, and northern Texas are the states with the highest wind 
potential. For the 1 MW generator, plant factors in this central U.S. 
region average about 15% at 30.5m or 25% at 61m, while for the 100 kW 
generator the plant factors average about 50% and 60% at these two respec-
tive heights. The areas of the country with the least potential for wind 
energy application are central California (plant factors right on the coast 
may be higher than indicated by the maps, however), and the mountain areas 
of east Tennessee, west North Carolina, western Virginia and eastern West 
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problem for the concept of augmenting electric generating capacity by wind 
generator systems is that, in most sections of the country, peak capacity 
is needed in the summer, while the winds are lowest in this season. 
In order to facilitate evaluation of plant factors for wind generators 
with operating characteristics other than those used here, a parametric 
study was done for a range of rated speed values. Figure 12.15 shows a 
plot of plant factor versus rated speed V1
 and cut-in speed V0
 for three 
typical locations with low, medium, and high values of scale parameter c. 
The Brunswick (microsystem application, see Section 15) was evaluated by 
averaging results from Savannah, Ga. and Jacksonville, Fla. Figure 12.15 
indicates that maximum plant factor is achieved by the lowest possible 
rated speed and lowest possible cut-in speed, or, in other words, the 
highest efficiency (a rather obvious statement when put that way). The 
importance of Figure 12.15 is in applying it to evaluate the average output 
power of various systems. As shown by Noel 1101, the rated power per unit 
area Pr/A for various generator systems is proportional to the third power 
of their rated speed. Since the design rated power per unit area for the 
NASA Plumbrook unit is 0.088 kW/m2
 at a rated speed of 8.0 m/s, the rated 
power per unit area of other systems with high rated speeds can be evaluated 
by a simple V1 3
 scaling. The average output power per unit area would be 
the product Fp(Pr/A) where F versus rated speed is taken from Figure 12.15. 
A plot of average output power per unit area versus rated speed is shown in 
Figure 12.16, which also shows the rated power per unit area on the top scale. 
This figure shows that considerable increase in average output power with 
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Figure 12.15	 Parametric variation of plant factor versus generator 
rated speed V1 and Cut-in speed V for three represen- 
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Figure 12.16 Parametric variation of the average output power per 
unit area P/A versus the generator rated speed for 
the three cities of Figure 12.15. Rated power per 
unit area Pr/A is shown on top axis. 
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(high mean winds). However the increase in power per unit area is never as 
great as the simple cubic, with which rated power per unit area increases. 
At sites with low c values (low wind speeds) there is little increase in 
average output power per unit area by increasing the rated wind speed. 
12.4 Accuracy of the Results 
There were three cities which had more than one airport whose results 
could be compared, in order to assess the accuracy of the results: 
Milwaukee (Mitchell Field, MKE; and Timmerman, MWC), Chicago (O'Hare, ORD; 
and Midway, MDW), and New York City (Laguardia, LGA; and Kennedy JFK). The 
Weibull parameters for these sites may be compared by consulting Appendix D. 
Comparison of their annual plant factor values showed, for the three cities, 
a root mean square difference of 11% between the two airport estimates. 
Thus the contours in Figures 12.7 through 12.14 should be interpreted as 
accurate only to within about 10% for the 100 kW unit and 5% for the 1 MW 
unit (i.e., one contour separation). In certain areas of the country, 
especially those having 100 kW unit plant factors below about 40%, the 
consistency was better between the various cities. Hence, in regions where 
F < 40%, the accuracy is probably about 5 percent for the 100 kW unit 
(i.e., half of one contour separation). 
Another interesting comparison was between the results for New York 
Central Park which has a projected 61m level 100 kW unit plant factor of 
only 20% whereas the two New York airports (LGA and JFK) averaged 70% 
100 kW unit plant factors. This difference is apparently due to wind 
blockage effects of the city buildings reducing the available wind power 
at the Central Park site. For this reason the Central Park results were 
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not incorporated into Figures 12.7 through 12.14. A similar effect may 
be responsible for low values of plant factor estimates for Brunswick, Ga. 
Although the data were not adequate (too few speed categories) for an 
accurate computation of plant factor at Brunswick, the estimated 100 kW 
unit plant factor at 61m was only 13%, whereas the nearby cities of 
Savannah, Ga. and Jacksonville, Fla. had 25% and 29% 100 kW unit plant 
factors at 61m. The low Brunswick values, may be due to a combination of 
wind blockage by tall pines which surround the airport and multi-story 
blimp hangar buildings on the airport grounds. The Brunswick station 
(Glynco Naval Air Station) has now closed, and it was not possible to 
confirm the location of the anemometer relative to the buildings and trees. 
Instead, the Brunswick values used in the micro system analysis were taken 
as averages of the Jacksonville and Savannah results. 
With regard to application of the results plotted in Figures 12.7 
through 12.14, it should be noted that the values shown should be inter-
preted as plant factors for wind generators at a height of either 30.5m 
(100 ft.) or 61m (200 ft.) above relatively smooth terrain (roughness 
lengths : 5 to 50 cm) with relatively flat topography. This is because 
all values in these maps were generated from wind data measured at airport 
locations. Although some approximations could possibly be made in order 
to estimate the differences which would occur for hilly or mountainous 
terrain, these effects should be estimated almost on a case-by-case basis 
only. A generalized method for accounting for hilly and mountainous 
terrain effects must await considerably more extensive research than has 
been done to date in this field.
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THE COST-BENEFIT MODEL 
13.1 Basis for Model 
The purpose of the cost-benefit model is the efficient and effective 
application of the cost-benefit method of analysis to wind power systems. 
The objective of the development of the model was to establish a practical 
tool for studying the relative costs and benefits of wind power systems 
under a variety of conditions. 
The model development effort included (a) the definition of the problem 
to be analyzed, (b) the selection of the appropriate measure and criterion 
to use in the cost-benefit analysis, (c) the formulation of equations relating 
the costs, benefits, and measures, and (d) the encoding of a computer program 
to solve the model equations. The model development assumed that the wind 
power system would be used to generate electric power, therefore the model 
was based on comparing conventional electric power generation with an 
electrical system which includes wind-powered generators. The model was 
developed primarily for use in analyzing System I, the Macro Application, but 
the basic approach and concepts apply to the analysis of System II, the 
Micro Application. 
The problem to be analyzed was assumed to be a comparison between two 
scenarios: a. baseline scenario, which assumes the continuation of conventional 
electrical power generation techniques, and an alternative scenario, which 
assumes that wind-powered generators are used along with conventional genera-
tors In the electric power system. The problem could thus be stated as, 
"what are the benefits and costs (compared with 'doing nothing') of adding to 
an electrical power system the capability for wind-generated electric power?" 
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Because the problem is stated as a choice between two alternatives, the 
appropriate measure for comparison (as described in Part II, Section 2) is 
the Net Present Value (NPV) of the difference in net benefits (benefits 
minus costs) between the alternative scenario (i.e., with wind power units) 
and the baseline scenario (i.e., with no wind power units). Moreover, as 
discussed in Section 2, the appropriate decision criterion is to choose the 
alternative (wind power) scenario over the baseline scenario if the NPV of 
the difference in net benefits is positive. 







H is the time horizion, 
i is the discount rate, 
B  is the value, in year k, of the additional benefits of the 
alternative scenario over the baseline scenario, and 
C  is the value, in year k, of the additional costs of the 
alternative scenario compared with the baseline scenario. 
The additional benefit of the alternative scenario is primarily the 
electricity generated by the wind power units, and this may be evaluated in 
several ways. However, the cost of fuel which would have been used to generate 
the electrictiy by conventional plants is one measure of the value of this 
electricity, and fuel cost is an important input to the calculation of 
benefits. 
Construction, operation, and maintenance of the wind power units are 
the primary cost differences between conventional systems and a system 
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which utilizes wind powered generators. The details of the assumptions 
regarding these costs are discussed in Section 14. 
Figure 13.1 illustrates the overall model used to compare the differences 
in net benefits between the baseline scenario and the alternative scenario. 
Although the diagram indicates three "modules" to the model, the completed 
computer model consisted of only two programs: a power calculation program 
and a net present value calculation program. The dotted line in Figure 13.1 
indicates the separation between the two programs, showing that the calcu-
lation of net benefit and cost differences between the baseline and alterna-
tive scenarios is performed in the same program as the net present value 
calculation. The power calculation model was described above in Section 
12 (Wind Data), and the net present value calculation model is described 
below. The description below illustrates the program as used for analyzing 
System I; similar analyses are appropriate for System II and are described 
in more detail in Section 15. 
For System I, the costs and benefits are estimated by three major 
categories of parameters r
 fundamental parameters which describe the wind 
systems, economic parameters of the wind system, and conventional system 
parameters (including fuel costs). In addition, certain parameters and 
decision variables, such as the construction/installation schedule for the 
wind power system and the choice of discount rate, will affect the net present 
value of the differences in net benefits. 
13.2 Fundamental System Parameters 
The fundamental wind system parameters include the size or capacity 
(e.g., in kilowatts) of the individual wind units and the number of units 












































































of these two parameters. If the wind blew continuously (at a speed above 
the rated speed and less than the feathering speed), then the annual 
production of electricty would be 8764 (the number of hours in a year) 
times this product. However, with wind speeds varying according to the 
distribution fitted to the actual wind data, the annual output will be 
scaled by the plant factors; that is, if G represents the annual electric 
power (in kilowatt-hours) generated by the wind system, 
G = (P f
	 r 
)(N)(P )(8764) where	 (13.2) 
w  
Pf = plant factor (calculated using the wind power model), 
N = total number of wind units (postulated in the system 
definition), 
= rated power, or capacity, of each wind unit (postulated in 
the system definition), and 
8764 = the number of hours in a year. 
13.3 Economic Parameters 
The economic parameters of the wind system include investment costs 
(including land acquisition, site preparation, installation and testing of 
the units) and operational and maintenance costs. For this model, R & D 
costs were not specifically considered, although such costs could be 
assumed to be included on a prorated basis as a component of the investment 
cost. Later studies, and other studies which are more concerned with details 
of wind power unit designs, should address the R & D costs in greater depth. 
Investment costs for wind systems are not well established (production 
costs depend on design details and market size, and currently neither is 
known with any certainty), and so a single value for this parameter could not 
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I k n k PA ' wherer (13.4) 
be assumed for the model. However, discussions of wind power unit design 
typically use assumed values or ranges of a cost per unit capacity, usually 
dollars per installed kilowatt, and this is the parameter included in the 
model. The values for this parameter considered for System I ranged from 
a low of $200/kW upwards to $16001kW. This range compares with fossil 
fueled generating plant costs of approximately $400-500/kw and with nuclear 
fueled generating plant costs of approximately $800/kW. Values within this 
range should include economically feasible values for wind power system costs. 
Current information is not available to project accurate estimates of 
operational and maintenance costs of wind power units; the model includes these 
annual costs as a percentage of the total investment. Most reported wind 
system designs appear to have low operational costs and virtually no maintenance 
costs. The NASA design is intended to be suitable for unmanned, remotely 
monitored (if at all) operation. Periodic blade inspections and replacements 
and perhaps minimum attention required for lubrication servicing are the only 
operational efforts anticipated. Consequently, annual operational and main-
tenance costs are expected to be very low, and values of 1 to 4 percent of total 
investment costs should provide an adequate, though perhaps pessimistic, 
estimate for this cost component. 
The cost component of the basic NPV equation (13.1) is then 
C  
= I  +
	
(13.3) 
where I. is the investment cost in year k and 
°k is the operational and 
maintenance cost in year k. In terms of A, the cost per installed kilowatt, 
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k(N/Yi )AP 1n	 for O<k<(Y -1) 





fl is the number of units installed in year k and P is the rated power of 
each unit. Because the annual operational and maintenance cost is assumed 
to be a fraction of the total investment to date, this cost increases with 
cumulative investment. In particular, if the wind power system consists 
of a total of N units and is installed at a uniform rate over a period of 
years, then
where m is the fraction corresponding to the assumed percentage of total 
investment which is postulated for annual operation and maintenance costs. 
The primary benefit components depend on the systems assumed for the 
baseline and alternative (wind system) scenarios. As described in more 
detail in Section 14, System I (Macro application) includes no energy storage 
facilities; consequently, the primary function of this system is that 
of a "fuel saver." Under these conditions, the principal benefit differences 
between the baseline scenario and the wind system scenario are reflected 
by the value of the fuel which would have been consumed if the wind system 
had not been in existence. That is, If Gk represents the amount of elec-
tricty (kWh) generated by the wind system in year k, then the principal 
difference in benefits between the baseline scenario and the alternative 
scenario is the difference in fuel consumed under the two scenarios. The 
value of this difference in benefits is then the value of the fuel saved. 
This value is at least equal to the cost (market value) of the fuel saved, 




Two conditions may be assumed in calculating the value of the benefit. 
Under one condition, the savings in fuel is distributed proportionally 
among all the fuel-consuming processes used to generate electricity within 
the region. (Hydroelectric-generated power is excluded from the base of the 
calculation, since no fuel is consumed by this process.) Under the second 
condition, the wind-generated electricity is assumed to replace the elec-
tricity generated by the process having the highest fuel costs per kilowatt-
hour output. 
At any particular time, if wind-generated electricty is available, the 
rational strategy would be for the utility to reduce the power output from 
conventional plants by cutting back the most expensive process. Thus condi-
tion 2 represents a rational choice at any particular time, but over a long 
period (e.g., a year), the most expensive processes (for example, oil-fired 
turbines) may not be in use at times when wind-generated power is availa-
ble. For example, the most costly electricity in terms of fuel cost/unit 
output is typically that generated by oil fired turbines or internal combus-
tion generators which are used for peak power generation. The peaks of 
power demand in the south typically occur on summer afternoons and evenings 
(due to cooking plus air conditioner loads), and such times are unlikely to 
be the best times for high winds. Consequently, although condition 2 
represents a rational strategy to follow at any particular time, benefit 
calculations made under this condition should be considered as optimistic 
or "best case" estimations. 
Conversely, condition 1 (proportional distribution of electricity among 
all fuel processes) does not represent a rational strategy at a particular time, 
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and represents a pessimistic estimation of the benefits of the wind powered 
electricity generation. This condition does not define the "worst case," 
which would be represented by the allocation of all of the wind-generated 
electricity to the least expensive fuel/process generated electricity. 
However, the worst case does not represent a realistic condition, and the 
proportional distribution of fuel savings is judged to be adequately 
pessimistic to provide a lower bound to the estimated benefits of the wind 
power system. 
For both conditions 1 and 2, eight different fuel-process combinations 
may be considered for generating electricity: 
1. coal-fired steam 
2. oil-fired steam 
3. gas-fired steam 
4. nuclear-fueled steam 
5. oil-fired turbine 
6. gas-fired turbine 
7. oil-fueled internal combustion 
8. gas-fueled internal combustion 
If Gk is the total electric power (kWh) generated during year k in a par-
ticular region and GXkis the power generated by the 2,th fuel-process 





C - (293.1) E2,
(13.9) 
If f k the fraction of total power generated by the 9th fuel-process 




and the subscript k is dropped (assuming, for example, that the fraction 
remains constant from year to year), then the fraction of fuel-generated 





If a system were 100 percent efficient, one million BTU's (MBTU's) 
of heat energy would be converted into 293.1 kilowatt-hrs. of electrical 
energy. If the 2th process efficiency is E and the fuel cost is F 2. (dollars 
per MBTU), then the fuel cost per kilowatt-hour for this fuel-process 
combination is 
The fuel cost per kilowatt hour, weighted by the fraction of power generated 










Under the "proportional distribution of fuel savings" condition (condition 1), 
then the value of the benefit in year k is given by 
C 
	
Bk = 293.1	 (j).
	 (13.11) 
2=1 
For the purposes of this model, the efficiencies of coal-, oil-, and gas-fired 
steam plants were assumed to be equal within the individual regions and 
therefore El
 = E2
 = E3 . Similarly, the efficiencies of natural gas and 
petroleum-fueled turbines are assumed to be equal, and the efficiencies of 
petroleum-and natural gas fueled internal combustion generators are assumed 
to be equal within a particular region; that is, E5
 = E6 and E 7
 = E8. 
Fuel costs (dollars per MBTU) for a particular fuel were assumed to be 
the same regardless of how the fuel was utilized. 
The quantity of electricity generated by the wind power system in year 
K depends on the number of wind power units in operation, the capacity of 
each unit, and the plant factor. If N is the total number of units in 
the system after it has reached full capacity, and Y 1
 represents the number 
of years to reach full capacity, then 
0	 k  
(k 
G =	 UJPRPf	




For condition 2 (electricity generated by the most expensive fuel-process 
combination is replaced by the wind-generated electricity), the expression 
for the benefits in year k are 






where 2 is the 2. which maximizes F 2./E 2.. For values of Gk>GZ*, similar 
expressions which indicate the replacement of the electricity generated by 
the next most expensive fuel-process are appropriate. 
Conventional System Parameters 
The conventional electric power generation system is defined by a 
limited set of parameters, chosen to permit the detection of the significant 
differences between the baseline scenario, costs and benefits and the 
scenario which includes wind power system. Because the wind power system 
is basically a "fuel saver," the cost of fuel is an important parameter for 
the cost benefit model. Because of the above assumption alternatives 
(condition 1 and condition 2, above), the amount of electricity generated 
using the different types of fuels is an important parameter. Finally, 
the efficiency of each of the fuel/conversion process combinations is an 
important parameter, since this determines the actual fuel cost per kilowatt 
hour of electricity. In order to establish the region-to-region differences 
in benefits and costs, values of these conventional system parameters were 
established for each of the nine Federal Power Commission (FPC) regions. 
Tables of the parameter values are given in Appendix E. 
Periodic FPC reports include the quantities of fuels consumed in each 
region, the most recent fuel costs, and the amount of electricity produced 
by the different generation processes. Additional data on the generation of 
electricity by nuclear power plants were obtained from economic analysts 
in the FPC, and the assumption was made that the type of process completely 
determined the efficiency of the generation process. (This assumption means, 
for example, that the efficiencies of coal-fired, gas-fired, and oil-fired 
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steam plants are equal.) The error introduced by this assumption is 
judged to be relatively small and insignificant for the purposes of the 
model; this is discussed further in Appendix E. This assumption and the 
FPC data permit the estimation of the quantities and parameters, 
described in the above paragraphs, used in calculating the benefits of the 
wind power system in each of the nine regions. 
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SECTION 14
ASSESSMENT OF SYSTEM I - MACRO APPLICATION 
System I, a Macro Application of wind power, was chosen for study after 
considering the results of the wind system categorization effort. The over-
view of the literature suggested that a system which is linked into the 
utility power grid, having no storage capability, would be of substantial 
interest. Such a system might be technically feasible in the near time 
frame, and widespread implementation could significantly reduce the consump-
tion of energy for electrical power generation. Consequently, the cost-benefit 
analysis was designed to compare two scenarios: the status quo scenario and 
an alternative scenario which included the installation of aerogenerators 
in the power grid. 
14.1 Scenario Specifications 
The status quo scenario is defined to be a "business as usual" scenario, 
with electrical power being generated by fossil- and nuclear-fueled and hydro-
electric power generation plants. Nine different conventional ,scenarios were 
postulated, one for each of the nine Federal Power Commission (FPC) regions 
shown in Figure 14.1. Each scenario consisted of the specification of the 
values of the parameters listed in Table 14.1. Values for these parameters 
were determined from FPC data on fuel usage and power generation and from per-
sonal communications (FPC releases and reports, 1972 and 1974, Collier, and 
Raymond). For each region, nine different combinations of fue1c and generation 
processes were included. Table 14.2 lists these nine combinations. 
Few data on nuclear fuel costs and nuclear plant efficiencies were 
collected, but this was not expected to be a significant constraint on the 























LIST OF CONVENTIONAL SCENARIO PARAMETERS 
(Values for Each of Nine Regions) 
Total Electricity Generated in year (C) [kWhrs] 
Fraction of G from each of nine generation processes (f e , 0<9,<8) 
Conversion Efficiency of each process (E) 
Fuel cost of each fuel (F t) [$/MBtu] 
Annual rate of increase of fuel costs (r) 1%] 
TABLE 14.2 





Coal	 Steam Turbine 
Oil	 Steam Turbine 
Natural Gas	 Steam Turbine 
Nuclear	 Steam Turbine 
Oil	 Turbine 
Natural Gas	 Turbine 
Oil	 Internal Combustion 
Natural Gas	 Internal Combustion 
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percentage of the total electrical energy generated in a region. Because 
the cost of nuclear fuel is relatively low (estimated at $.22 per million 
BUT's), it is reasonable to assume that the more expensive fuels would be 
saved by the wind-generated power before reducing the output of a nuclear 
plant. Consequently, the overall impact of variations in these data was 
judged to be relatively slight. 
The alternative scenario is defined as the same configuration as the 
status quo scenario plus the addition of aerogenerators dispersed throughout 
the network. Each aerogenerator provides electrical power to the utility 
grid whenever the wind speed is above its cut-in speed (a parameter of the 
wind power unit). Table 14.3 summarizes the basic addition which transforms 
the status quo system into the alternative system. 
The capacity of the wind power system, 500 MW, was selected to be 
comparable to the capacity of some of the modern conventional power plants. 
The installation rate (100 each year for five consecutive years) was chosen 
as a reasonable rate of building the wind system from initial implementation 
to full capacity. The units were assumed to be dispersed because, with 
imperfect spatial correlation of wind statistics, such a dispersed system may 
provide a higher average power output than a system having all its capacity 
at a single location. (One member of the project team, Dr. Justus, currently 
is investigating this hypothesis empirically under an NSF grant.) 
The approach to estimating wind system costs was chosen on the basis 
of the following considerations: data availability, the accuracy of availa-
ble data, the questions to be answered by the analyses, and the availability 




POSTULATED WIND POWER SYSTEM 
- 500 1-megawatt (MW) units, dispersed throughout region 
- Installed at rate of 100 each year for five years 
- No energy storage capability 
TABLE 14.4

POTENTIAL SCENARIO DIFFERENCES 
Benefits	 Costs 
Reduced Air Pollution 
Tourist Attraction 
Focus for National Spirit 
R&D Stimulus 
Reduced Maintenance of Conventional Plants 
Increased Availability of Fuels 
Decreased Investment Required for 




Increased Air Pollution 
Initial Investment 
Operational and Maintenance 
Ecological Damage 
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treatment rather than a detailed breakdown of costs by component or 
subsystem, and this choice reflected the relative paucity of up-to-date, 
valid estimates of component and system costs and the fact that the study 
objectives did not require a more detailed treatment of costs. 
The two scenarios are compared on the basis of a 40 year time horizon 
(comparable to the planning horizon for conventional power generation plants) 
and using an annual discount rate of five percent. The chosen discount 
rate is high compared with older cost benefit analysis practices but low 
compared with some recent guidelines. The choice of discount rate reflects 
the analysts' and decision makers' subjective judgment about the future 
value of costs and benefits. The rate of five percent was judged to ade-
quately represent both the recognition that future resource flows are less 
valuable than current flows and the recognition that future energy produc-
tion is the primary motivation for performing the study. 
14.2 Identifying Scenario Differences 
The project team, through surveys of the literature, discussions with 
the project sponsor, brainstorming , assuming the roles of special interest 
groups, examination of economic and social theory, and the definitions of 
the scenarios themselves, identified the potential scenario differences 
listed in Table 14.4. This list was reduced by considering each potential 
difference in view of the following criteria: 
- the objectives of the analysis, 
- values of the decision maker, 
- conservative assumptions, 
- preliminary judgment of relative importance, 
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- data availability, 
- resource constraints, and 
- analytic tools. 
"Reduced air pollution" might be either a benefit or a cost, depending 
on how the fuel which is saved by the wind generated power is consumed by 
other uses. The fuel saved, to be a benefit, must be utilized in some way 
and not simply left unproductive (as, for example, coal being left in the 
ground). If the other use of the fuel produces more pollution than the use 
of the fuel in an electrical power generating plant, then the net result of 
more pollution is a cost. On the other hand, if the other use for the fuel 
results in a cleaner transformation of energy and less pollution, the net 
result of reduced pollution is a benefit. Because of the'ambiguity of this 
difference and what is judged to be its second order significance, this 
difference was not utilized in the cost-benefit analysis. 
"Tourist attraction" and "focus for national spirit" are parallel to 
the Dutch experience. However, values of these benefits of the wind system 
(alternative) scenario are judged to be relatively difficult to estimate 
and were assumed to be zero for this study. 
"R&D stimulus" is a potential benefit, but difficult to assess and 
measure. Its contribution to the analysis was judged to be inconsequential 
for the purposes of this analysis. 
"Reduced maintenance for conventional plants" might result from reduced 
operation of these plants due to operation of the wind generators. However, 
this potential benefit is judged to be small compared with the primary benefit 
of reduced fuel consumption.
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"Increased availability of fuels" is judged to be the most important 
benefit of the postulated system. The value of the fuel saved therefore 
is the most valuable difference in benefits between the two scenarios. 
Because the system is postulated to be a fuel saver (no energy storage), 
the concept of increased firm capacity of the power system by adding the 
wind units is not consistent with the defined scenario. The conventional 
power plants will continue to be built in both the status quo and the alter-
native scenario; consequently, the benefit "decreased investment required 
for building conventional system capacity" does not exist. 
"Visual and noise pollution" are intangible and consequently were not 
examined in the study. Similarly, "ecological damage," although potentially 
measurable, Is not well-defined, and evaluation of this potential cost was 
beyond the scope of this study. 
"R&D costs" may be considered either (A) as sunk costs, and thus inap-
propriate as cost elements in the analysis, or (B) as a portion of the 
investment costs assumed for the wind system. These costs were not examined 
explicitly in the study. 
The major cost difference between the two scenarios is the "initial 
investment" required in the alternative scenario for the installation of the 
wind units. A smaller, though recurring, cost difference is the additional 
"operating and maintenance" cost of the wind units. The chosen approach 
to examining the wind system cost was that of assuming a cost parameter, 
investment cost in dollars per unit capacity in kilowatts. Operational and 
maintenance cost was represented as an annual percentage of the total wind 
system investment cost. Thus the difference in costs between the two 
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scenarios was specified by two parameters: (1) investment cost per unit 
capacity and (2) an annual operational/maintenance percentage rate. 
In summary, the differences between the two scenarios .which were 
examined in the study include both a cost difference and a benefit difference 
in resource flows over time. The cost difference is the additional invest-
ment and operational/maintenance costs of the wind system. The benefit 
difference is the value of the fuel saved by the operation of the wind 
power units in the alternative scenario. The amount of electricity generated 
was assumed to be the same in both scenarios. 
14.3 NPV Calculations 
A computer program was used to perform the calculations described in 
Section 13. The model was utilized to perform calculations for baseline values 
of the model parameters, for sensitivity and parametric studies, and for 
regional comparisons. 
14.3.1 Choice of Baseline Values 
The baseline parameter values are shown in Table 14.5. The 
values for plant factor, total electrical energy generated in the region, 
the fraction of energy generated by the different processes, and the fuel 
costs are representative of the East North Central (Eastern Great Lakes) 
Region. The installation cost of $800/kW was chosen because this value is 
comparable to installation costs of nuclear and modern conventional plants. 
The other baseline value, $350/kW, was used because an early calculation 
(using relatively low fuel costs) showed this to be the breakeven cost for 
the Great Lakes area: costs above $350 resulted in negative net present 
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TABLE 14.5 
BASELINE VALUES OF MODEL PARAMETERS 
Basic Parameters	 Value 
Plant Factor	 .5 
Rated Power (each unit)
	
1 MW 
Number of Units	 500 
Installation Cost
	 $800 /kW 
$350 /kW 
Operational/Maintenance Rate	 1% 
Time Horizon	 40 Years 
Installation Rate	 100/yr for 5 yrs. 
Discount Rate	 5% 
Annual Rate of Fuel Cost Increase	 0% 
Energy Generation (East North Central Region, 1973 Data) 
Total Electrical Energy 	 3.45 x 10" kWh 
Fraction by: 
Hydroelectric .011 
Coal-Fired Steam .827 
Oil-Fired Steam .037 
Gas-Fired Steam .021 
Nuclear .084 
Oil-Fired Turbine .008 
Gas-Fired Turbine .008 
Oil-Fired Internal Combustion .002 
Gas-Fired Internal Combustion .002
Fuel Costs (East North Central Region,	 ($/NBtu) 
September 1974 Data) 
Coal	 .78 
Oil	 1.78 
Natural Gas	 .82 
Nuclear Fuel	 .22 
; 
1. Pessimistic Operation - fuels replaced proportionately 
2. Optimistic Operation - most expensive fuel replaced first 
214 
values of the difference between the conventional and alternative (wind 
system) scenarios. 
Wind system designs are projected to require unmanned sites and to be 
virtually maintenance-free; consequently, the choice of an annual cost of 
1% of the total wind system investment was judged to be adequate for periodic 
blade replacement and preventive maintenance on the units. 
FPC data (1973) were used to calculate the fraction of electrical 
energy generated by the different generation processes, and later monthly 
FEA data on fuel prices and heating values were used to calculate the fuel 
costs. 
14.3.2 Parametric/Sensitivity Calculations 
Calculations of NPV were made using different values for the 
plant factor, installation cost, operational and maintenance rate, time 
horizon, discount rate, and annual rate of fuel cost increase. Calculations 
were made by assuming, in turn, each of the two operating conditions. 
14.3.3 Regional Comparisons 
The model was used to compute the NPV of the scenario differences 
assuming that the same wind systems were installed in each of the nine FPC 
regions. Values of three types of parameters changed from region to region: (1) 
the plant factor (which depends on the wind speed distribution), (2) the energy 
generated and the fraction generated by each process, and (3) the fuel costs. 
In order to summarize the potential for utililzing aerogenerators for elec-
trical power production in the different regions, the breakeven value of A 




14.4.1 Parametric/Sensitivity Study 
Figure 14.2 illustrates the effect of changes in discount rate 
on the NPV of the differences between the scenarios. From these curves, it 
is clear that the lower value of the investment parameter A (dollars per 
installed kilowatt) yields a positive NW. Negative NW does not itself imply 
a loss, but rather the Present value with respect to a particular interest 
rate. The effect of increasing the discount rate is to reduce the NW; this 
occurs because the benefits of the wind system accrue in the future, and thus 
higher discount rates reduce the contribution of the future benefits to the 
NW. From this figure, it is evident that changes in time horizon (from 40 
to 50 years) do not affect the NW significantly. 
Figure 14.3 illustrates the effects of changes in investment cost, 
operating condition, and plant factor on NW. Note that the assumed opera-
tion condition not only affects NW, it also influences the sensitivity of 
the results to changes in plant factor. 
Figure 14.4 illustrates the effect of investment cost and operational/ 
maintenance factor on NW. As one might anticipate, because the contribution 
of maintenance cost to total costs is small, changes in the operational/main-
tenance factor do not yield substantial changes in NW. 
Figures 14.5, 14.6, and 14.7 illustrate the relationships of discount 
rate and fuel price rate of increase on NW. These three dimensional plots 
may be used to show the range of values of interest from different angles 
and perspectives. As is evident from the figures, very high NW's may 
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14.4.2 Regional Comparisons 
Figures 14.8 through 14.16 illustrate the calculations for 
each of the nine FPC regions of NPV as a function of investment cost per unit 
of installed capacity, with operational condition and two values of plant 
factor as parameters. The higher curves in these figures correspond to 
values of plant factor calculated at 200 feet for the 100 kW Pluinbrook 
operating characteristics. The lower curves correspond to calculations 
made by assuming one-half the plant factors calculated for the Pluinbrook 
unit, reflecting the higher cut-in and rated speeds anticipated for a 1 MW 
aerogenerator design. These curves determine, for the assumptions specified, 
ranges of parameters and conditions which may correspond to economic feasi-
bility for wind systems in this application. Note that for some regions, 
the difference between condition 1 and condition 2 is quite large, indicating 
a large difference between average fuel cost per unit of electricity and 
most expensive fuel cost per unit of electricity. 
Table 14.6 summarizes the NPV of the baseline system, using plant fac-
tors, fuel prices, and electrical power generation process fractions appro-
priate for each region. The values in this table illustrate that both high 
average winds (high plant factor) and high fuel prices contribute to high 
NPV's. For example, the Mountain region has reasonably high winds (P f = .5) 
but, because of inexpensive fuel, the NPV is negative for a wide range of 
investment values. 
Table 14.7 summarizes the regional comparison by listing the breakeven 
values of the investment parameter--i.e., the largest value of A for which 
the NPV will be positive or zero. These values may be considered as "design 
goals" for aerogenerator costs. The left-hand side of the table shows 
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TABLE 14.6 
NET PRESENT VALUE, BY REGION, OF NET DIFFERENCES IN SCENARIOS

(BASE VALUES OF PARAMETERS, 9/74 FUEL PRICES) 
NPV ($MILLION) 
REGION CONDITION 1 CONDITON 2 
New England 480 780 
Mid Atlantic 320 900 
South Atlantic 130 580 
East South Central 0 420 
West South Central 40 780 
West North Central 40 720 
East North Central 80 690 
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calculations made from the plant factors shown in the left-hand column. 
These values were taken from the contour map showing plant factors for 200 
foot units having the Pluinbrook 100 kW unit's operating characteristics. 
The right hand side values were calculated by assuming one-half these plant 
factors, reflecting the anticipated lower plant factors which would result 
from higher cut-in and rated speeds expected for a 1 MW wind unit. 
14.5 Conclusions 
This study examined the economics of using aerogenerators in a utility 
power grid in order to save fossil and nuclear fuel. The study used 
available data to establish cost goals for different technical and operating 
conditions and compared these goals for different regions. 
The results indicate that, under certain conditions, the potential 
exists for economically benefiting from wind power systems as fuel savers 
in a utility grid. Although many regions might benefit, the highest poten-
tial appears to exist for the New England states, which have both relatively 
high winds and relatively costly fuels used for electricity power generation. 
Several conditions assumed for the study may change in the future, and, 
consequently, the results and conclusions are subject to several caveats. 
If fuel prices continue to increase, the wind power system scenario will be-
come more attractive than this study indicates. Similarly, experience with 
a network of aerogenerators may indicate the feasibility of a new scenario, 
that of using a portion of the wind system capacity to reduce the firm 
capacity of the conventional system. If this Is feasible, the investment 
in conventional systems can be reduced. 
On the other hand, there is no assurance that wind systems can be built 
which (1) fall within the ranges of costs used in this study, and (2) perform 
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as assumed in the calculations. In particular, the 1 MW units postulated 
for this study were assumed to have the same cut-in and rated speeds as the 
100 kW NASA Plumbrook unit. Design trade-offs appear to indicate that it 
is less expensive to Increase these speeds for larger unit, lowering the 
plant factor but also lowering the investment per unit of energy output. 
In summary, the study results indicate that, even for systems which 
act only as fuel savers and do not contribute to firm system capacity, 
aerogenerators in a utility grid can be economically advantageous. 
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SECTION 15 
A MICRO ANALYSIS OF THE 
POTENTIAL OF WIND ENERGY SYSTEMS 
15.1 Introduction 
The objectives of this micro analysis are to (1) illustrate the princi-
ples of engineering economic analysis, (2) assess the potential of wind 
energy systems in private sectors, and (3) explore the behavioral or moti-
vating forces, that is profits, that would induce the entrepreneur to utilize 
a wind power system. Unlike the macro analysis which reflects a viewpoint 
from society as a whole, this micro analysis emphasizes costs and benefits 
to a firm. Although "cost" and "benefits" will be addressed, the micro 
analysis is not a cost-benefit analysis in the true meaning of the words, 
but rather it would be more properly called an engineering economic impact 
analysis. As will be seen, whereas in the macro analysis benefits were in 
terms of fuel saved, the micro analysis benefits are in terms of reduced 
costs to the firm and associated profit. The approach or methodology used 
in this analysis is based in general on that described in Section 7; that 
is, the problem will be defined, the analysis designed, the format of the 
results established, and the results calculated and presented to the decision 
maker. The problem definition is in terms of the status quo scenario and 
the project scenario with emphasis on the relevant differences between 
scenarios. Society in this analysis is considered simply to be the firm 
and consequently there will be no social impact analysis. 
As background for the motivation of this analysis, there has been a 
recent breakthrough in the chemical processing of stack dust and there are 
obvious potential benefits with the one of interest being the extraction of 
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magnesium. However, the energy requirement for the steps of the chemical 
process associated with producing magnesium is intensive and the windmill 
offers the potential of saving electricity. This particular process for ex-
tracting secondary metals from stack dust was selected as a target applica-
tion to evaluate the potential of wind power systems in the private sector. 
The project chosen for analysis is associated with a pilot plant located 
near Brunswick, Georgia and enters the unit of the plant that would pro-
duce magnesium metal by electrolysis of magnesium chloride. For this unit, 
electric power could be purchased from a public utility company or it could 
alternatively be produced by a windmill generating facility. 
The engineering economic analysis, which though not totally appropriate 
will be called a cost-benefit analysis, and will in essence be a capital invest-
ment analysis from the point of view of the plant owners. Their question is 
postulated as follows: Can a plant-owned windmill generating facility be 
constructed which will result in a return on Investment with reasonable 
earnings after taxes? The source of the earnings would be the production 
cost saved by producing instead of purchasing electric power. After adjust-
ments for taxes and maintenance the savings would become yearly positive 
cash flows. Although the project "yield" and the amount of money the 
plant owner can afford to invest in a windmill generating facility are of 
concern [1], the analysis will delineate elements of the plant owners' 
decision about constructing a generating facility and also attempt to 
determine the ranges of cost that would make the purchase of a windmill 
attractive to the plant owner.
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15.1.1 Electric Power Requirements for Magnesium Production 
In 1971 U.S. production of primary magnesium totalled 123,500 
tons, all of it from two manufacturers, Dow Chemical Co. at Freeport, Texas, 
and American Magnesium Co. at Snyder, Texas. N.L. Industries planned the 
start-up of a plant which would process 45,000 tons/year of magnesium out 
of brine from Utah's Great Salt Lake. Late in the year, American Magnesium 
Co. shut down its Snyder, Texas, production, but planned to resume by 1974. 
Dow slowed down the construction of its new 25,000 ton/year plant in Dalles-
port, Washington, at a cost of $3,000,000 in contract cancellation fees. 
Alcoa, at about the same time, announced plans for a new 20,000 tons/year, 
$50,000,000 plant at Addy, Washington. Alcoa's plant would employ 300 to 
400 persons with an annual payroll of about $3 million [2, 3]. 
Metal extraction processes are by nature energy intensive. The new 
Alcoa plant would employ a "silicothermic" process; but the bulk of magnesium 
is produced by electrolysis of molten magnesium salts. Older electrolysis 
methods required 10 kWh per pound of magnesium; but recent improvements have 
reduced energy consumption. 
For a requirement of only 6.5 kWh per pound [4] for the electrolytic 
production of primary ingots, the electric energy used in 1971 to produce 
magnesium would have been at least 1.6 x 10 kWh, and the average continuous 
power demand would have been 190 megawatts. That amount of electric energy for 
magnesium extraction would have been less than 0.1 percent of the total 
electric energy generated in the U.S., but at a rate of 2 cents/kWh, 
it would have cost $32 million. Equivalent fuels required would have been 
2.5 million barrels of oil ($28 million at $11/bbl), 740,000 tons of coal 
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($19 million at $25/ton) assuming conversion efficiencies of 33 percent. 
But it would have been equivalent to only one-half day's oil consumption 
by U.S. automobiles. 
These fragmentary statistics on U.S. magnesium production give perspec-
tive to the engineering economic analysis of wind generated electric power 
for the plant that has been proposed for location at Colonel's Island, 
near Brunswick, Georgia. 
15.1.2 Economics of Magnesium Production 
The electrolytic extraction of magnesium is costly. At 5 mills 
per kWh (1968 costs), electricity cost $1.46 per million BTU, compared with 
40 cents for natural gas and 20 cents for coal. But in 1973 an estimated 
200 x 10 kWh of electric energy (about 11% of the U.S. total) was used by 
steel, aluminum, magnesium, and other plants for "metal recovery and puri-
fication by electrowinning, electrorefining, and electric furnace smelting" 
[3.5,6]. The reasons for using electric energy instead of fossil fuel energy 
include the ability to fractionate metals directly and selectively from 
mixtures of metallic salts, and the ability to free a metal from even small 
quantities of impurities. At today's cost of 2 cents per kWh [7] the 
electrowinning industry pays in excess of $4 billion for electricity. 
Magnesium and aluminum are light metals with similar characteristics, 
but raw materials for magnesium are practically unlimited in the U.S., 
whereas almost all aluminum ore is now imported. Yet the U.S. consumption 
of aluminum is some 50 times greater than the consumption of magnesium. 
Part of the reason is in the comparative desirability of the chemical and 
physical features of aluminum; in addition, however, the costs of producing 
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aluminum have been some 20 percent lower than the costs of producing 
magnesium. Research in metallurgy and changes In market conditions (such 
as the recent increase in price of foreign bauxite) could reduce aluminum's 
advantages and increase the demand for magnesium. This is one of the 
market forces behind the proposal to build the Brunswick plant. 
A 1968 study by the Bureau of Nines examined the costs of producing 
magnesium by seven distinct final processes, and by several intermediate 
routes from feed materials such as dolomite, MCO 3 , sea water, and 
oyster shells [6]. In an electrolysis cell, magnesium Is extracted from 
a molten solution of chlorides of magnesium, sodium, calcium and potassium. 
Optimum concentration of magnesium in the mix is from 10 to 25 percent. 
The magnesium metal separates by floating in the melt; and as magnesium is 
removed, the other salts accumulate and must be removed by periodic cleaning. 
(A cell using a mix of pure anhydrous chlorides of magnesium and lithium 
would be somewhat more efficient in that the magnesium metal would sink and 
its recombination with evolving chlorine gas would be prevented.) 
The process step that involves extraction of anhydrous magnesium chloride 
(which is used to charge the electrolytic cell) from an aqeous solution 
requires very close control of temperature and drying conditions, to keep 
the dehydrated chloride from hydrolyzing to magnesium oxide, hydrochloric 
acid and water, thus undoing earlier process steps. Early Dow processes 
avoided this difficulty by charging the electrolytic cells with magnesium 
chloride dihydrate: MgCl 2
 l 1/2 H20, rather than anhydrous MgC12 ; but 
the Bureau of Mines study found production cost to be lower using the 
anhydrous magnesium chloride route rather than the Dow process, partly 
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because less electrical energy Is consumed in side reactions, and partly 
because the electrical resistivity of the anhydrous salt is high, so that 
resistive heating of the charge keeps the salt molten without requiring 
additional external heating. 
15.2 Scenario for Analysis (Problem Definition) 
A plant to process stack dust, recovering zinc oxide and "electronic" 
or pigment grade iron oxide, has been proposed for location at Colonel's 
Island, near Brunswick, Georgia. The process, which is diagrammed in 
Figure 15.1, offers an economically attractive method for handling the 
pollutants produced by a nearby plant [4,6]. 
The precipitation of the pigment grade iron oxide is accomplished by 
additions of hydrochloric acid and magnesium oxide, and an additional set 
of process steps would extract magnesium metal from the solution of magnesium 
chloride which remains when the ferric oxide precipitates. Distillation of 
the magnesium chloride solute is indicated in the diagram as a possible 
avenue to anhydrous magnesium chloride, which is used to charge the electro-
lyte cell. 
Cost in 1968 for the extraction of anhydrous magnesium chloride from 
a 35 percent solution was 5.1 cents per pound of magnesium metal, with 
3.1 cents per pound allotted to production costs and 2.0 cents for a 20 
percent return on investment. For the electrolytic extraction of magnesium 
metal from the anhydrous magnesium chloride, production cost in l968 was 
15.7 cents and the 20 percent return on investment was 8.3 cents per pound 
of metal. Parameters for the 1968 analysis were: 
(1) 24,000 tons of magnesium per year 
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(3) 350-day operating year 
(4) 20 year linear depreciation 
(5) 5 mills per kWh for electricity 
(6) $3.25 per hour, average labor cost 
At 5 mills per kWh and 6.5 kWh per pound, the 1968 cost for electriL 
energy was 3.25 cents per pound of magnesium metal. The cost for electrical 
energy, at today's estimated cost of 20 mills per kWh, would be 13 cents 
per pound. This rate for electric energy corresponds roughly to a fuel-plus-
overhead cost of $2.00/million BTU (thermal) for coal. It is this portion 
of production cost which, after making adjustments for taxes, would have 
to "buy" a windmill generating facility for the Brunswick plant owners. 
Since it is postuiaced that trie iirunswick plant would produce 20,000 tons 
per year of magnesium, the yearly increase in equivalent earnings (through 
reduced production costs) arising from a plant-installed generating facility 
would be a cash flow of $5.2 million, before taxes and before deducting 
maintenance and operating costs. 
Postulating 20,000 tons per year of magnesium production, and assuming 
that 6.5 kWh electric energy per pound of ingot is required, the annual 
demand for electric energy would be 2.6 x 108 kWh. If this energy is used 
in 350 working days, or 8400 hours, the windmill generating facility would 
have to generate 31 megawatts ot continuous power. 
The peak power required of the generating facility or total rated power 
would depend in part on the wind characteristics in the vicinity of the 
proposed site on Colonel's Island. Data taken at a nearby military instal-
lation indicate a plant factor of only 0.15 at a low altitude, but at a 
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higher altitude the plant factor should approach 0.3. It will be assumed 
that one-megawatt or larger units would be installed, on 200 to 300 feet 
towers or cable arrays, and that the wind plant factor would be 0.3. If 
it is desired that the plant-owned windmill generating facility be in-
dependent of commercial power, there would have to be means for storage 
of energy in order to maintain constant delivery of 31 megawatts of power. 
The efficiency of the storage and reconversion of energy would have to be as 
high as possible--certainly it would have to be higher than the 50 percent 
cited [9,10] for hydrogen electrolysis systems. A super flywheel driven 
by each windmill is an attractive high-efficiency, energy storage system. 
Or it might be possible for the public utility power grid to serve as an energy 
storage pool. Power produced during periods of strong wind could be more 
than the requirements for electrolysis; the excess energy could be fed into 
the power grid. Then, during periods of calm, the power required for 
electrolysis would be drawn from the grid. Net exchange of energy with the, 
grid would be zero over a year if the windmill system is sized properly. 
Using either the super flywheel or the power grid for energy storage could 
minimize the number of windmills required. 
15.3 Comparative Analyses (Analysis Design) 
15.3.1 Investment Alternatives 
If a windmill generating facility is included in the proposed 
magnesium plant, the yearly price of utility company electricity would 
constitute a saving of production cost. That saving, when reduced by 
operating expenses for the windmill facility and by net tax paid on the 
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increased earnings, would constitute a benefit to the plant owners. Factors 
which affect the benefit include the yearly electric energy used, the 
electric utility rate, the income tax rate, the investment tax credit, 
depreciation of the windmill facility, operations and maintenance expenses, 
method of financing, and the expected rate of return on the investment. 
The choice by the potential investor of an expected rate of return will re-
flect his estimate of the investment risk and will be influenced by available 
alternatives. A plant owner traditionally expects 15 to 20 percent rate of 
return. The alternatives facing the plant owner could be (1) whether to 
purchase or produce the electric energy for electrolysis of magnesium, 
(2) whether to make a cash investment in the windmill plant or invest the 
cash in bonds, and (3) how to finance the 'windmill plant. As was explained 
in Section 2, there are various criteria that can be used in making a decision. 
These criteria include net present value, cut off period, pay back period, 
net average rate of return, internal rate of return and benefit-cost ratio.. 
It is assumed that the structure of the decision is really to accept or re-
ject the use of a windmill so that the criterion to be used in making the 
decision is whether or not the net present value is greater than zero (see 
Figure 2). 
The net present value can be expressed simply for the status quo and 
its alternative; that is, 
(1) Purchase electricity (Status Quo): 





(15.2) (B-C) PR =	 wpl NPV [B-C	 - C I 
where
B = all benefits accruing to production of magnesium 
C  = cost of purchased electricity 
C = other costs associated with production of magnesium 
C wpl = costs of the windmill plant. 
It is assumed that the gross income (sales) will not be affected by 
the use of a wind power system and that costs, other than those associated 
with electricity for the energy intensive process, will be the same with or 
without the windmill. Thus, the advantage of producing rather than purchasing 
electricity is then the difference in cash flow between the alternative and 
the status quo, or
(15.3) (B-C)	 - (B-C)	 = NPV [C - C	 ] PR	 PU	 e	 wpl 
The analytical formulations for these two terms, C 
a	 wpl and C , will be 
developed in the following section. However, before proceeding, the various 
cash flow factors should be identified. As might be readily arrived at, the 
cash flow factors include yearly energy used, electric utility rate, income 
tax rate, investment tax credit, depreciation of the windmill facility, 
operations and maintenance costs, method of financing and expected rate of 
return on investment. Unlike the macro analysis, taxes, depreciation, invest-
ment credit and method of financing enter into the micro analysis. If 
society as a whole were being considered these factors would not be included 
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in the analysis and an analysis equivalent to that of the macro analysis 
would be performed. Let us now consider how these factors enter into the 
calculation of the two costs, C and C 
	
e	 wpl 
15.3.2 Net Present Value of Producing Electricity 
The savings of production cost, realized by producing instead 
of purchasing electricty, would be a positive, annual cash flow: 
C  = NPV [(2.6 x 10 8)R1 1	 (15.4) 
where
2.6 x 108
 = electricity required to produce 20,000 tons of 
magnesium, kWH/year 
R = cost for electricity, if it were purchased, $/kWH 
The windmill costs would be negative cash flows: 
C	 =NPV [NA +o+T]	 (15.5) 
wpl 
where
0 = operating costs for windmill-generators, $/year 
N = number of windmill generator units 
A = installed cost per windmill-generator, $/unit 
T = tax costs, on the savings realized by producing rather than 
purchasing electricity, $/year 
The number of one-megawatt windmill-generator units, if no energy storage 
Is required, is: 
N=2.6LO	 31 




2.6 x 10 = electric energy used per year, kWH 
8400 = plant operating year in hours (350 production days) 
Pf wind plant factor at chosen site. 
For general analysis purposes, it can be assumed initially that the 
electric generating facility is independent of the commercial power 
company and consequently a means for storing energy must be provided. Not 
only would this independence add the cost of storage equipment to the cost of 
windmill-generators, it would also require an increased number of windmill-
generator units. Although-the development of storage units for windmill 
usage-is-in its; early stages In'dnot much.. eøst-t&hn1egy tradeoff informa-
tion exists ithasbeeii pointed out that the efficiency of storing and 
reconverting energy by the hydrogen route would be 50 percent or less [9,10]. 
If energy is stored and reconverted the number of generators required would be 






e = conversion efficiency for storing and reconverting energy 
= unity if no reconversion is used. 
If e  is 50 percent, N' would be two times N. 
24.9
The net present value of producing windmill power can be written: 
NPVPR = NPV [2.6 x 108 R] - NPV
	 + 0 + Ti
	 (15.8) I P f e C	 -' 
The net present value of the cost of incremental taxes on the amount 
of money saved by producing instead of purchasing electricty would be: 




t = tax rate 
= zero only if the entire plant does not show a profit 
D = yearly depreciation of windmill/generator facility 
R = investment incentive rate 
The annual operating cost can be estimated as m percent of the wind-




The effect of depreciation is to defer taxes and over the lifetime 
of a project, the investment decision is somewhat insensitive to the 
depreciation method used (straight line or accelerated). The widely 
accepted method used in decision making is the conventional straight-line 
method which was considered suitable for this analysis. Use of the 
straight-line method results in the net present value of depreciation, 
NPV (D) = NPV	 (15.11) 
where
n = years to zero salvage value 
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A further tax savings, or tax shield, is possible if the purchase of 
the windmill plant is financed by bonds. For analysis bond interest paid 
can be considered production cost and subtracted ftazR G. The debt fi e 
nancing tax shield is treated in the next section. 
The cost of purchased electricity is rising. To take account of this, 
let
R = 0.02 + (s) (k) 	 (15.12) 
p 
where
0.02 = early 1975 industrial rate, $/kWH 
s = increase in rate per year, $/kWh/YR, 
k = year number, counting from 1975. 
The present forecast [8] is that the industrial rate will double in five or 
ten years. The base parameter value chosen for s (for the sensitivity 
analysis below) is $0.002/kWH/YR which reflects a doubling of the rate in 
10 years; i.e., a 10 percent per year growth rate. 
The expression for net present value of the benefit of the windmill 
plant can now be formulated as follows: 
NPV PR	 e	 wpl =NPV[C -c I 
=NPV 12.6xlO8R -'- 
_o_] 
IL.	 p	 P f e c 
= NPV [2.6 x 10  R -31A - p Pe	 Pe 
	
fc	 fc 
- (2.6 x 108 R ) (t) 3]A + (m)	 (t) 
	
p	 Pe fc 
	
31A ()+R	 31-Al 
n	 i Pe f c
	





Gathering terms which are computed over the same periods yields: 
P 
	
NPVPR = NPVH [(2.6 
10  
R	 3lniA') (l - t) 
f ec 
[(3,A 	 13111A1
+ NPV	 p e	 ;;) I + NPV1Pe





Here the subscripts denote 
H = horizon for return of investment 
n = years to depreciate to zero salvage value 
1 = one year for the investment credit 
F = years to finance the investment (F = 0 implies cash payment 
for the plant before the startup of the plant.) 
15.3.3 Financing the Investment 
The cost of the windmill plant. 
includes a potential tax shield. The windmill plant could be paid for in 
cash, as an expenditure by the plant owners made in anticipation that a 
specified rate of return, say 15 percent, would be satisfied over a 40 
year span, or it could be financed by the sale of bonds, or the owner/ 
managers could finance it through sale of stock. Even before making the 
decision about how to finance the windmill plant, however, the plant owner 
needs to examine alternative investments of available funds. 
If the plant owner invested in 10 percent bonds or other paper instead of 






the rate of return on plant investment to be 15 percent, would be: 
L = F [(1 . 15) 40 - (1.10)40] 31A Pe fc 
r3lA 
[P,ec][223]	 (15.16) 
It would be advantageous to invest in the windmills, if a rate of return 
higher than 10 percent can be realized. 
A second alternative to cash purchase of the windmill plant would be 
debt financing through the sale of bonds. The cost for the windmills can 





 = LP e f 	 fcJ
[(l+i)Y -11 (15.17) [(31A)(Rb) (l_t)]1l+iY+	
Pf 
where the factor on the right of each term is the appropriate net present 
value factor and 
R.b = interest paid on bonds 
y = years to maturity of bonds. 
The second term reflects the tax shield generated by the interest cost. 
When y is zero, the second term vanishes, and the expression reduces to 
the cash outlay term, 
The third alternative, financing through the sale of additional stock 
to 'outsiders is in reality a dilution of plant ownership. The choice between 
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the status quo and buying windmills by selling bonds might require the 
use of a higher discount rate (because of the higher risk inherent in the 
obligation to pay annual interest and to repay the bonds) than would be 
used to evaluate financing through sale of additional stock. Since the 
sale of stock simply changes the complement of plant ownership, nowever, 
it does not require a different determination of costs and benefits. It 
can be viewed simply as a method of raising funds for the cash purchase 
of plant. It will be shown that the cash purchase of windmills would not 
be cost beneficial, whereas debt financing would. The decision about the 
degree of debt financing of the total plant is outside the scope of this 
analysis. 
15.3.4 Benefit-Cost Model 
The net present value of the benefit-cost of producing elec-
tricity can be formulated for calculation in the form: 
	
NPV
inA'	 1	 - 1] =	 [(5.2 x 10 6 - 3l
	 H 





[( ,+,) n - 
 i(Pe) 
L f c	 J L"'+ 	 ] n<H 
(31R A
+ pe / fc
H 
+ (1-t) (2.6 x 108) (s) E 	 k
k k=l (l+l) 
____	
(1±j)Y - I 31) (Rb) (1_t)] j(1+i) y 
-	 (Pf 
/31A f c ) - 'P e	 [ 	
(15.19) 
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In summary, the six terms in the final expression of Equation 15.19 
in the order in which they are written, represent the following: 
1. The first term represents that part of the equivalent income 
(derived by producing, instead of buying, electricity) which would 
be realized if the 1974 millage rate held constant over the assumed 
horizon. The amount saved ($5.2 million) each year is reduced 
by the assumed operating expenses for the windmills, 
(31A  
and the net "income" is shown reduced by an amount that could 
be called "tax before tax credit." 
2. One reduction of taxes paid out each year is shown as the second 
term, which represents the tax credit for depreciation 9f the windmill 
property. 
3. The third term represents the investment incentive "bonus," which 
is currently allowed as a one-time-only tax credit. 
4. The fourth term represents the effect of the expected future increases 
in the cost of electricity if it were purchased. By producing the 
electricity, the windmills save the current purchase price each 
year, which is assumed to increase by "S" cents per kilowatt hour. 
In the kth year, the increase over the 1975 millage rate is thus 
(k) (S). 
5. The fifth term represents the effect of paying yearly interest on 
bonds, the sale of which is assumed to finance the windmills, all 
installed by the beginning of the first plant year. The tax shield 
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of the interest payments is included. Note that if the term y, 
which indicates the life of the bond issue, is zero, the fifth term 
correctly disappears because that condition would indicate cash 
outlay for the windmills. 
6. The sixth and last term represents the redemption of the bonds. 
If y is zero, it represents cash outlay for the windmills, 31A 
Pe f  
15.3.5 Sensitivity Analyses 
As was described in Section 7, there are three types of sensi-
tivity analyses that could be performed: subjective, partial and general. 
Which one to use strongly depends upon the resources available (money and 
time) as well as the type of questions to be answered. For this analysis a 
partial sensitivity analysis was performed that was consistent with the data 
available and the anticipated type of results that might be useful to a 
decision maker. 
Before performing the partial sensitivity analysis, it was necessary 
to establish baseline values for the various parameters that are associated 
with the project scenario. In establishing these baseline values, 
a subjective analysis was performed to determine what might be typical values 
for the parameters as well as the range of values over which to perform the 
sensitivity analyses. Selected baseline values for the sensitivity analyses 
are shown in Table 15.1. The partial sensitivity analysis was performed 
by investigating the sensitivity of net present value to changes in values 
for a selected parameter, with all other parameter values held equal to 
their baseline values as listed in the table. The results of the analysis 
are given in Figures 15.2 through 15.13. Most of the basic assumptions for 
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TABLE 15,1




P  0.3 
eC 0.9 





Wind Plant Factor 
Storage/Conversion Efficiency Factor 
Number of 1 MW Units 
Cost/Installed Unit 
Operations/Maintenance Cost Factor 
Time Horizon 
Discount Rate
Investment Tax Credit Rate	 R1	 0.07 
Tax Rate	 t	 0.5 
Electric Power Rate 	 R	 (0.02 + sk) 
Slope of Average Projected Rate Increase	 s	 0.002 
Depreciation Period	 n	 40 
Bond Maturity Period	 y	 10 
Rate of Interest on Bonds	 R 	 0.1 
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the sensitivity analysis are listed as base parameters In Table 15.1; 
other underlying assumptions are: 
1. The boundaries for the benefits and costs are of a business nature 
only. 
2. Debt financing of the windmill facility is possible, and will not 
unduly risk the total plant investment. 
3. A site can be found where the wind plant factor is 30 percent or 
higher. The site will accommodate on the order of 120 one-megawatt 
windmill-generators. 
4. High efficiency energy storage and reconversion are included. An 
arrangement to exchange energy with the public utility power grid 
would be one possibility. 
5. The plant owners are willing to accept a 15 to 20 percent rate of 
return on the investment they make in the generating facility. 
The selection of the baseline values are based on interaction with 
NASA/Lewis Research Center personnel, discussions with the Georgia Power 
Company, and input from the wind data analysis performed for the Brunswick, 
Georgia area. The plant factor of 0.3 is based on the point design of the 
100 kW, Plumbrook windmill and a windmill height of 61 meters. This is an 
optimistic value for the plant factor corresponding to the Brunswick, 
Georgia wind data statistics. However, it is believed that higher winds 
are available nearer the ocean where the windmills could possibly be located. 
No attempt was made to optimize site locations. The cost per installed unit 
of $500/kw is interpreted to include all start-up costs associated with the 
production of electricity, including possible storage costs. This baseline 
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cost is considered simply to be a value about which the range of unit 
costs is varied. The time horizon is taken to be 40 years which corresponds 
to typical life times associated with windmill towers. On each of the fi-
gures the baseline value for the parameter of interest is indicated. 
Figure 15.2 illustrates that there is a double penalty in an isolated 
generating system Independent of the utility company. The cost of required 
energy storage equipment increases the investment burden per windmill, and 
the number of windmills also increases as the energy conversion efficiency 
decreases. As mentioned previously there is little cost-performance data 
available in the area of energy storage but two attractive approaches to 
low-cost energy storage might be the super flywheel atid the exchange of 
electric energy with the public utility grid. The cost for a zero net 
exchange of power with the utility grid should be quite small. The base 
value assumed for e, 0.9, is equivalent to assuming a means of energy 
storage 80 percent more efficient than the hydrogen route suggested by 
Hieronymous. The cost for energy storage, whether by super flywheel, utility 
exchange, or other means, is assumed to be included in the 10 percent penal-
ty in the base parameter. 
As shown in Figure 15.3, the wind plant factor, P f , has the same in-
fluence on NPVPR as the conversion factor, e. To obtain a larger value 
for P  than the value of 0.3 reported for the vicinity of Brunswick, the 
windmills might be erected offshore. The continental shelf extends some 
75 miles to the east of Brunswick, the depth of water is only about 120 
feet. The wind factor offshore should approach 0.5. The decision about 
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tradeoff analysis of costs per windmill for seaflow and erection versus 
a larger number of windmills near Brunswick. 
Figure 15.4 shows the effect of windmill cost on the net present value 
of windmill generation. The cost per windmill should be as small as possible, 
consistent with reliability. A worthwhile target might be $500,000 for each 
one-megawatt unit, including windmill, generator, tower, energy storage 
equipment, power conditioning equipment, and per-windmill wiring that is in 
excess of what would be required if the electricity was purchased. As indi-
cated in the figure breakeven cost is $600/kW or the maximum windmill cost 
that would result in a positive net present value under the given assumptions. 
The maintenance and operating cost factor, becuase it is a small per-
centage of the cost of the installation, has only a weak influence on NPVPR, 
as shown in Figure 15.5. The time horizon that is chosen would perhaps be 
expected to have a strong influence on the NPVPR but because a relatively high 
discount rate (compared to the social discount rate) is used, NPV as suggested 
by Figure 15.6, is not very sensitive to the time horizon. 
The discount rate assumed for basis in the analysis is 15 percent. 
This value is lower than the 20 percent usually assumed for investment deci-
sion analysis. Figure 15.7 indicates the sensitivity of the NPVPR to the 
discount rate. 
Figure 15.8 shows the sensitivity of NPVPR to changes in the investment tax 
credit rate. The effects of an increase in the investment tax credit rate 
to 12 percent or more to encourage fuel saving can be seen from this figure. 
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Lowering the income tax rate to 40 percent has also been suggested as 
an incentive to save fuel. The values of NPVPR for tax rates from zero to 
50 percent have been plotted in Figure 15.9, The discount rate of 5 
percent Is near the basis generally accepted for cost-benefit analyses of 
public and government projects. The rate of 10 percent is near that per-
mitted to regulated public utility companies. The base value assumed for 
the Brunswick plant is on the low side of the value generally used to justify 
alternative business Investments. Note from the Figure 15,9 that reducing 
the tax rate from 50 percent to 40 percent would benefit the plant owner 
$5 million, but it would benefit a public utility company $9 million. 
Note also that if the windmill plant Is constructed by the government, 
which pays no taxes, the NPVPR is $170 million higher than the plant owner's 
NPVPR. This is a measure of the social value of windmill production 
facilities. 
The industiral electric power rate presently quoted by a Southeastern 
electric power company [8] is 2 cents per kWH. The projection of future 
rates anticipates that the rate will climb to 4 cents in 5 or 10 years. 
The base value assumed for this analysis is an increase of 10 percent of 
today's price per year. Thus the rate will be 4 cents in 1985, 6 cents in 
1995, 8 cents in 2005, and 10 cents in 2015. Figure 15.10 shows the in-
fluence of the electric power rate on NPVPR. If the average increase of 
the rate is 5 percent per year ($0.001/year) the NPV will be about $6.5
PR 
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Figure' 15.11 shows the benefit of accelerated depreciation, with a gain 
in NPVPR of $4 million by depreciating to zero salvage value in 20 years 
rather than 40 years. The amount of the gain depends on the size of the 
investment. 
Figures 15.12 and 15.13 show the power of debt financing. The left 
end of the curve in Figure 15.13 (zero years for financing) represents 
cash outlay by the owners for the plant. It is obvious that the lower the 
interest rate and the longer the maturity term, the greater the advantage 
to the plant owners. Figure 15.12 indicates that interest at 7 percent 
instead of 10 percent would be worth $4.5 million, net present value, for 
10-year bonds. Extension of the term of the 10 percent bonds to 15 years 
would likewise increase the net present value about $4.5 million. One must 
ask how an 'increase in the discount rate from the base value of 15 percent 
to 20 percent (to compensate for the increased 'risk of debt financing) would 
affect the net present value. Figure 15.7 indicates that the net present 
value would be decreased about $10 million. Tradeoffs and adjustments that 
should be made in the parameters are readily apparent in the sensitivity 
curves. 
15.4 Baseline Sensitivity Values 
To obtain an estimate of the relative importance of the various 
parameters and how sensitive the net present value is to changes in the 
parameter values, point calculations of sensitivity were made. Sensitivity 
at a point can be defined by the following equation: 
change in NPV	 L\NPV 
NI'V (,at Baseline)	 NPV S	 (15.20) 
change in parameter value =  
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The above definition of 8en8itivity simply gives the percentage change 
in net present value in response to a percentage change in the parameter 




The sensitivity was cTalculated using the above equation for the various 
parameters of Figure 15.2 to 15.11. The calculated results are given in 
Table 15.2. As can be seen from the table, Net Present Value is most 
sensitive to storage efficiency, installed cost, discount rate, wind plant 
factor and rate of fuel increase. For example, a 10 percent increase in 
plant factor will result in a 50 percent increase in net present value and 
a 10 percent decrease in installed cost will result in a 60 percent in-
crease in net present value. 
15.5 Conclusions 
Techniques of cost-benefit analysis, more appropriately called engi-
neering economic analysis for the micro analysis, permit detailed examination 
of the various parameters which bear upon investment decisions. It has been 
shown that for the stated assumptions a range of parameter values exist that 
result in a positive net present value of the project scenario over the 
status quo scenario and that there is a definite potential for the magnesium 
plant at Brunswick, Georgia, to produce electricity with windmill generators, 
instead of buying electricity. 
It is interesting to extend the results of this analysis from that of 
a single firm within the electrowinning industry to that of the industry 
and consider the total amount of fuel that might be saved. Now the potential 
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TABLE 15.2 
SENSITIVITY OF NET PRESENT VALUE

TO CASH FLOW FACTORS 
NPV 
Sensitivity = NPV AX 
x 
Wind Plant Factor 	 + 5 
Storage Efficiency	 + 7 
Installed Cost	 - 6 
Rate of Fuel Increase 	 + 2 
Operating Cost Factor	 - 0.8 
Time Horizon	 - 0.1 
Depreciation	 - 0.1 
Discount Rate	 - 6 
Bond Maturity	 + 0.8 
Bond Interest Rate	 - 2 
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of fuel saving by windmill generation of electric energy for the electro-
winning industry can be estimated as follows. The annual power coüsumption 
was estimated to be about 2 x 10  megawatt hours, or about 25,000 megawatts 
average. Assuming an industry wide average wind plant factor of 0.4 and 
a storage efficiency of 0.9 results in a rated power required of about 
70,000 megawatts. Plant investment in windmills at $500/kW would be $35 
billion; for a 20-year schedule of installation, the investment would 
average $1.75 billion a year. Equivalent fuel saved would be about 16 
million barrels of oil the first year, 32 million, the second, 48 million 
the third, etc. At $10 a barrel, the savings would be $160 million the 
first year. Assuming a ten percent per year rise in the price of oil, the 
second year saving would be $362 million, the third year $576 million, etc. 
From the viewpoint of the economy, reducing oil consumption is 
desirable; therefore, a discount rate of 5 percent seems reasonable when 
estimating the net present value to the economy of the oil saved. The net 
present value of oil saved by the 20-year schedule of installed windmill 
generators would be $38 billion. The net present value of the expenditure 
of $1.75 billion each year, for 20 years, is $22 billion so that the dif-
ference in net present values alone would be $16 billion. Other benefits 
would accrue from reducing the deleterious effect on our balance of trade 
caused by importing oil, reducing the drain on nonreplenishing fossil fuels, 
and reducing pollution from fossil fuels. 
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PART IV 




16.1 Cost-Benefit Methdology Study 
At the outset of this program, questions posed included the following: 
"Can a widely accepted methodology be established to evaluate the relative merits 
of alternative projects in todays complex economic-political-social environ-
ment?" and if so, "Can high. level decision makers be convinced of the utility 
of such a methodology?" To address these questions, a thorough review of lit-
erature dealing with cost-benefit methodolgies or analyses was made; journal 
articles, books, and other sources were reviewed and cost-benefit analysis 
concepts were assessed. The most pertinent concepts were identified and ex-
plained. This work resulted in a logically consistent, explicit, yet flexible 
methodology (summarized in Section 7) developed for the performance of cost-
benefit analyses for NASA type problems. The following are some specific 
conclusions that can be made based on the cost-benefit methodology study. 
(1) A cost-benefit analysis identifies and evaluates the benefits 
and costs associated with alternatives for achieving defined public 
goals. Techniques used in identifying and comparing costs and 
benefits are almost as numerous as existing analyses. 
(2) As applied welfare economics, cost-benefit analysis uses a decision 
criterion identified as "Potential Pareto Superiority" which labels 
a project as superior if those who gain from the project could com-
pensate those who lose so that none would be worse off with the 
project.
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(3) The criterion for use in decision making on the selection of 
alternative projects depends upon the problem structure, i.e., 
type of decision to be made, independency of project, and the 
type of capital constraint. Criteria include the net present 
value criterion and the benefit/cost ratio. It should be 
emphasized that performing a cost-benefit analysis does not and 
should not imply using a benefit/cost ratio as the criterion 
to rank projects. 
(4) The most important aspect of a cost-benefit analysis is the 
identification of all relevant costs and benefits. 
(5) The major stumbling block In identifying costs and benefits is 
the double-counting problem relative to the several ways and 
classification schemes that benefits and costs may be classified. 
(6) Classification schemes include internal and external effects, 
incoinmensurables, intangibles, and direct and indirect effects. 
Although it may be desirable to place a benefit in one category 
or another, the important thing is that benefits (costs) be 
additions (deletions) to the real product of an economy or to the 
real welfare of its members. 
(7) Quantification of costs and benefits is usually based on market 
prices of the goods under consideration as long as these prices 
indicate the value of the goods; however, because market prices 
do not always reflect social value, consideration must be given 
to utilizing a shadow price, that is, an adjusted price which 
does reflect social value. 
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(8) Shadow prices can be thought of either as dual variables arisiig 
from mathematical programming or as true economic valuations. 
Although these two meanings are identical, the situation at hand 
will dictate whether to use the programming approach or economic 
theory or both. 
(9) To compare one project to another or to determine the economic 
viability of a particular project, the t:tine stream of appropriate 
costs and benefits must be reduced to a single number and in such 
calculations the rate of discount is a crucial parameter. The 
"social rate of time preference" is the rate at which society as 
a whole is willing to give up present consumption for future con-
sumption. It is not reflected by an individual's rate of time 
preference and only the latter can be observed in economic data. 
It is important to realize that the use of a low discount rate 
(say 3 to 5 percent) values long term benefits much more than if 
a higher discount rate (of, say 10 percent) were used. 
(10) "Social Impact Analysis" is an alternative term used to describe 
cost-benefit analysis in the broad sense. A fruitful approach 
to social impact analysis is the iterative-interactive decision mode 
which combines objective data analysis by the analyst and subjective 
problem analysis by the decision maker. 
(11) Although the social opportunity cost of capital appears to be greater 
than the cost implied in a conventional cost-benefit analysis, the 
consensus among economists is to avoid on practical grounds the 
complex estimations associated with this concept even though its 
technical basis is flawless. 
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(12) An important step in a cost-benefit analysis is the performance 
of a sensitivity analysis which is also a means of presenting 
to the decision maker as much information as possible in a for-
mat useful to the decision maker. Ranges of estimates provide 
the decision maker with information on the identification of the 
most critical paramLrs as well as the accuracy with which the 
parameter values have to be known. Three levels of sensitivity 
analysis are subjective, selective, and general. 
(13) In performing a cost-benefit analysis, perhaps the most important 
ingredient, is the analyst's interaction with the decision maker 
who is the beginning and the end of the cost-benefit analysis 
cycle. 
16.2 Wind Data Collection and Assessment 
From the wind assessment of the present study several conclusions can be 
made with regard to aerogenerator plant factor (ratio of average output 
power to rated power): 
(1) Plant factors can be accurately computed from wind speed distri-
butions, taken to be Weibull distribution functions. The plant 
factor is a nonlinear function of the Weibull distribution parame-
ters (as shown in Figure B-2). Highest plant factors are obtained 
with high mean wind speeds and low variance of the wind speed. 
(2) Although plant factor increases with height, there is a level at 
which further increase in height would not be effective in increasing 
aerogenerator output (as shown by Figure 12.2). For aerogenerators 
with operating characteristics near those for NASA's Plum Brook 
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unit, it would not be necessary to go above a height of 60 m 
(200 ft) for maximum system performance. 
(3) As shown in Figures 12.6 through 12.10, on a seasonal and annual 
basis the average plant factor, at a height of 60 m (200 ft), is 
greater than 0.6 for a large section of the middle portion of the 
U.S. and certain parts of the New England coast. 
(4) Although aerogenerator output may be increased by designing improve-
ments in the rated power per unit area of the blades, actual out-
put power per unit area does not increase proportionally. As shown 
in Figure 13.12, the best gains would be achieved at high wind 
speed sites, but at best a doubling of output power per unit 
area is achieved by almost a quadrupling of rated power per unit 
area. In contrast, at low wind speed sites, very little increase 
in output power per unit area is realized by increasing rated power 
per unit area. 
16.3 Application of the Cost-Benefit Methodology 
Categories of windmill generator systems which might have significant 
positive potential were identified especially in view of possible large scale 
utilization. A list of system options was categorized in a matrix classi-
fication scheme using alternative technologies and alternative end uses of 
the system product as the two classification dimensions. Cost of large aero-
generator systems and components are not well established for current tech-
nologies, and it was judged that costs of previous designs could hot be 
meaningfully extrapolated to current dollars. Two types of wind power 
systems were selected for the application of the cost-benefit methodology; 
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the first system was a macro analysis of a wind system which is linked into 
an utility power grid having no storage capability. The second system was 
a micro analysis of a wind power system from the viewpoint of a firm that 
utilizes an energy intensive process. System I was considered to be used 
as a fuel saver and System II was considered to be an electricity saver 
resulting in reduced operating cost. A cost-benefit model was designed and 
implemented on the computer to establish a practical tool for studying the 
relative costs and benefits of wind power systems under a variety of condi-
tions to efficiently and effectively perform associated sensitivity 
analyses. Based on the wind data analysis results, the cost of fuels in 
the various regions throughout the United States, the efficiency of fuel 
conversion processes and on the baseline values for the status quo scenario 
and the alternative scenario (project), the conclusions that may be drawn 
about the System I and System II applications are described below. 
(1) The analyses of System I and II demonstrated the cost-benefit 
analysis and engineering economic analyses concept in social and 
private frameworks. 
(2) System I results were found to be sensitive to the operational 
strategy (the most expensive fuel replaced first or all fuels 
replaced proportionately), installation costs, plant factor, fuel 
price increases, and discount rates. 
(3) Based on both wind potential and fuel prices, wind systems appear 
to have greatest benefits in the New England and Mid Atlantic 
regions.
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(4) The study results indicate that even for systems which act only 
as fuel savers and do not contribute to a firm system capacity, 
aerogenerators in a utility grid can be economically advantageous. 
(5) For System It, a range of parameter values exist that results in 
a positive net present value of the project scenario over the 
status quo scenario and that there is potential for the use of 
windmill generators to produce electricity for energy intensive 
processes. 
(6) System II results are most sensitive to storage efficiency, wind 
plant factor, and installed cost. 
(7) The divergence between the social discount rate and the higher 
internal rate of return demanded by firms suggest that a socially 
optimal use of wind power can be achieved only by appropriate 
government inducements to firms to adopt this new technology. 
As a general conclusion, it might be stated that the cost-benefit metho-
dology that was described in Part II of this report can be utilized in 
performing a cost-benefit analysis of a variety of projects. Although the 
general methodology would apply, the specific models must be tailored to 
some extent for the particular problems being analyzed. A method has been 
demonstrated to determine and present results in a format suitable for a 
decision maker even when the cost of the project components are known with 
great uncertainty or not known at all. Thus the utility of the methodology 
should be widely accepted by decision makers providing that there is the 





17.1 Cost-Benefit Methodology 
The following recommendations are made with regard to use of the 
methodology described in Sections 1 through 8. 
(1) The results of any cost-benefit analysis should be used as a 
decision ata and there should be considerable interaction with the 
decision maker, especially in the problem definition phase, 
(2) Although the methodology or procedures are presented as a uni-
directional approach to cost-benefit analysis, iterations should be 
made as appropriate to reflect higher order effects. 
(3) All "social" effects, which are typically incotnmensurablës and in-
tangibles, should be considered and at least described in the anal-
ysis. 
(4) The iterative-interactive approach, described in Section 5.4, 
should be considered as a possible methodology for incorporating the 
social effects into a quantitative analysis. 
(5) During the early stages of a cost-benefit analysis, the analyst should 
convey to the decision maker for approval the format of the results 
and this format should allow the results to be presented in a clear 
and understandable manner. 
With regard to extending the cost-benefit methodology or "manual," the 
following recommendations are made. 
(6) An example application other than wind would enhance the utility of 
the methodology since not all concepts discussed in this program were 
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applicable to the wind generator cost-benefit analysis. 
(7) Additional investigations should be made so that a section on cost-
benefit analysis of research and development programs could be in-
cluded in the manual format. 
(8) An empirical study should be made of the discount rate relative to 
the appropriate one to be used in cost-benefit analyses. 
(9) A compendium of social impact assessment methodologies should be 
developed which would include an identification of the various 
methodologies and a description of data requirements and usefuliness 
of results. Each methodology would be assessed for validity and 
applicability to NASA problems. New approaches should be synthesized 
and described and relations between social impact assessment and 
cost-benefit analysis should be explored further. 
17.2 Wind Data Collection and Assessment 
The wind data collection and assessment performed in this study is 
adequate for evaluation of wind generators operated as fuel savers (rather 
than to augment generating capacity) and operated as single units (rather than 
in large interconnected arrays). For fuel saver operations the plant factor 
(fraction of rated output power actually realizable) is the only parameter 
which needs to be evaluated from the wind data. This can be done adequately 
from the data in Appendix D by the method discussion in Appendix B. Results 
are shown in Figures 126 through 12.10. However, for wind generator systems 
which are not utilized to augment electrical system capacity it is recommended 
that the following additional wind data analyses be made. 
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(1) Analysis of frequency distributions of return times (time required for 
output power to return above a certain level once it goes under that 
value) would be necessary in order to properly evaluate storage re-
quirements of systems when a certain generated power capacity is 
necessary. 
(2) Arrays of aerogenerators will also be able to add system capacity, 
if they cover sufficient area that even if one part of the array 
suffers cairns 3 other portions of the array will still be generating. 
Therefore, statistics of array output power as a function of spatial 
size of the array would be necessary for evaluating the potential of 
the method of generating capacity augmentation. 
(3) Both of these parameters (frequency of return times, and statistics 
of array output) cannot be evaluated with the single site wind speed 
frequency distributions used in this study. Instead, the hourly 
(or 3 hourly) wind values at sites (or arrays of sites) must be used. 
(4) This wind data collection and assessment has been limited to the con-
tiguous United States • It is recommended that :consideration be given 
to performing similar assessments of winds of non-contiguous U.S. 
regions. 
17.3 Cost-Benefit Analysis of Wind Generators 
The cost-benefit analysis of wind generators described herein was per-
formed following the methodology outlined in Sections 1 through 8 and is con-
sidered to be a first iteration. The results presented are preliminary in 
nature and a second iteration should be done to achieve a more complete cost-
benefit analysis. Additional investigations should include the following 
recommendations.
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(1) Sensitivity analyses were made for a set of baseline values and 
critical parameters were identified. Additional analyses should be 
made with emphasis on investigating the sensitivity of net present 
value to changes in the values of the critical parameters. For 
these analyses, baseline values should be used that reflect the most 
updated information available on wind generator systems. 
(2) As part of the second iteration, a social impact analysis should be 
made in view of the possible implementation of windmills in the most 
promising regions. 
(3) The analyses carried Out were for large windmill systems conceptually 
employed as a fuel saver and as an alternative source of electricity. 
The second iteration should also include other applications that in-
corporate smaller units associated with residences or industrial 
complexes. 
(4) Other aspects of assessing the potential of wind power systems should 
be considered although they may not be the prime responsibility of 
NASA. Such items include (a) government inducement of firms to adopt 
wind generator systems, (b) property rights to wind, (c) impact on 
zoning restrictions, and (d) land-use planning. 
(5) In addition to the above recommendations, it is suggested that a 
methodology be developed for determining the "optimal" energy source 
development for a region; sources would include wind and solar energy 






SOCIAL VALUES AND ELASTICITY CONSIDERATIONS 
As discussed previously, CBA reduces to a simple task in an "IDEAL" 
economy characterized by agreement with a large number of restrictive assump-
tions. These assumptions were listed in the previous section. Now let us 
examine specific circumstances which cause the actual economy to deviate from 
the ideal, and how economic theory can aid in determining correct social 
values. In CBA, knowing and accepting the limitations of one's tools is crucial. 
Thus, the prupose here.is also to frankly assess the merit of the suggested 
approaches. 
A.l Shadow Pricing Under Imperfect Competition and 
Production Hierarchies 
The question addressed in this section is: What can be said 
about the true social value (shadow price) of a good produced under imper-
fect competition and (possibly) used as an input to other production 
processes, when these other processes are also in the context of imperfect 
competition? 
The importance of this topic to CBA stems from the recognition that 
inputs to public projects are, alternatively, inputs to private production 
processes; and as such these inputs would otherwise add to the production of 
final consumer goods. Furthermore, when there is a production hierarchy, 
and it is not characterized by perfect competition all the way through, the 
market price of a good produced within the hierarchy is not indicative of 
its true social value. Likewise, the benefits of a project may be in the 
saving of some good (as in a wind energy project where fossil fuel is saved), 
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and if this good is part of an imperfectly competitive production hierarchy, 
its market value may not adequately reflect its social value. 
A.l.l The Analytic Framework* 
The objective here is to develop an operational approach 
to estimating the social value of a good produced and used in an imperfectly 
competitive production hierarchy. By "operational" is meant that the 'formula" 
developed should depend on only observational data. "Imperfectly competitive" 
means the firms selling the goods are not price-takers, i.e., they have 
some control over the market price of the good. This means that the demand 
curve faced by a representative firm slopes down to the right, it is not 
horizontal at the market price as in the case of a perfectly competitive firm. 
It should be noted that this situation--imperfect competition--undoubtedly 
characterizes the majority of U.S. markets. A "production hierarchy" is 
the set of industries and their input-output relation to one another, where 
no good is a direct or indirect input to its own production. To achieve 
reasonable generality, the hierarchy considered here is one wherein each 
good is an input to each "later" good. To make the analysis tractable, we 
initially limit our consideration to a four-tier hirarchy. This initial 
analysis is then readily generalized to a production hierarchy of an arbi-
trary number of tiers. 
The analytic framework is as follows. There are four goods in the 
model, X091 X1 , X2 , X3 . X0
 is a "primary" good (relative to the model) and 
X1 = F1(X) 
X2
 = F2 (X02 , X12) 
X3 = F3 (X03 , X13 , x23) 
* For the reader not knowledgeable in basic elasticity concepts, it is suggested 
that he read Section A.8 before continuing. 
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where F', F2 , F3 are production functions, X 1 is the total output of the ith 
good, and X1 is the amount of X used in X. X 3 is a final consumer good, 
so all of X3 produced goes toward final consumption. However, X031 X, and 
X2 are, in addition to inputs, also final consumer goods. Thus, part of 
the production of these goods is diverted to consumers, and the remainder 
is passed forward for use in production. The representative firms in each 
of these four industries are imperfect competitors in their product markets, 
but perfect competitors in their factor markets. For example, the repre-
sentative firm producing X2 faces a downward sloping demand curve for his 
output, thus he can 'iary the price he receives by varying his output. 
However, the representative X2 firm, in purchasing inputs X 0 and X1 , simply 
pays the established market price. He has no control over his factor prices. 
The concern will be the determination of the shadow price of X 0 . For 
concreteness, it is assumed that a proposed public project will use up 
(or release) a relatively small amount of X 0 , and its social value is 
required as an input to a CBA. 	 The project's use of X0 is one-time only, 
the supply of X0 is assumed perfectly inelastic. 
The social value of a decrease in the quantity of X0 available for 
non-project uses is the value of consumption foregone by society because of 
the decreased availability of X 0 , where the value of consumption is regarded 
as willingness-to-pay. Before proceeding, some additional notation must be 
introduced, and for convenience, that already introduced is reviewed. 
X	 the quantity of X used in the production of X.ij	 (by the assumption of a production hierarchy, 
1<j; and i = 0, 1, 2; j = 1, 2, 3 
* Attention is restricted to a "relatively small" quantity of X0 
to avoid the complicating issue of consumers' surplus. 
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the quantity of X. devoted to final consumption 
S.P.(X0 ) the shadow price of 
MPP..	 the marginal physical product of X.. 
MRP..	 the marginal revenue product of X.. 
13	 13 
MR	 the marginal revenue from X. 
P 1 	 the market price of X.
From the foregoing discussion, we have the definition
C 
S.P.(x0 ) =	 + p2 
aX	 +	 ax 
C + 0 3x0
	
(1) 
ax0 	 ax   
Equation (1) can be expanded to 
s.P.(x0 ) = p	




ax3	 + 2 ax 	 +	 ax l' + 0 ax   
Now consider the expressions of the form ax./ax, in particular consider 
9x3 /ax0 . From the hierarchial production relations, we have 
= F3 { X03 , F1 (X01), F2 [ X02 , F 1 (X01 )]}	 (3) 
Thus,
ax 	 ax  ax 03ax  ax 13ax  ax 01
-=	 ------+-- 
ax0	 ax 03 aX0 	 •x	 ax1 ax01 3x0
ax ax 23 ax DX 12ax1	 ax01 
+
ax 23 ax ax 12 ax 
	
ax 01 ax0 
ax ax 23 ax ax02 
+




ax 2- ax  ax 12 ax  ax 01ax ax
 02
ax0 - ax 12 ax  ax01 ax0 + ax 2 ax0 
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ax 	 ax  ax01 
ax  - ax 01ax 
	 (6) 
	





_j , R 1 for ax.
	 ax. ii	 1	 1 
and substituting (4), (5), and (6) into (2), we have 
s.P.(x0 )	 P3 R 3 [4pp	 R23 • MPP12
 R12 MPP01
 R 
+ MPP23 • R23 MPP02 R + NPP13 R. 3
 • MPP01
 R01 
+ MPP03 • R03 ] + P2 R2 [NPP12 •	 MPP01 R, 
+ MPP02 R02 ] + P1	 [MPP01 R0 ] + P0 • Rocic 
By definition, MRP.. = MPP 	 MR.; 13	 ij 
and assuming profit maximizing behavior by the firms, x.. will be such that 
P i = MRP J	 (9) 
Thus, from (8) and (9), 




Using (10) in (7), and rearranging terms, 
x = 3210	 R3cR23R12R01 + P 3 P 2 P 0 R3cR23R 
o	 MR3MR2MR1	 MR3MR2 
+ 
3P1 E' o R3R1R1 + 3)0 R3cRo3 
MR3MR1	 MR  
+ 2)1p0 R2CR12R01 + P 2 P 0 R2R2 
MR2MR1	 RR  
+ P 1 
P 
0 R1R1 + PoRoc 
MR  
The question arises, at this point, as to whether (11) is in any sense opera-
tional. That is, does (11) depend only on observational data? To answer 
the question in the affirmative, the MR's and R's must be related to obser-
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vational data. Recall R =
	 is the change in the amount of X. used in the 
j:f.j	 1. 
production of X as the total production of X. changes. In other words, R.. 
has to do with the demand for X. For concreteness, consider the demand for 
X2 . There are two groups of demanders of X 2 : consumers of X2 and producers 
of X3 . Write these demand functions as 
X2 = D2 (P) and X23 = D23 (P2 )	 (12) 
Assuming the market for X 2 is in short-run equilibrium, 




+	 = D' 
1: 2	 P2	 P2	 2C + 
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So, for example, 
DX 23
R23 = ax  = 
D'
2C 













Note that R23 + r2= 1 and in general, 
E R = 1 for each i. j i3 
Note further that the elasticity of demand for X.,. is 
p	 ax..	 P 
E	
ij	 i	 D. 4 ,so 




We find, from (13) and (15), that the R's depend on the (D')'s and the 
(D')'s depend on price, quantity, and the sector* elasticity of demand. 
These are all, in general, observational variables. 
Turning now to MR., note it is defined as 




+ 1	 = p (i +.	
-	 )	 p (i -	 )ax





Thus, MR depends on the elasticity of market demands 
Summing up the results of this subsection, a computational formula 
(11) was developed for finding the shadow price of a good in a production 
hierarchy, and the formula was shown to be operational. 
A.1.2 Generalization to a Production Hierarchy with Arbitrary 
Number of Tiers 
In what follows, consider X0 as the basic 
commodity whose shadow price is to be determined. The greater the number 
of tiers, the "more basic" X is. In a one-tier hierarchy (if such a term 
is applicable), X0 is the only good, it is not an input to 'less basic" 
goods, and is, itself, a strictly consumption good. In a two-tier hierarchy, 
X0 is an input to X1 , X1 is strictly for final consumption, but part of X 
may also be used for consumption. The following table is useful for 
representing input-output relations in a hierarchy. In any column, the 
One-Tier	 Two-Tier	 Three-Tier	 Four-Tier	 Five-Tier 
X 	 xlxO	 x2x1x0	 x3x2xlx0	 x4x3x2xlx0 







sequence of X's show how the production of the final good is affected by 
the basic good, X0 . For example, in column four, X 3 is affected by X2, 
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which is (directly) affected by X09 and so on. These relations follow from 
the specification of the hierarchial relations in the preceding subsection. 
Now note, in (11), that the sequence of subscripts on the P's in each term 
correspond to one of the subscript sequences in the first four columns of 
the table. There are eight terms in the RIIS of (11), and the subscript 
sequences correspond to the first four columns. Likewise, had (11) 
corresponded to a five-tier hierarchy, the RI-IS would contain sixteen terms, 
each corresponding to one of the sequencies in all five columns of the table. 
Thus, to construct the shadow price formula for a hierarchy of N tiers, an 
N column table, similar to the one presented, can be generated. The term 
corresponding to sequence 
X
	
x	 ...x	 x 
r  rN l	 r  0 
is
P	 P	 ...P	 P 




r  rK+l Or  
MR MR	 MR 
rM rM_l	 r  





It is obvious that the number of terms in the general forumula for an N-tier 
hierarchy is 2N1• In practice, of course, this number will be pared down 
when certain possible input sequences do not, in fact, occur. 
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A.1.3 The Rules of Shadow Pricing 
Using the analysis developed thus far it is possible to state 
the basic rules which apply to shadow pricing. The assumptions underlying 
the analysis, and hence underlying the derivative rules, are 
- the supply of the good whose shadow price is to be determined is 
perfectly inelastic 
- the decrease in the availability of the basic good, and the resulting 
decreases throughout the hierarchy, are "relatively small." Thus 
significant price changes do not occur, and there is no need to 
consider losses of consumer surplus 
there are no externalities associated with the goods in the hierarchy 
markets are in short-run equilibrium. 
Rule 1: If the production hierarchy is perfectly competitive (each industry 
is composed of price-taking firms), the shadow price of a good is its market 
price. 
To see this, recall that for a perfect competitor, price equals marginal 
revenue. Thus, (11) becomes 
SP(X0) = Po (R3cR23R12R01 + R3CR23RO2 + R3cR13R01
(16) 
+ R3cR03 -F R2cR12R01 + R2cR02 + RicRo1 + Roc) 
From (14), R 3 = 1, so the parenthesized portion of the RI-IS of (16) can be 
written as
R23 (R12 . R + R02 ) + R01 (R13 + R1) + R2c(Ri2Roi + R02) 
+ R03 + Roc
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Factoring further, 
(R12 R01 + R02 ) (R23 + R2c) + R01 (R13 + Ric) + R03 + Roc 
By (14), R23 + R 2 = 1, and so 
R12	 + R02 + R01 (R13 + Ric) + R03 + Roc, or 
R01 (R12 + R13 + Ric) + R02 + R03 + Roc 
Again, by (14), the parenthesized term equals, 1, leaving 
R 01 + R02 + R03 + Roc 
which, by (14), also equals 1. Thus, Rule 1 holds. Rule 2: The shadow price
* 
of a good is never less than its market price, under normal demand conditions. 
In Rule 1, when P = MR for each good in the hierarchy (except X0 ), S.P. 
(X0 ) = P0 . Under normal demand conditions, firms face downward sloping (to 
a greater or lesser extent) demand curves. In this case, price exceeds marginal 
revenue, so each term Pi /MR i will exceed one. Thus, the shadow price of X 0 will 
never be less than P 0 . This is easily verified from (11). 
Rule 3: The more imperfectly competitive the production hierarchy, the greater 
the excess of S.P. (X 0 ) over P0 
Since the usual measure of the degree of competition faced by a firm is 
the ratio of its price to its marginal cost, and since a profit maximizing 
firm equates marginal revenue with marginal cost, the Pi /MR i rations in (11) 
enables one to directly incorporate the degree of competition into shadow 
price analysis. Thus, it is clear from (11) that S.P. (X 0 ) rises as the 
degree of competition deteriorates. 
* By "normal" is meant downward-sloping-to-the-right demand curves. 
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Rule 4: Under normal demand conditions, the "more basic" a good, the more 
(percentage-wise) its shadow price deviates from its market price. 
Here, "more basic" refers to the number of tiers overlying the good 
in question. Thus, in terms of the foregoing analysis, X 0 is more basic 
than X1 . X1 is more basic than X2 , etc. 
Compare the shadow price of X with the shadow price of X0. 
S.P.(X0 ) was computed in (11) above. It is easy to see that 
S.P.(x1) 




_ 	 R 
+ MR	 12R2c + P . R l	 ; 
A formal proof of Rule 4 is tedious. It may be . demostrated by example. 
Suppose the price of each good is 2, marginal revenue from each good is 1, 
and each good is evenly divided among alternative uses, that is, 
R01 = R02 = R03 = Roc = 1/4, R12 = R13 = R 1= 1/3, R23 = R 2 = 1/2, and 
R 3 = 1. 
From (17),
S. P. (X / )2.2.21	 -.i+2	 • 1 -
	 11	 2	 3	 1	 3 
22	
+2	 L 
1	 32	 3 
- 8^8+4^4 
6	 6	 6	 6 
=4 
And, from (11),
_2'222	 1	 1	 1	 l2•2•2	 1	 1 1 
1 . 1 . 1	 234	 1.1	 2	 4 
2 • 22	 1.1	 1+22	 1 
+ 11	 234	 l 
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Thus, as predicted, S.P.(X0) exceeds the S.P.(X1). 
A.2	 Unemployment of Resources 
Economists refer to the factors of production--labor, capital,
and land--as the resources of the economy. The more restrictive notions of 
resources as minerals, oil deposits, or timber stands, etc. are subsumed 
in the classification "land." Whenever any of these factors are available 
but not being used to the fullest possible extent, there is resource 
unemployment. Capital means tools, machines, aria other manufactured means 
of production. 
In a perfectly functioning competitive market economy, unemployment of 
any resource is a strictly temporary phenomenon. For unemployment simply 
means that at trie current market price, the quantity supplied exceeds the 
quantity demanded. Market forces will then tend to lower the market price 
(which increases quantity demanded and/or decreases quantity supplidd) until 
a full employment market equilibrium is achieved. If it is the case that 
quantity supplied always exceeds quantity demanded, the price falls to zero. 
Such is the case for the good, air. 
It is clear that ours is not a perfectly functioning competitive market 
economy. Especially in the labor market, unemployment does not drive the 
price of the good (wages are the price labor) down * ; thus unemployment can 
* This is usually attributed to the presence of labor unions, which have 
a monopoly supply of labor. This is a key facet in Keynsian macro-
economics, where the theory asserts the likelihood of an unemployment 
equilibrium.
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be mdre than strictly temporary. When price does not respond to supply and 
demand, and consequently does not reflect social values (insofar as it is 
agreed that a perfect market does reflect social values), market price is not 
a useful measure for CBA. We now examine each factor category to see how 
unemployment affects CBA measurements. 
A.2.1 Labor 
Labor which would be otherwise unemployed should be valued 
at a zero social cost when employcd in a project. This is obviously in spite 
of the fact that the use of that labor has a dollar cost. To see why this 
rule is valid, let us illustrate Its derivation. Recall that a project 
moves society from one state to another. In the initial state, S°, there 
is one unemployed worker, a, who is receiving $50 per week unemployment 
compensation. For simplicity, suppose taxpayer B alone is taxed $50 to 
pay a. The new state, S', has a employed by the government, earning $150 
	
per week.	 's taxes are increased to cover this new government expenditure. 
Assume a's output has a social vlaue of $150 per week. The table summarizes 
the social accounting (weekly basis). The government's unemployment payments 
to a, and Vs tax payments to the government are transfer payments. Transfer 
payments do not reflect the production of goods or services. 
STATE	 COST	 BENEFITS 
	
S°	 $50 (Value of consumption	 $50 (Value of consumption 
foregone by )
	
enjoyed by a) 
	
S'	 $150 (Value of consumption 	 $150 (Value of consumption 
foregone by )
	
enjoyed by a) 
$150 (Value to society of 
of a's production) 
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Note, first, that Net Social Value in S° must be zero if S 0
 is to be 
the base of reference. 
The change from S 0 to S entails a change in Social Costs of $100 = $150-$50. 
The corresponding change in Social Benefits is $250 = $150 + $150 - $50. 
Therefore, the Net Social Value of the change from S° to S' equals the 
change in benefits less the change in costs, or 
Net Social Value (S° to S)
	 $150	 $250 - $100. 
Once such an exercise has been performed, its simpler equivalent may he 
employed. And that is the rule stated above. To reiterate, the rule states 
that a's employment costs society nothing if a would be otherwise unemployed. 
Of course, the social benefit is the value of a's production. The shorthand 
accounting procedure implied by the rule is presented in the table. Of course, 
Net Social Value of S 0
 to S' again equals $150. Ordinarily, the marginal 
social benefit resulting from a's employment would not be easily isolated. 
Rather, that benefit would be aggregated into some broader category. His 
employment cost, on the other hand, will be specifically recorded. For that 
reason, the rule is more concerned with the cost of employment rather than 
benefit. 
CHANCE OF STATES	 COSTS	 BENEFITS 
S 
0
to S	 0	 $150 (Value of new output) 
Properly interpreted, the rule means one must be very wary of counting 
jobs created as a benefit of a project, for this is correct only if the job 
holders would be otherwise unemployed. Two pitfalls must be avoided. 
First, a job created by a project will exist over a number of years. Costs 
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and benefits must be tallied for each year of the project. Even if the job 
goes to an unemployed individual in the first year of the project, this is 
no reason to suppose he would remain unemployed over the time span the job 
exists. Unemployment is cyclical. The proper approach, given current 
unemployment, would be to value the social . cost of employment at zero for 
the first year (maybe two years) and then at the wage rate thereafter. 
The second pitfall is for the analyst to suppose his is the truly 
marginal project. It is tempting to look at unemployment statistics and, 
noting that there is always some unemployment (even beyond transitory 
unemployment--people between jobs), conclude that this project will draw 
from that unemployed labor pool. The difficulty is that if this approach 
is taken in each project, the "margin" may well become ten million workers 
wide. Again, the proper approach is to value labor costs at the wage rate, 
except when the analyst is reasonably sure the jobs will be filled by the 
unemployed. Such certainty, given the current state of economic forecasting, 
cannot extend beyond one or two years for the general labor market. However, 
for certain classes of jobs, it may be possible to construct an employment 
probability distribution over future years. This approach, if warranted 
within the context of the analysis, could provide the decision maker with 
a better grade of information. 
A.2.2 Capital 
Capital which would be otherwise unemployed should be 
valued at zero social cost when employed in a project. The original or 
replacement costs, or the depreciated value are simply not relevant. Society 
incurs the cost of producing capital when it is produced--for the social cost 
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is the consumption opportunities currently precluded by devoting resources 
to capital construction instead of consumer goods. Only present and future 
costs are relevant to decisions, past (sunk) costs are not. For example, 
if rotors to capture wind energy could be placed on unmodified electric 
transmission towers, the social cost of using those towers for the project 
is zero. Their construction costs were incurred in the past--their social 
cost has already been paid. However, if the same project requires new 
towers, their construction is a social cost of the project. 
A.2.3 Land 
Land which would be otherwise unemployed should be valued 
at zero social cost when employed in a project. Land is a good which provides 
a time flow of service. The price of a tract of land is usefully considered 
to be an approximation to the Net Present Value of the flow of rental 
receipts. (This would be exactly true in a land market characterized by 
perfect knowledge of future land uses and demands). This point of view ex-
plains why idle land is valuable. The higher the price of a tract, the 
higher the anticipated rental receipts. Thus, the market price of a tract 
is a good measure of its social value because rental receipts are based on 
a tract's productive capacity. When a project will employ a tract, to the 
exclusion of other uses, for a significant length of time, the market price 
should be taken as the social cost of the land. For shorter periods, a ren-
tal value should be taken as social cost. If the analyst can be reasonably 
certain the land would remain idle for some years, zero social cost should 
be charged for those years.
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A.3 Non-Marginal Price Changes 
A.3.1 Consumer Surplus 
So far attention has been restricted to situations in which 
the production of goods has increased or decreased without a concomitant change 
in the price of the good. Then, social benefit or cost is measured by the 
price times the change in quantity. Since reasonable approximations are the 
best CBA can hope to achieve, even a small (marginal) price change need not 
alter this approach. For then it may not make much difference to the final 
result whether the change in quantity is multiplied by the new price or the 
old price. 
However, when there is a substantial (non-marginal) change in price, 
greater precision is demanded. It is achieved through the use of the con-
cept--consumer's surplus. In the Figure A.l, let AD represent a consumer's 
demand for Q, and let the price of Q be P°. The demand curve shows that if 
the price of Q were 50, the consumer would purchase one unit. In other words, 
the consumer's WTP for the first unit of Q is 50. However, since the price 
is P0 , he pays only P° for that unit. Thus, he receives a surplus from that 
first unit of 50-P°. Likewise, it could be argued that his surplus on the 
second unit is 48-P°, on the third unit is 46-P°, and so on. His surplus on 
the last unit he purchases, the fifteenth in the figure, is zero. How much 
is the consumer's total surplus from consuming fifteen units? Clearly a very 
good approximation to this figure is the area ABP°. ABP° is the surplus from 
the consumption of fifteen units of Q since his total WTP for those units is 
the area ABQ°0, his cost is P°BQ°0, and 
ABP° = ABQ°0 - P°BQ°0.
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Now suppose that a project has the effect of lowering the price of Q 
to P', resulting in an increase in consumption from Q° to Q . The net 
surplus to the consumer of this change in states (from S° characterized by 
0	 0	 1	 , 
P and Q to S characterized by P and Q') must be equal to the increase 
in WTP less the increase in expenditure. 
In S°, WTP = ABQ°O 
In S
	 = AcQ1O 
LWTP(S° to S 1 ) = ACQ°O = BCQ1QO, or 
&4TP = II + III 
In S°, expenditure = P°BQ°O = I + IV 
In S 1 , expenditure = P1CQ 1O = III + IV 
Net change of movement S 0 to S 1 = L,WTP plus 
expenditure = (II + III) + (I - III) 
= I + ii 
There area P0BCP1 = I + II is the value to the consumer of the drop in price for 
this particular commodity. It is called the consumer's surplus due to the price 
change.
A.3.2 Compensating Variation 
In the beginning of this section, it was agreed that WTP' deter-
mines the value of a good to an individual for CBA. Directly above, a certain area 
under a demand curve was equated with WTP. For all practical purposes, this equa-
tion is unassailable. However, from a strict theoretic point of view, it is not 
quite correct. The following discussion is not meant to modify the use of con-
sumer surplus as described above, it is intended only to elucidate a technical 













Q 	 Qt 
Figure A.l Illustration of consumers' surplus 
The proper way to interpret a demand curve, such as that illustrated 
in Figure A.2, is: when D is the demand curve for Q for a specified time 
Figure A.2 Interpreting a demand curve. 
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interval (i.e., per week, per month, per year), then if the price is constant 
at P ° for that interval, the consumer will purchase Q0 over that interval. 
If the price is constant at P' for that interval, the consumer will purchase 
Q' for that interval. If the price is constant at P''...and so forth. 
The demand curve does not mean: if the price is initially at P0 , the 
consumer will purchase Q°. If the price drops to P 1 during the time interval 
for which the demand curve is drawn (e.g. at the beginning of the second 
week for a monthly demand curve), the consumer will purchase an additional 
Q' - Q° , if it drops again to P" during the interval, he will purchase an 
additional Q' '
 - 
While this is strictly not a correct interpretation, a little reflection 
will indicate it is the one the consumer surplus approach is based on. 
To derive an exact measure of the value of a price drop to an individual, 
it is convenient to phrase the question this way: what is the maximum 
amount of money the consumer would be willing to pay to be able to buy (all 
he wants of) the good at the lower price rather than the higher price? 
The answer to the question is that amount of money which leaves him at 
the same level of utility at the lower price with less money to spend as at 
the higher price with more money to spend. That amount of money is called 
his compensating variation (of income). 
To determine a compensating variation, the analyst must either know 
the consumer's utility function (a practical impossibility) or be able to 
subject him to some elaborate experiment designed to reveal the compensating 
variation (very costly).
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Fortunately, there are two theorems which obviate the need to attempt 
a computation of compensating variation. Loosely stated, they are: 
Theorem 1: The smaller the price change in question, the closer is 
the consumer's surplus measurement to the compensating variation. 
Theorem 2: The smaller the proportion of income spent on the good in 
question, the closer is the consumer's surplus measurement to the compen-
sating variation. 
Actually, theorem 1 doesn't really help very much, since in practice 
attention is restricted to significant price changes. However, the second 
theorem is quite useful since, at least in advanced economies almost every good 
consumed, with the exception of housing, accounts for a small proportion of 
total expenditures. Thus, for practical purposes, consumer's surplus is a 
close enough measure of the value of a price change, the technical difficulty 
notwithstanding. 
A.4 Increasing Returns (to Scale) 
In an "ideal" perfectly couLpetitive economy, firms set their prices 
equal to their marginal costs. Thus market price isameasure of both WTP for 
the good and the SOC (or shadow price) of that good. When a firm's production 
is characterized by increasing returns to scale (alternatively, diminishing 
average cost), the firm will actually lose money--make negative profits--if 
it sets its price equal to its marginal cost of production. Naturally, the 
firm will not accept negative profits, and sets its price in excess of marginal 
cost, as does the non-perfectly competitive firm. Thus, the market price may 
differ from the shadow price. 
Increasing returns characterizes many public utilities, and this is the 
basis for the importance of this case. Public utilities are regulated by 
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0	 H	 C 
government agencies. Such regulation is designed, at least in theory, to 
protect the consuming public against indiscriminently high prices (excess 
profits) and insufficient quantities supplied. The formula which accomplishes 
both these goals is average cost pricing. This is Illustrated in Figure A.4. 
D, AC, MC represent the market demand, average cost, and marginal cost curves, 
Figure A.4	 Public utility pricing 
respectively. A policy of marginal cost pricing would imply a price of OC 
(at which MC crosses D). However, at a price of OC and production of OG 
(which equates the quantity supplied to the quantity demanded at price OC), 
the firm's total revenue (price times quantity) is CFGO. The firm's total 
cost (average cost times quantity) is BEGO. The firm's loss is therefore 






satisfies all demand (at that price) and covers all costs without economic 
profits. This is the type of outcome regulatory commissions seek to 
achieve. 
Relevant to CBA is that the social benefit of a marginal unit of output 
is equal to the WTP, or OA; while the social cost (assuming competition 
elsewhere in the economy) is HJ. 
A.5 Government Taxation and Subsidization 
These tools of government cause observed prices to deviate from 
the corresponding shadow prices. While taxes and subsidies ought to be 
left in the price when computing WTP for the marginal unit, they should be 
netted out in calculating the SOC, or shadow price, of producing the 
marginal unit. Figure A.5 shows the supply and demand for good Q in a 
perfectly competitive economy. Government levies a per unit tax on Q in 
the amount of t. The tax is collected from the manufacturers. This shifts 
P1 
Figure A.5 Shadow pricing with taxation. 
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the original supply curve, S 0 , upward by t to S'. The new equilibrium 
price and quantity are P' and Q' . Since, at the margin, consumers are 
willing to pay P' for Q, P' is the social benefit of increased output. 
However, C is the social cost of producing the additional units. This 
can be inferred from the supply curve because no economic profits are 
being made by the firms. All receipts are used to cover the tax and the 
costs of production. A government subsidy for Q may be analyzed analogously. 
A.6 External Effects 
External effects (or externalities or spillovers) are usually, 
although not necessarily, identified with some form of pollution. Such 
effects may be said to exist when the actions of one economic agent affect 
the welfare of another, and the former is neither compensated (in the case 
of a good spillover) nor charged a fee (in the case of a bad spillover) by 
the latter. Thus, a bad (or negative) externality either reduces utility 
or increases production costs, depending on whether it impinges on a con-
sumer or a firm. In either case, the externality has a SOC. Therefore, 
externalities must be valued and incorporated into CBA. Public projects 
can give rise to external effects in two ways--through inputs to the project 
and through the outputs of the project. 
A.6.1 External Effects from Inputs 
Suppose good Q is an input to a public project, the 
project will employ Q units of Q, and each unit of Q produced has an exter-
nal cost of e dollars. For concreteness, we can think of Q as electric 
power from a thermal plant, and Q's production involves sulphur emissions. 
Should the project be assessed a social cost of e Q? Not necessarily. How 
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much to assess the project depends on the supply conditions of Q. Put 
another way, it is necessary to determine how much more Q is actually pro-
duced because of the project. To illustrate, consider three supply 
situations: perfectly inelastic, perfectly elastic, and the "normal" case. 
a) With perfectly inelastic supply, the quantity supplied does not 
respond to price changes. For the relevant time period, it is 
rigidly fixed. Let D° be the original demand for Q, and D' the 
demand after the project's demand of Q has been incorporated. 
Figure A.6a shows that the only effect of the increased demand 
is to raise the price of Q. Therefore, the Q units of Q will be 
purchased by the project, but the higher price will decrease others' 
purchase of Q by Q. There Is no increase in external effects due 
to the project. No externality charge should be levied against the 
project in this case. 
b) When the supply is perfectly elastic, the increase in quantity 
supplied exactly matches the increased quantity demanded. This 
is the case where the project does subject society to increased 
externality costs of e Q. 
c) In the normal case--where S is neither vertical nor horizontal--
the increased demand causes both a price rise and increase in output. 
While the project again gets its Q units, some of these are given 
up by purchasers who do not wish to pay the higher price. The 
remainder constitute new production. Only the externality costs 
attributable to the new production should be charged against the 












Figure A.6	 Externalities and shadow pricing 
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A.6.2 External Effects from Outputs 
Any external effects arising from the output of a project 
are to be charged against the project. For example, in the evaluation of 
a proposed airport, the daily aircraft noise is a cost to individuals near-
by. This cost should be accounted for in the CBA. 
It is often easy to determine the existence of a cost due to an external 
effect, but it is usually quite difficult to determine the magnitude of that 
cost. This is because, by definition, the effects are uncompensated, or 
unpriced. There is no market determination of value to guide the analyst. 
The best approximations are necessarily quite crude. Note that the principle 
of value determination--WTP or SOC or shadow pricing--still applies. The 
problem lies in making the principle operative. With regard to the airport 
noise problem, for example, one could conceive of asking each individual 
how much he would be willing to pay to avoid the noise. While such a 
complete survey is often not feasible., that is not even the main problem. 
The main problem is getting individuals to reveal their true valuations. 
Each person who opposes the construction of the airport is motivated to 
exagerate the noise costs, each person who favors it is motivated to under-
state it. 
In CBA, the analyst can deal with externalities in a number of ways, 
none of which is completely satisfactory. 
a) Conduct a survey of WTP among the affected individuals and hope 
that true preferences are revealed, or that the exagerations 
cancel out the understatements. 
b) As an estimate of WTP, compute the costs of avoiding the externality, 
such as the costs of sound insulation for homes and autos, ear plugs 
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for being outdoors, etc. This is neither an upper bound nor a 
lower bound on the true cost. For example, avoidance costs may 
be $3000, but one person may value silence at $10,000 while another 
values it at $100. The fact that it would cost the airport 
administration only $3000 to give the first individual the silence 
he values at $10,000 does not diminish the fact that the lack of 
silence is a cost of $10,000 to that person. Thus, the avoidance 
cost has no special significance to a CBA beyond its intuitive 
appeal as a reasonable number to look at, and perhaps as an 
indicator of the order of magnitude of some individual valuations. 
c) Compute the critical value of the externality. All the social 
benefits and all other social costs can be computed to yie1da 
Net Social Value of the project before the inclusion of the value 
of the externality. Thus, if the value is already negative, or 
lower than some alternative project, the project is definitely not 
worth the undertaking, and an exact computation of the loss due 
to the externality need not be attempted. If the value turns out 
positive, then a critical value can be computed for the externality, 
and the judgement left to the decision maker as to whether the 
actual social cost of the externality exceeds the critical value. 
For example, in the airport noise problem, suppose the Net Social 
Value of the airport, exclusive of noise considerations, is $10 
million. The decision maker must then judge whether that figure 
outweighs, or is outweighed by, the social cost of the noise. 
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d) As a last resort, only a qualitative description of the impact of 
the externality can be presented to the decision maker. This 
effectively shifts the burden of analysis from the analyst to the 
decision maker. It is not recommended except when all quantitive 
methods fail. 
A.7 Public Goods 
Public goods are goods which are consumed jointly by individuals. 
Formally, a public good has the following characteristics: 
a) Consumption of such a good is non-rival in the sense that one 
person's consumption does not diminish the amount available 
to any other person. 
b) It is not feasible (and sometimes not even possible) to exclude 
any individual from consuming the good, once the, good is provided. 
Examples of public goods include national defense, mosquito control 
activities, light houses, and certain governmentally preserved "natural" 
areas. Many other goods exhibit "publicness" to lesser, but still signifi-
cant degrees. These goods include police and fire services, and July 4th 
fireworks displays. 
Since it is not feasible--in the sense of at reasonable cost--to exclude 
any person from consuming a public good, it follows no firm is likely to 
find it profitable to supply public goods to the market since it would have 
to rely on voluntary contributions for its revenues. Payments for private 
(non-public) goods are not voluntary insofar as one must pay to receive 
the good. Here, due to non-excludability, one receives the good whether 
or not he pays. Therefore, it is possible to simultaneously have a 
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demand for a good and no firm willing to supply it. In such situations, 
governments undertake to provide the goods and finance this provision 
through taxes. In general, there is no precise relation between the taxes 
one pays and the public goods one consumes. In addition, one tax payment 
to a government unit will go towards the payment for a variety of govern-
ment services. For example, a local property tax may finance local educa-
tion, police and fire services, street lighting, road maintenance, etc. 
The point of all this is that there is no meaningful per unit "price" to 
the individual for the consumption of public goods. This lack of price 
means a lack of an objective yardstick of value for public goods. There-
fore, when a public project affects the quantity of some public good, the 
cost-benefit analyst is faced with the difficult problem of determining 
the value of that good without any guidance from objective measures of 
value such as market prices. 
The modern economic theory of public goods was formulated by Paul 
Samuelson in a series of articles in the mid-1950's. The theory is 
interesting because it simultaneously provides a specific formula for deter-
mining the value of a public good to an individual and then explains why 
this formula can never be actually applied. (This, by the way, is not a 
shortcoming of the theory. It results from an appreciation of human 
avarice.) It is important that the analyst, charged with valuing public 
goods, be familiar with this theory, if only so he knows what his approxi-
mations should be approximations to. 
For expositional ease, the theory is developed in the context of an 
economy with one public good, and three consumers. Once the general 
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principles are discovered, extension to more realistic cases is straight-
forward. First, assume that one can meaningfully express the units of 
measurement for the public good, e.g. number of acres in a park, soldiers 
in an army, or mosquitos killed. In Figure A.7, let S represent the economy's 
supply curve for the public good, and assume the prices correspond to shadow 








Figure A.7	 Supply and demand for public goods. 
D is the market demand curve derived by adding the individual demands 
vertically. This is in contrast to the horizontal addition of demand 
curves for private goods. The optimal amount of the public good the govern- 
* 
ment should provide is Q , determined by the intersection of S and D. To 
* 
see this, consider the alternatives. If some amount less than Q were 
provided, say Q, the total WTP for one extra unit would be P, while the 
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cost to society (the three consumers) of providing that extra unit would 
be P°. Since P exceeds P°, total social welfare is increased by providing 
* 
that marginal unit. This argument applies to any value of Q less. than Q 
* 
That is. whenever the amount provided is less than Q , society's welfare 
can be increased by increasing Q . A similar argument shows that if more 
than Q* were provided, society could increase its welfare by decreasing 
that amount. Therefore, Q 
*
is the optimal amount of the public good since 
* 
any deviation from Q causes a drop in welfare. 
How should Q be financed? A reasonable criterion is that each indi-
vidual should pay in proportion to the benefits he receives, which are 
expressed by his WTP. Thus, from the individual demand curves, 
a 
when Q * units are provided, a, f, and ó are willing to pay P + P 
+ P 5 = P. The result is that the optimal amount of the public good can 
be determined, and it can be financed by assessing Individuals on the basis 
of the WTP reflected in their demand curves. 
With regard to CBA, it would appear there is 'a clearcut method for 
determining the value of a public good to an individual--simply refer to 
his demand curve for a measure of WTP. 
But that is the catch! In general, there is no way to get an individual 
to reveal his true WTP for a public good. For private goods, true WTP Is 
revealed by consumers' purchases of various quantities at various prices, 
i.e. through the market. But public goods are not traded in a market (due 
to their non-excludability property, discussed above), so WTP is not revealed 
by behavior. Why not simply approach the consumer and put the matter before 
him--"The government is considering providing a 50 acre park in this area, 
how much would you be willing to pay to get such a park? The park, inci-
dentally, will be financed by general tax revenues." 
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If he favors the idea, he would try to increase the chance of its being 
adopted. Since he knows he is not going to be assessed the amount he states, 
he will likely respond with an exaggerated figure. If he's against the idea, 
even though the park would yield him some benefits, he will likely understate 
his WTP. 
At this point, the reader might object that the consumer should be 
told that he will be assessed in proportion to the amount he claims. That should 
force him to be more truthful, particularly if he favors the project. Let 
us analyze how a consumer might respond in that situation, assuming he does 
favor the project. First of all, he definitely wouldn't exagerate the value 
he would get from the park. If he did, and the park were provided, he'd suffer 
a net loss. The remaining alternatives are to tell the truth or to under-
state true WTP. Recognizing these alternatives, the individual will assume 
that everyone else will also consider them when responding. It is convenient 
to use a "game" matrix to represent the individual's decision problem. 
He has two strategies--tell the truth or understate. He assumes "everyone 
else" has the same options. As the matrix indicates, there are four possible 
outcomes, or "payoffs" to the individual. Suppose that the value to the in-




Individual's	 Truth	 100	 80 
Strategies
Understate	 140	 100 
*
The values in the matrix are expected values, since total WTP may exceed 
actual cost, he may not be asked to contribute his entire stated WTP. 
Furthermore, the payoffs assume the park is built. If it is not built, 
there is neither loss nor gain.
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On the other hand, suppose he understates and everyone else tells the 
truth. Then he still gets a park, and in addition saves some money. 
This outcome is clearly superior to the former, say its valued at 140. 
If he tells the truth, and everyone else understates, his assessment will 
be closer to his stated WTP. Certainly, the value of this outcome must 
be less than when everyone, including himself, tells the truth. Suppose 
it's worth 80. Finally, suppose everyone, including himself, understates. 
Then the proportional assessments will tend to be the same as when every-
one tells the truth. Value it also at 100. 
Let us now determine the rational strategy for the individual. 
Clearly it is to understate. For no matter what everyone else does, 
understating always yields the higher payoff. If everyone perceives the 
situation as does this individual, everyone is motivated to understate 
his true WTP. Thus, a straightforward inquiry addressed to individuals 
does not hold much promise in eliciting true responses concerning the 
value of public goods for CBA.* 
To summarize, the theory of public goods outlined above suggests 
that assessing individuals on the basis of their WTP can lead to an optimal 
provision of public goods. Unfortunately, there is no foolproof method to 
get individuals to reveal their WTP. Their retorts, it is reasonably 
feared, may easily be biased by strategic considerations. 
What is the cost-benefit analyst to do? Once again, there is no 
completely satisfactory approach. However, approaches usually followed 
include 
a) Surveys, where the questions are asked in a manner disguising 
* It should be obvious that the specific numbers used in the game matrix 
are irrelevant, so long as they bear the proper directional inequality 
relation to one another. Behavior of the sort predicted by this game is 
called the "free rider" problem.
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their purpose. The problem still remains that responses to 
survey questions may not be based on careful consideration of 
one's own values. 
b) Analogy to private goods. Where the public good is related to 
some marketed good, the price of the latter may be a guide to the 
value of the former. 
c) Experiments. Individuals might be asked to participate in 
"realistic" games designed to reveal their true preferences. 
Such information is costly, and usually of questionable reliability. 
d) Public referenda which provide a number of output-cost levels to 
vote on, and where the means of financing the project can reasonably 
be claimed to be currently-unknown. Since no one knows how the 
costs will be shared, it is hoped the votes,do not reflect strategic 
behavior. While this method might be useful for determing the 
most preferred level of output, it does not ascertain whether the 
Net Social Value, even at that level, is positive. 
Note: In certain types of economic studies, it is frequenly assumed that 
the cost of providing a good is equal to the value of consuming the good. 
Such an assumption must never be made in CBA, for it clearly sidesteps the 
whole problem of determining whether or not benefits exceed costs. 
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A.8 Fundamental Elasticity Concepts 
Elasticity is best thought of as simply meaning !'responsiveness." 
Elasticity of demand is a measure of how responsive the quantity demanded 
is to price. Elasticity of supply is a measure of how responsive the quantity 
supplied is to price. In what follows, demand elasticity will be treated 
explicitly. Supply elasticity is entirely analogous. Elasticity of demand 
is defined as 
E = Percentage Change in Quantity 
D Percentage Change in Price 
The reliance on percentages frees the measure of elasticity from dependance 
on the units of measurement. Otherwise, elasticity could be manipulated 
by changing price measurements from dollars to cents or quantity measurements 
from pounds to tons, watts to kilowatts, etc. 
Elasticity of demand is a measurement taken along a demand curve. In 
general, elasticity will be different at different points on the curve. 
Thus, one must always speak of the elasticity of demand at a certain point on 
the curve, or in a certain small neighborhood on the curve. There are two 
approaches to measuring elasticity: arc elasticity and point elasticity. 
The former is useful when demand is not represented by a function, 
but rather by a table or a graph. Arc elasticity is computed between two 
points on a demand curve; while point elasticity, as the term suggests, is 
computed at a single point. 
The equation for arc elasticity is 
Q  - 
Q + g 
2 




where (P , Q ) is one price-quantity combination on the demand curve and 
I	 I 
(P , Q ) is the other. Two remarks need be made about the formula. First, 
the minus sign preceding the R}IS insures that ED turns out to be a non-
negative number. Since demand curves slope downward to the right, the 
direction of the change in quantity is always opposite to the direction of 
the change in price. Without the minus sign, then, the RES would always be 
negative. Simply for the convenience of having ED non-negative, the minus 
sign is included. Second, note that Q° + Q and P 0 + P are the averages 
2	 2 
of the quantities and prices, respectively. This alleviates the problem of 
having to choose one or the other as the "base" from which to compute the 
percentage change. In general, a different base will lead to different 
values for ED between the same two point. 
The following example illustrates the use of the arc elasticity formula. 
Suppose it is known that at the price of 10, quantity demanded is 25; 
and at the price of 15, quantity demanded is 20. Arbitrarily let 
I	 I 
(P°, Q°) = (10, 25) and (P, Q) = (15, 20). Then, 
25 - 20 
25+20	 5 
E -	 2	 -	 22.5_ 




Point elasticity is used when the demand relation is a function, 
such as would result from estimation via regression analysis. The formula 
for point elasticity is derived from the formula for arc elasticity by a 
limiting process, i.e., letting Q
° approach Q ' . The formula becomes 
D	 Q dP
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By way of example, suppose the demand relation is 
_ oip2 _ .ip+ioo 
and suppose we wish to find the elasticity of demand when P = 50. 
When P = 50, 
Q = - .01 (502) - .1 (50) + 100 
= - 25 - 5 + 100 
= 70 
Also
dQ = - .02P - .1 = - .02(50)
 
Hence
ED	 (- 1.1) = .79 
We say that demand is elastic (at some point or in some neighborhood) if 
ED > 1. 
Demand is inelastic if ED < 
Demand is unitary elastic if ED = 
The significance of the elasticity concept is its relation to the 
effect- on total expenditures as price changes. In particular, the 
following results hold: 
If demand is elastic, raising the price will lower total expenditures 
on that good. 
If demand is elastic, lowering the price will increase total expenditures 
on that good. 
If demand is inelastic, raising the price will increase total expendi-
tures on that good. 
If demand is inelastic, lowering the price will decrease total expendi-
tures on that good. 
If demand is unitary elastic, any change in price will leave total 
expenditure the same.
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The proof of these results is quite simple. Each addresses the change 
in expenditure as price changes or dE, where E is expenditure. 
dP 
Since total expenditure on a good is simply price per unit times number 
of units sold, 
E = P . Q 
dE - P dQ + Q 
dP	 dP 
=(! gq 
Q dP Q 
= (1 - ED) 
Since Q is always positive, 
> 
dE
= 0 as E = 1. dP	 D
> 
It is useful to relate elasticity to graphical representations of demand 
curves. Caution: while elasticity is related to the slope of a demand 
curve, the slope alone does not indicate elasticity values. The best example 
of this is a linear demand: its slope Is constant throughout, yet elasticity 
varies point to point. 
A vertical demand curve is perfectly inelastic (ED = 0): changes in 
price do not affect quantity demanded. 
P
Perfectly Inelastic Demand 





Perfectly Elastic Demand 
at each point. ci) C) 
•14 
Ii
Unitary Elastic Demand. 





A horizontal demand curve is perfectly elastic (ED = co): the good 
can only be sold at the given price. Any attempt to raise it causes 
sales to plunge to 0.
A demand curve shaped like a rectangular hyperbola (given by a demand 
equation like Q = K/P, where K is any positive constant) is unitary elastic 
everywhere (ED = 1)
I	 Q
Quantity 
Linear demand curves are elastic at high prices, inelastic at low prices, 
and unitary elastic at their midpoint. 
'NElastic Region 
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APPENDIX B 
A METHOD FOR EVALUATING OUTPUT WIND POWER 
CHARACTERISTICS FROM INPUT WIND STATISTICS 
The method discussed here is based on certain assumptions with regard to 
the wind frequency distribution and the wind generator operating characteris-
tics. These assumptions are: 1) The wind frequency distribution p(V), which 
gives the fraction of time over the year (or other time interval) during 
which the wind speed has a value V (within certain small limits dV), is a 
Weibull distribution (see Appendix C), characterized by two parameters, the 
scale parameter c and the shape parameter k. 2) The wind generator has a 
given value of cut-in speed V, rated speed V1, and feathering speed V2 and 
rated power P, which uniquely determine the output power as described by 
equation (B-i). given below. 
The variable (instantaneous)output power P(V) as a function of the 
instantaneous wind speed V is, from assumption 2, given by 
where the coefficients A, B, and C are determined by the two conditions 
P(v) = A + By + Dy2 = 0	 (B-2) 
P(V1 ) = A + By 1




and the assumption that 
P(V) = A + By + CV 02 = P	 (B-4) 
where the wind speed V is defined as V = (V + V1)/2 and the power value 
P . is taken to be 
C
P	 = P (V /V1 ) 3	 (B-5) 
c	 r	 c 
From the conditions (B-2) through (B-4), the values of A, B, and C are 
determined to be
B = [P (V 2 - V 2) - P (V 2 - V02 )J/D	 (B-6) 
r C	 0	 C 1 
C = [P (V - 1	 V ) - P (V - V )]/ D	
(B-7) 
c	 o	 r c	 o 
A = -BV -CV 2	 (B-8) 
0	 0 
where D is given by
D = (VV )(V 2 -V 2 ) - (V -V 0 ) ( V 1 2-V 0 2 )	 (B-9) 1	 0	 C	 0	 C  
Figure B.l shows the design turbine power curve for the NASA Plumbrook 
unit [ii which has the characteristics V = 3.6 m/s 
(8 mph), V1 = 8.0 m/s (18 mph), V2 = 26.8 m/s (60 mph), P r = 100 kW (generator 
output). The dashed curve in Figure B.l is the approximation to the actual 
curve, by equation (B-i). The approximate curve is seen to be identical with 
the actual curve above a speed V of about 12 mph. This form of output curve 
is obviously a simplified parameterization of an actual output curve from a 
real wind generator system, but should be accurate for the present design 
purposes.
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3Turbine Power for 





Cut-in	 Rated	 Wind Spend	
eatiering 





Operating characteristics (turbine power versus 
wind speed) for NASA's Plumbrook unit. Cut-in 
speed \" is 3.6 m/s (8 mph). Rated speed V1 is 
8.0 n/s0 (13 mph). Rated power (at the generator 
output) is 100 LW. 
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The annual average output power P can be evaluated by integrating P(V), 
from equation (B-l), weighted by the probability p(V) for observing the speed 





P(V) p(V) dV f	 (A + BV + CV2) p(V) dB	 (B-b) 
V2 
+ 1, p(V) dV 
1 
where, from assumption 1, above, the probability distribution p(V) is given by 
p(V)dV = (k/c)(V/c)'1 exp[_(V/c)kl dV
	 (B-li) 
Through a change of variables x = (V/c)k, .x = (V/c) 1 , x1 = (V1/c)k, and 
x2
 = (V2 /c) 1 , equation (B-b) becomes 
Xl	
-xx P = A p0 + Bc f x	 e dx + Cc 2 1 2/k x	 e -x dx+p 12
	
(B-12) I
X	 x 0	 0 
where p01 and p12 are the cummulative probabilities 




p12 =	 p(V)dV = e	 - e	 (B-14) 
1 
The integrals in (B-12) must be evaluated by series approximation 
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F =P/P 
p	 r (B-l6) 




	 dx= -x	 {n/k[(1 + n/k) 1/O! - x2 (2 + 
x0
+ x3 (3 + n/k)/2! - x4 (4 + n/k)1/3! +
	
(B-15) 
where n takes on the values 1 or 2 for the integrals appearing in (B-12). 
From the average output power P, evaluated by (B-12), various factors 
of interest can be easily evaluated. The plant factor F, the ratio of the 
average output power to the rated power is given by 
The energy pattern factor f is defined as the ratio of the average 
available power to the power available in the mean wind, or numerically, in 
terms of the plant factor F, the energy pattern factor is given by 
where V is the mean wind speed, either evaluated directly from the wind data, 
or estimated from the previously determined Weibull parameters by the relation 
CO	 00
1/k -x V = I Vp (V)dV = c I x	 e dx = (c/k) r(l/k)
	 (B-18) 
0	 0 
The available power P 





Thus P is the available power in the mean wind assuming the same system 
efficiency at V as it has at the rated speed V1 . The annual specific energy 
output in kW hours per rated kW, E, is given by 
E = 8766P/P =8766F
	 (B-20) 
r	 p 
and, of course, the actual annual energy output E, in kW hours would be 
E = 8766
	 (B-21) 
A computer program has been written which takes input values of cut-in 
wind speed (V), rated wind speed (V1), feathering wind speed (V 2 ), rated 
power (P), and for each input value of wind frequency scale parameter (c) and 
shape parameter (k) calculates, via the above equations, output values for 
the following: plant factor (F), arithmetic mean wind speed (V), available 
power in the mean wind (P), average available power (P), energy pattern 
factor (f), the annual specific energy output in kW hours per rated kW (E), 
and the annual energy output in kW hours (E). The program uses an efficient 
method for computing an accurate numerical approximation to the series 
expansion of the integral in equation (B-15). 
Figure B.2 shows a plot of plant factor values computed by this program 
for a wind generator having the operating characteristics of the NASA Plum-
brook unit (V = 8 mph, V1 = 18 mph). Qualitatively the results in Figure 
B.2 may be explained as follows: at high mean wind speeds (high c values) 
a small variance (high k value) is desirable to limit the wind speeds to 
only high values near the (high) mean (where the output will be at or near 
the rated output); at low mean wind speeds (low c values) a large variance 




Cut-in Speed V = 3.6 m/s (8 mph) 









Shape Factor k 
k
2	 4	 6	 8	 10	 12 
:ca1e .ctor,	 (rn/s 
Figure B.2	 Parametric variation of plant factor F (ratio of 
average output power to rated power) vrsus Weibull 
scale factor c and shape factor k. 
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APPENDIX C 
THE WIND DISTRIBUTION FUNCTIONS EXAMINED, AND

THE METHODS FOR EVALUATING THEIR PARAMETERS 
Empirically it is found that the probability distributions of the wind 
components u and v are approximately Gaussian. If the u component is Gaussian 
with mean u and standard deviation o u , and the v component is Gaussian with 
mean v and standard deviation
	 then the joint probability distribution for 
simultaneous occurrence of components u and v is given (in terms of 
normalized variables x = Cu -
	
and y = (v - v)/a) by 
p(u,v) du dv = (2ir)(1-p 2 )
-1/2	 2 
exp [-(x + y 2 
- 2pxy)/2(1-p 2 )] dx dy	 (C-l) 
where p is the correlatluLL .ueffic1ent for the u-v cross correlation. The 
probability distribution of wind speeds p(V)dV can, in principle, be evaluated 
by transforming from Cartesian to polar representation (p(u,v) du dv to 
p(V,O) V dV dO where 0 is the wind direction) and integrating out the 
angular dependence
2n 




A closed form integration of (C-2) using p(u,v) from (C-i) cannot be 
performed without resorting to special assumptions. If it is assumed that 
U = V = 0, p = 0, and a =v = a , then (C-2) can be evaluated using p(u,v) 
from (C-i), as follows
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p(V)dV = (2ir a 2 l 2n
	 2	 2 
)	 I exp[- (v /2o )IVdV dO 
0 
= (V/a 2 ) exp [- (V2 /2a 2 )] dV	 (C-3) 
which is the Rayleigh distribution. The Rayleigh distribution has only one 
adjustable parameter, a, which can be adjusted to find the best fit to an 
empirically observed set of observed frequencies of occurrence at wind speed 
From an analytical standpoint, the Rayleigh distribution is not expected 
to fit observed wind frequency distributions very well because of the severely 
limiting assumptions used in its derivation. Non zero values for u, V and p 
and inequality of a and a would add additional parameters (and considerable 
complexity) to (C-3). From a practical standpoint, the single adjustable 
parameter a in the Rayleigh distribution does not give enough adjustability 
to provide good fits to observed distributions. 
In an attempt to provide better comparison between the analytical and 
the observed distributions, but yet remain with fairly simple analytical 
expressions (e.g. two parameter distributions), two empirical wind speed 
distribution functions have been used: the Weibull, and the log-normal. The 
Weibull distribution 
p(V) dV = (k/c)(V/c)kl exp [_(V/c)kJ dV
	
(C-4) 
has found application in the study of wind loads on buildings [11 and the 
log-normal distribution
-1 PM dV = (2ir) -1/2
 s	 exp [-2,n(V/Vg)/2s 2 I dy/V	 (C-5) 
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has been used in air pollution studies, for example by Larsen and Church 
[21, primarily because of the observations that air pollution concentrations 
are distributed in a log normal fashion [3]. The Weibull parameters c and ,k 
are respectively known as the scale factor and the shape factor. The log 
normal parameters are Vg the geometric mean wind speed, and s, where a  = e  
is known as the geometric standard deviation. 
For empirical evaluation of these various distribution parameters, we 
have sets of data which consist of number of observations N. (i = 1 to n) 
of wind speeds in n different speed class intervals, each interval covering 
a speed range V 1 to V1 . The frequencies of occurrence f 1 of speeds in each 
Interval is evaluated by f. = N./N, where N = EN  (E implies summation 
from 1 to n). The cummulative frequencies F. are computed by summing the 
individual frequencies 
3 
F.E	 f.	 (C-6) 
i=l 
These cuinmulative frequencies can then be compared to the expected cuimnula-
tive probabilities P(V.) 
V. 
3 
P(V.) = I p(V) dV	 (C-7) 
3	 0 
for each of the distribution functions considered. 
Rayleigh 
For the Rayleigh distribution the cummulative probability is given by 
P(V.) =	 2	 2 I	 exp(-V /2a )VdV 
= 1 - exp (-V12 /2c 2 )	 (C-8) 
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Through a change of variables y. = 9,n (l-P(V)) x1 = V 1 2
 (C-8) becomes 
y = ax	 (c-9) 
where the constant a = - 1/202. The parameter a can then be evaluated by 
a least squares straight line fit to (C-9), i.e. by finding the value of 
a which minimizes 
E = E [in(1 - F1) - a V 2 ] 2	 (C-b) 
Weibull 
The Weibull cummulative distribution is given by 
V. 
1 
P(V1) = f (k/c)(V/c)k_l exp [_(V/c)k] dV 
0 
= 1 - exp [(V/C)k]	 (C-il) 




= a + b X 1
	
(C-12) 
where c and k are related to a and b by 
c = exp (- a/b) 
k = b	 (c-13) 
The c and k parameters can be evaluated by a least squares straight line 
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fit to (C-12), i.e. by finding the values of a and b which minimize 
= { in [- th (l - F1)] - a - b th V j2	 (C-14) 
Log-Normal 
The log-normal cuinmulative distribution is given by 
2.nV1	
'2	 1 2 P(V1 ) = I	 (27r)	 s 	 exp [fl(V/Vg)/25 I d(inV) 
0.5 + erf [th(Vi/VgVS ]	 ( c-15) 
where erf is the error function 
erf(Z4) = (2)/2	 e2' dZ
	 (c-16) 
0 
Through the change of variables y1 = erf 1 [P(V1)-0.5}, X1 = £nV, where 
erf 1
 is the mathematical inverse of (C-16), i.e. 
erf 1
 [erf(Z)] = Z	 (C-17) 
equation (C-15) becomes 
y1 = a + b
	
(C-18) 
when V and a are related to g	 g	 a and bby 
Vg
 = exp (-a/b) 
ag =
 exp (1/b) (c-19) 
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The Vg and 
°g 
parameters can be evaluated by a least squares straight line 
fit to (C-18), i.e. by finding the values of a and b which minimize 
C = [ erf(F. - 0.5) - a - b 
Comparison of the Distribution Functions 
As expected, when goodness-of-fit of these distribution functions 
to observed data was tested, both the log-normal and the Weibull distributions 
performed better than the Rayleigh distribution. Observed frequencies of low 
wind speeds (V < 2 m/s) did not fit the log-normal distribution well, but the 
Weibull distribution fit well over the entire speed range. This presented no 
real problem, however, since the distribution function need only fit the obser-
vations accurately between the cut-in speed V and the rated speed V 1 (see 
Appendix B, equation (B-12) through (B-14). In order to get the best possible 
agreement between the analytical distribution functions and the observed data, 
the distributions were fit only between the limits of 3.6 m/s (8 mph) and 11.2 
m/s (25 mph) because it was assumed that this range would include the cub-in 
and rated speeds of most generator units. Figure C.l shows examples of observed 
wind frequencies for Atlanta, Ga. The straight lines in Figure C-i represent 
Weibull distributions fit to all the data. The c and k values listed in Figure 







• 1967-71 6.1m (20 ft) 
0 1951-60 21.1m (72 ft) 
1.	 2	 5	 10 
Wind Speed \7, m/s 
Figure C.1 Average distribution of wind speed in Atlanta, Ga. 
from anemometers at 72 ft. (1951-1960) and at 20 ft. 
(1967-1971). The straight lines represent Weibull 
distributions. Weibull statistics were evaluated 
from best fit between 3.6 m/s (8 mph) and 11.2 
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BY SEASON AND ANNUAL AVERAGE 
Seasonal and annual Weibull distribution scale parameters (c, m/s) 
and shape parameters (k, dimensionless) for various sites in the U.S., 
arranged alphabetically by state and city. Codes are the three letter 
airport codes identifying the airport at which the data were taken. All 
data had constant anemometer heights (as listed) over the period of 
record. All data sets contained five or more years of wind data except 
the Kennedy SC (1967-1969) and WKY-TV (1966-1967) tower data. Table D.l 
shows c and k values for wind distributions measured at the indicated 
heights. Tables D.2 and D.3 show values of c, k and mean wind speed U 
at heights of 30.5m and 61m, respectively. All c and k values were deter-
mined by methods described in Appendix C. The average wind speeds U 
were evaluated from c and k by equation B-18. A contour map of u at 30.5m 
height is shown in Figure 12.6. 
Plant factors (ratio of average power output to rated power output) 
were evaluated for the c and k values and are shown in Tables D-4 and D-5. 
These plant factor values were evaluated by the method described in 
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REGIONAL POWER GENERATION DATA 
This appendix summarizes the data required for the model described in 
Section 13 and used in the analyses for Sections 14 and 15. The model and 
analyses required regional data describing 
- the amount of electric power generated by each type of conventional 
power generating system, 
- the efficiency of each type of generating system, and 
- the costs of fuels used in generating the electricity. 
Figure 14.1 illustrates the nine regions for which FPC data were available; 
consequently, these boundaries were assumed for the analyses of regional wind 
power potential. Table E.1 provides data for the total U.S. production of 
electric power by process, the quantities of fuels consumed, the process 
efficiencies, and the percentage of electrical energy produced by each type of 
fuel-system combination. Tables E.2 through E.10 display similar data for each 
of the nine FPC regions. 
The values in column 2 (fuel quantity) in each of Tables E.1 through E.10 
were determined from FPC 1973 data [1]. The numbers in column 3 were 
calculated using the quantities in column 2 and the mean heat values for the 
fuels in the different regions. The mean heating values of the different fuels 
in the individual regions, shown in Table E.11, were determined from FPC 1974 
data [2,3]. 
The "energy produced" (column 4) values were determined from FPC data 
and information [1,4]. Working papers [4] were necessary to establish the amount of 
nuclear-fueled electrical energy produced in 1973. Column 5 has two parts: 
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the numbers on the right are the percentages of electrical energy produced 
by the different processes in column 1 and the numbers on the left are the 
percentages produced by the different fuel-process combinations. The process 
percentages reflect the relative percentages of each value of "energy pro-
duced" in column 4. The percentages for the fuel-process combinations were 
calculated by assuming that the process efficiencies (column 6), determined 
by dividing the kilowatt-hours produced by the Btu's consumed and the 
appropriate energy conversion factor, remain the same regardless of the fuel 
used in the process. By making this assumption, the percentage of each 
process can be divided proportionally among the different fuels according 
to the quantities of energy consumed by fuel type (column 3). This assumption 
is judged to be reasonably valid and should yield results which are accurate 
to within a few percent, particularly for those steam plants in which different 
fuels can be utilized. However, some of the newer, more efficient steam 
plants burn coal, and larger errors (e.g., five percent) may occur in such 
cases. The error caused by this assumption is judged to be greatest in the 
South Atlantic region. The average steam plant efficiency in this region is 
34.7%; however, the Marshall plant in this region has an average efficiency of 
greater than 39% [5]. 
The last column in the tables, efficiency, was calculated for the different 
processes by dividing the values in column 4 by the values in column 3 and 
comparing this quotient with the energy equivalent factor (1 MBTU = 3412 kWh). 
Few data were on nuclear process factors were collected. Nuclear 
processes contribute only a small percentage to the total energy generated in 
any particular region; the fuel cost in nuclear-generated electric power is 
relatively low; and it may be assumed that nuclear plants would be the last 
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ones to be cut back as the wind system generates power. Consequently, 
precision and accuracy in the nuclear data were not required. On a national 
basis, it is estimated that efficiencies of nuclear power plants average 
about 33% [6]. 
Figures E.1 through E.10 illustrate the fossil fuel costs for the 
contiguous United States and for each of the nine FTC regions for the last 
half of 1973 and the first three quarters of 1974. These values were deter-
mined from FTC data on fuel costs for electric power generation (reference 
1 and 2). Nuclear fuel costs were assumed to be approximately $.22/MBtu 
for each of the regions. This value is approximately the recent purchase 
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Figure E.1	 Mean fuel costs as a function of time for the indicated 
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Figure E.2 Mean fuel costs as a function of time for the indicated 
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Figure E.3 Mean fuel costs as a function of time for the indicated 
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Figure E.4 Mean fuel costs as a function of time for the indicated 
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Figure E.5 Mean fuel costs as a function of time for the indicated 
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Figure E.6 Mean fuel costs as a function of time for the indicated 






























Figure E. 7 Mean fuel costs as a function of time for the indicated 
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Figure E.8 Mean fuel costs as a function of time for the indicated 





























Figure E.9 Mean fuel costs as a function of time for the indicated 
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Figure E.10 Mean fuel costs as a function of time for the indicated 
fuels in the Pacific region of the United States. 
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